Pratt v. Stout, 10584.
| Citation | 85 F.2d 172 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 10584.,10584. |
| Parties | PRATT, Regional Director, et al. v. STOUT et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
G. L. Patterson, Regional Atty., National Labor Relations Board, of Washington, D. C. , for appellants.
John G. Madden, of Kansas City, Mo. (Alfred Kuraner and Madden, Freeman & Madden, all of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GARDNER and SANBORN, Circuit Judges, and NORDBYE, District Judge.
This is a suit in equity for an injunction against the appellants, who are a Regional Director and the members of the National Labor Relations Board, restraining them from prosecuting a complaint issued by the board charging the appellees with unfair labor practices affecting commerce, and from enforcing the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., 29 U.S.C. A. § 151 et seq.) against the appellees.
In their complaint in this suit the appellees assert the unconstitutionality of the act, the threat of irreparable injury to them by virtue of the proceedings of the board, and the inadequacy of any remedy available to them at law. They applied to the court below for a temporary injunction. The appellants filed a return to the order requiring them to show cause why such an injunction should not issue, and moved to dismiss the appellees' complaint for want of equity. The application for the temporary injunction and appellants' motion to dismiss were heard together. The court entered a decree denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, and granted the application for the temporary injunction. See Stout et al. v. Pratt et al. (D.C.) 12 F.Supp. 864. Complete and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed.
The complaint alleged, and the court found, in substance, as follows: That the complainants (appellees) are residents of Tennessee and a copartnership engaged at Aurora, Mo., in the business of manufacturing flour and similar products under the name of the Majestic Flour Mill; that the defendants are as hereinbefore stated; that the case is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States; that it is a civil action; and that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000. That complainants, ever since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act on July 5, 1935, have been engaged exclusively in the intrastate business of milling and manufacturing flour and similar products at Aurora, Mo., and have at no time been engaged in commerce between the states; that at least 75 per cent. of the raw products used in the mill have been grown and purchased locally, and not more than 25 per cent. thereof have originated outside the state; that the movement of the raw products originating outside of Missouri terminated upon delivery at the mill; that the products manufactured at the mill were not destined for any particular points of delivery or any particular purchaser; that a substantial portion of such products, upon sale by complainants, reached points both within and without Missouri; that the employees of complainants are local employees who reside in Aurora and are there engaged exclusively in the manufacturing activities of complainants, and that none of such employees are engaged in the purchase of raw materials, the sale of the finished products or the transportation of products either raw or manufactured. That in June, 1935, a controversy arose between complainants and their employees as to wages and hours of labor; that a compromise was reached and the mill continued operations; that further demands were then made by the employees, including a demand that complainants enter into a contract with a labor union providing for a "closed shop," increased wages, a conditional right to discharge any employee, and operation of the mill under supervision of a "grievance committee" designated by the union. That complainants increased wages as demanded, declined to enter into a contract with the labor union, but endeavored to cooperate with the committee appointed by the union. That additional demands were made for a reduction of hours without reduction of pay, the right of the employees to select a foreman in charge of plant operations, and the right of employees to determine the number of men to be employed in the several operations involved in manufacturing. That because of the demands of the union and of complainants' employees and the increased cost of manufacturing resulting therefrom, complainants were forced to shut down their mill on August 20, 1935, retaining only sufficient employees to purchase wheat locally produced and to protect their property. That the Chamber of Commerce of Aurora intervened as a mediator, and, at its instance and request, complainants made an offer to pay increased wages for the same hours of labor as had previously prevailed; that this offer was recommended for acceptance by the mediator and was satisfactory to the employees; but that the employees insisted upon the execution of the contract heretofore mentioned with the union, which contract complainants refused to execute. That thereafter complainants reopened their mill, re-employed all former employees who applied, and, in so doing, bargained with such employees individually, and thereupon complainants resumed manufacturing operations at the mill. That on November 8, 1935, the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against complainants, charging them with unfair labor practices affecting commerce; alleging the purchase by complainants of raw materials in states other than Missouri, and the sale and transportation in interstate commerce of a large part of their manufactured product; the designation by their employees of a certain union as the representative of such employees for the purposes of collective bargaining; the request by the union on August 20 and 29, 1935, that the complainants bargain with said union as the exclusive representative of all employees; the refusal by complainants to bargain collectively; their bargaining individually with each employee; their refusal to recognize or deal with the union; the requesting and urging of their employees to terminate their membership in the union, and the inducing of some employees to joint a company union. That complainants were allowed five days to answer the complaint issued by the board, which was set for hearing at Springfield, Mo., on November 21, 1935. That defendants have heretofore caused an investigator to intrude into complainants' mill, asserting the right to examine complainants' books and records and to interview complainants' employees; that defendants threaten and intend to cause other investigators thus to intrude and to interfere with the discharge of complainants' business and their relations with their employees; that defendants threaten and intend, by subpœna, to compel upon the hearing the production of private books and records of complainant and to make public disclosure thereof, and to compel the attendance of complainants' representatives and employees as witnesses; that said acts of the defendants would disrupt and interfere with the business of complainants and their contractual relations with their employees; that defendants threaten and intend to order and direct complainants to restore a large number of employees to work and to pay said employees wages during the period that they have rendered no service therefor; that all of such acts, threatened and intended, constitute irreparable injury to complainants; that complainants cannot resist or defend against the charges except at great expense, and that to defend would require the production as witnesses of over one hundred persons and the payment of their witness fees and transportation from Aurora to Springfield, and the production of such witnesses at prohibitive expense before the Board at Washington, D. C.; that such expense, as well as that of retaining counsel, will be irrecoverable; that the necessary witnesses would include all of the employees of complainants at their mill, with the result that the hearing would, during its continuance, disrupt complainants' business; that if the complainants should seek to prevent the intrusion of the board's investigators or should resist, prevent, or interfere with the defendants or their representatives in the enforcement of the act, they would, by the terms of the act, be subjected to a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment for one year, or both, for each purported violation of the act; that, because of these penalties, the complainants cannot prevent the attendance of their representatives, who will, under threat of penalties, be compelled to disclose confidential information pertaining to the complainants' business, all to the complainants' irreparable injury. That the pendency of the complaint with the board and the continuance of said proceedings against complainants would result in the harassment of complainants, the disruption of all harmony in the relations between them and their employees, and the impairment or destruction of the good will of complainants' business; that, by reason of the pendency of the proceedings and the publicity attendant thereon, complainants would be held up to public scorn, hatred, and contempt as violators of the law of the United States, to their irreparable damage; and that such damage will accrue and will cause complainants irreparable loss even though no attempt is made by the defendants to cause or to procure the enforcement of any order or orders against complainants by judicial proceedings. That complainants, in addition to their milling business at Aurora, own three other...
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