Pratte v. Coffman

• Decision Date: 31 October 1862
• Citation: 33 Mo. 71
• Parties: MARY PRATTE et al., Appellants, v. RALPH COFFMAN et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

33 Mo. 71

MARY PRATTE et al., Appellants,

v.RALPH COFFMAN et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1862.

Appeal from Madison Circuit Court.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The following are the instructions given for plaintiffs:

1. If the jury believe from the evidence that the mind of Joseph Coffman, deceased, was so impaired by sickness, age, or any other cause, at the time of the execution of the instrument of writing produced, purporting to be his will, as to subject him to the dominion and control of the said defendant, John Coffman, and that the said John Coffman exercised such a power and control over the mind of the said Joseph Coffman in the disposition of his property by said instrument as to destroy his liberty and free agency and cause it to be made to suit the purposes of the said John Coffman and not his own, then they will find the issue for the plaintiffs.

2. Although imbecility of mind and undue influence are neither to be presumed in the absence of proof, yet each may be inferred and established by circumstances, such as the acts, words, conditions, relations and circumstances of the parties each to the other.

3. If the jury believe from the evidence that John Coffman procured the making of the instrument in question by Joseph Coffman by frequent importunities, which, on account of his weakness and infirmity of mind, he could not resist, and for the sake of peace yielded to his wishes and made it different from what he had intended and would have done but from that influence, then they must find that it is not the will of Joseph Coffman.

Defendants' instructions given:

1. If the jury believe that Joseph Coffman was, at the time he signed the writing produced and purporting to be his last will and testament, of sound mind, and that he signed the said writing and published the same as his last will and testament without being constrained thereto by John Coffman, then they must find that the writing produced is the will of said Joseph Coffman.

2. It was not unlawful for John Coffman, by honest intercession and persuasion, to procure the signing and publishing by Joseph Coffman of the writing produced as his last will, if the same was signed and published by the said Joseph Coffman when of sound mind freely and without being constrained thereto by said John Coffman.

3. Unless the jury believe that John Coffman exercised over the mind of Joseph Coffman, at the time the said Joseph Coffman signed the writing produced, such an influence as destroyed the free agency of said Joseph, they must find that the writing produced is the will of said Joseph Coffman, deceased, unless they also find that he was of unsound mind at the time of signing the same.

Court's own instructions:

1. If the jury find the writing mentioned in the plaintiffs' petition is the last will and testament of Joseph Coffman, deceased, the form of the verdict will be as follows: “We the jury find the writing mentioned in the plaintiffs' petition is the last will and testament of Joseph Coffman, deceased, in manner and form as defendants have alleged.”

2. If the jury find the writing is not the last will and testament of Joseph Coffman, deceased, the form of the verdict will be as follows: “We the jury find the writing mentioned in the plaintiffs' petition is not the last will and testament of Joseph Coffman, deceased, in manner and form as the defendants have alleged.”

J. W. Noell and Fox, for appellants.

B. A. Hill, Robbins, and A. Burwell, for respondents.

BAY, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiffs, who were heirs at law of Joseph Coffman, deceased, filed their petition in the Circuit Court of Ste. Genevieve county, at the May term, 1858, against Ralph Coffman et al., also heirs at law, to contest the validity of the last will and testament of said Joseph Coffman, deceased. The suit was brought under our statute of wills, and in the mode therein prescribed. The petitioners attack the will upon two grounds: First, that at the time of making said will said Coffman was not of sane and disposing mind; second, that said will was made and procured through an undue influence exercised upon the mind of the testator by John Coffman, his son and largest devisee under the will. John and Ralph Coffman filed separate answers, denying all the material allegations in the petition, and the infant defendants answer by their guardian ad litem, denying any knowledge of the matters and things contained in the petition.

By consent of parties, the venue was changed to the county of Madison, in the tenth judicial circuit. Upon the trial a verdict was rendered for the defendants, whereupon the plaintiffs filed their motion for a new trial, which being overruled, the cause is brought here by appeal.

During the progress of the trial, many exceptions were taken to the ruling of the court, but we shall only notice such as seem to be chiefly relied upon by the appellants for a reversal of the judgment.

The plaintiffs proposed to examine as a witness Hiram Blackledge, one of the defendants, and a son-in-law of the testator, who was objected to upon the ground of incompetency; and to lay a proper foundation for the objection, the other defendants read in evidence the will, and also the inventory and appraisement of the estate, to the introduction of which plaintiffs objected. The court admitted those papers in evidence, whereupon the plaintiffs offered to examine the witness on his voir dire touching his interest in the event of the suit; but the court refused, and the witness was held to be incompetent and therefore excluded, to which ruling of the court the plaintiffs duly excepted.

There is no force in the objection to the introduction of the will and inventory, for they had been previously read in evidence by the plaintiffs, and it was competent for the court to examine them for the purpose of ascertaining the extent and character of the interest of the witness.

Our code does not exclude a witness by reason of any interest he may have in the event of the action, but it does exclude him if he is a party to the action, or if the action is prosecuted or defended for his immediate benefit, subject, however, to this exception, that a party may compel any adverse party or person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, to testify at the trial or by deposition as a witness, in the same manner, and subject to the same rules, as witnesses.

But he must be an adverse party, not simply an opposing party upon the record. It is immaterial what position he occupies upon the record, his interest must be adverse to the party calling him. Any other construction of the statute would authorize a party to testify in his own behalf, and open the door to the worst species of fraud and imposition. Thus A., B. and C. may be jointly and equally interested in setting aside a will; but, by an understanding and agreement between them, A. will institute the proceeding and make B. and C. defendants for the purpose of making them witnesses, or introducing their declarations in evidence.

The statute neither admits or contemplates anything of the kind. The question, therefore, to be determined is whether the witness was interested adversely to the will. If so, then he was clearly incompetent to testify against those who were endeavoring to maintain it. To determine this question, no better evidence could be furnished than the will, together with the inventory and appraisement of the estate, for they would undoubtedly show whether any advantage would accrue to the witness by the defeat of the will. It may be proper here to remark that...