Western Union Telegraph Co. v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N

• Decision Date: 27 August 1938
• Docket Number: No. 3014,3015.,3014
• Parties: WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA et al. YERKA et al. v. WILLIAMS, Chairman of Industrial Commission, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

24 F. Supp. 370

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA et al.

YERKA et al. v. WILLIAMS, Chairman of Industrial Commission, et al.

Nos. 3014, 3015.

District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

August 27, 1938.

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Henry H. Flor and Victor P. Reim, both of New Ulm, Minn., and William E. MacGregor, Guesmer, Carson & MacGregor, and Donald F. Pratt, all of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiffs Yerka and Manderfeld.

Coursolle, Preus & Maag, of Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff Western Union Telegraph Co.

William S. Ervin, Atty. Gen. of Minnesota, and John A. Pearson, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Minnesota, for defendants.

Sam J. Levy, of Minneapolis, Minn., for Martin Bros. Co., Northbilt Manufacturing Co., Robitshek-Schneider Co., Rosen and Barnes, United Garment Mfg. Co., Strutwear Knitting Co., Munsingwear, Inc., Minneapolis Knitting Works, Winget-Kickernick Co., Boulevard Frocks, Inc., D. B. Rosenblatt, Inc., Great Six Company, Liberty Garment Mfg. Co., and Liman Mfg. Co.

John A. Goldie, of Minneapolis, Minn., for Minnesota State Federation of Labor.

PER CURIAM.

The suits are in equity to enjoin the enforcement against the plaintiffs of an order of the Industrial Commission of Minnesota establishing minimum rates of wages for women and minors employed in industry in the State of Minnesota. The order complained of was made on April 25, 1938, effective July 11, 1938, and is known as "Minimum Wage Order No. 13." The plaintiffs in each of the suits, employers of women and minors in industry in the State of Minnesota, are directly affected by the challenged order. Martin Bros. Co. and others who with it seek to intervene in No. 3015 are also employers directly affected by the order. The Minnesota State Federation of Labor is an unincorporated association affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and is composed of 650 unions in Minnesota and has a membership of some 70,000 wage earners, including women and minors directly affected by the challenged order. It desires to intervene to protect its rights and the rights of all wage earners in the State affected by the order. The defendants, as appears in the titles of the cases, are the Industrial Commission of Minnesota, its members, and the Superintendent of its Division of Women and Children.

In No. 3015 the allegations of the complaint show that the suit arises under the Constitution of the United States, and that more than $3,000 is involved, exclusive of interest and costs. The same basis for Federal jurisdiction exists with reference to No. 3014, and in that suit diversity of citizenship is alleged. It is therefore apparent that this Court has jurisdiction.

Briefly stated, the main contentions of the plaintiffs, and of the other employers (of women and minors) who seek intervention, are:

1. That the procedure followed by the Industrial Commission in establishing minimum rates of wages for women and minors employed in industry violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

2. That the Minimum Wage Law of Minnesota (Chap. 547, Laws of Minnesota 1913, as amended; Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927, §§ 4210-4232; Chap. 79, Laws of Minnesota 1937; Mason's Minnesota Statutes, Suppl., § 4214) authorizes neither the procedure followed by the Commission nor the order made by it.

The plaintiff The Western Union Telegraph Company, in addition, contends that the order conflicts with an Act of Congress, namely the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.; and that, in so far as the order constitutes a regulation of the wages of its employees, it imposes an undue burden upon interstate commerce, in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

The defendants deny any lack of due process in the procedure followed by the Commission in establishing rates of wages, and contend that the procedure adopted by the Commission and the challenged order made by it were in conformity with State law and not in conflict with any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The questions of law upon which this Court must ultimately pass, after a trial of these causes upon their merits, are apparent. The Legislature of Minnesota, in dealing with minimum living wages for women and minors employed in industry, was dealing with a subject within its regulatory power. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330. The Legislature selected the Industrial Commission as its instrumentality to exercise the administrative judgment necessary in applying the legislative standards prescribed in the Minimum Wage Statute. The powers and limitations of the Commission were therein defined. Whether the Commission has applied the standards set up, whether it has acted within the authority conferred upon it by the Legislature or gone beyond that power, whether its proceedings satisfy the constitutional demands of due process, "whether, in short, there is compliance with the legal requirements which fix the province of the commission and govern its action, are appropriate questions for judicial decision", and constitute questions of law which this Court is required to decide. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276, 53 S.Ct. 627, 632, 633, 77 L.Ed. 1166. All questions arising under the Constitution of the United States and under the laws of the State are before this Court for decision. Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388, 391, 58 S.Ct. 334, 337, 82 L.Ed. 319.

Upon the applications for preliminary injunctions, we are not required to finally determine the issues of law tendered by the pleadings.

The granting or denial of a temporary injunction pending final hearing is within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed upon appeal unless contrary to some rule of equity or the result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion. Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43, 50, 43 S.Ct. 466, 469, 67 L.Ed. 853; Meccano, Ltd., v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141, 40 S.Ct. 463, 465, 64 L.Ed. 822; Love et al. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 185 F. 321; Security Metal Products Co. v. Kawneer Co., 8 Cir., 14 F. 2d 569; Special School Dist. v. Speer, 8 Cir., 75 F.2d 420; Pratt v. Stout, 8 Cir., 85 F.2d 172, 176.

If the questions presented by a suit for an injunction are grave and difficult and the injury to the moving party will be certain, substantial, and irreparable if the motion for a temporary injunction is denied and the final decision is favorable, while if the motion is granted and the decision is unfavorable the inconvenience and loss to the opposing party will be inconsiderable or he may be protected by a bond, the injunction usually should be granted. City of Newton v. Levis, 8 Cir., 79 F. 715, 718; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 124 F. 156, 160; Henry Gas Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 191 F. 132; Massie et al. v. Buck, 5 Cir., 128 F. 27, 31, 32; King Lumber Co. v. Benton, 5 Cir., 186 F. 458, 459; Love et al. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 185 F. 321, 331; Security Metal Products Co. v. Kawneer Co., 8 Cir., 14 F.2d 569, 575; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815, 49 S.Ct. 256, 73 L.Ed. 972; Pratt v. Stout, 8 Cir., 85 F.2d 172, 176, 177.

When the nature of the questions which arise upon a suit for an injunction makes them a proper subject for deliberate examination, and if a stay of proceedings will not result in too great injury to the defendants, it is proper to preserve the existing state of things until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully investigated and determined. Hadden v. Dooley, 2 Cir., 74 F. 429, 431; Blount v. Societe Anonyme du Filtre, etc., 6 Cir., 53 F. 98, 101; Pratt v. Stout, 8 Cir., 85 F.2d 172, 177. See, also, Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 673, 47 S.Ct. 222, 228, 71 L.Ed. 463.

Do these suits present questions which are grave and difficult, which require deliberate examination, and which could better be determined after a trial upon the merits?

The first, and perhaps the most important, question presented is whether the procedure followed by the Commission in arriving at its Order No. 13 was in accordance with the constitutional requirement of due process.

It appears that for many years prior to Order No. 13, the Minimum Wage Law of Minnesota, in so far as it applied to adult women employed in industry, was virtually in suspension; this because of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of April 9, 1923, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238, which held that the Minimum Wage Law of the District of Columbia was unconstitutional. When that Court overruled the Adkins Case, on March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330, the Minnesota Industrial Commission undertook to establish minimum rates of wages for both women and minors employed in all of the industries of the state of Minnesota. The procedure followed by the Commission was, in substance, this: In or about June, 1937, it appointed an Advisory Board, so called, consisting of eleven members, five of whom were suggested by the Minnesota Employers' Association and five by the Minnesota State Federation of Labor, the eleventh member being chosen by the other ten. This Advisory Board (which, it is now conceded, is not such an advisory board as the statute authorized, but did not require), apparently after must study and investigation but without holding public hearings, made its report and recommendation to the Commission. The Commission, after giving published notice, held a hearing on April 11, 1938, with respect to minimum...