Pratte v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 05 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2009-0953.,2009-0953. |
| Citation | 929 N.E.2d 415,125 Ohio St.3d 473,2010 Ohio 1860 |
| Parties | PRATTE, Appellant,v.STEWART, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
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Syllabus of the Court
1. The 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to a civil action arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired before the effective date of that subsection.
2. Pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.
3. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse. ( Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.)
Kircher Law Office, L.L.C., and Konrad Kircher, Mason, for appellant.
Matan, Wright & Noble and Scott E. Wright, Columbus, for appellee.
Gamso, Helmick & Hoolahan and Catherine G. Hoolahan, Toledo, urging reversal for amici curiae, National Association to Prevent the Sexual Abuse of Children, Survivors' Network of Those Abused by Priests, and National Center for Victims of Crime.
{¶ 1} This appeal requires a determination of the appropriate statute of limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse in which the claimant alleges that memories of the abuse were repressed. Appellant, Amy Pratte, asserts that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C), which became effective on August 3, 2006, cannot be applied retroactively to her claim that she suffered childhood sexual abuse, because her memory of the abuse was repressed until after the limitations period expired. Pratte argues that pursuant to this court's decision in Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, the statute of limitations for a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse does not accrue until the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that she was sexually abused. Pratte therefore contends that repressed memory continues as a tolling mechanism after the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C).
{¶ 2} Conversely, appellee, Rodney Stewart, contends that R.C. 2305.111(C) unambiguously applies retroactively to Pratte's claim and that the statute does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. Stewart therefore maintains that Pratte's claim, which was filed beyond the 12-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.111(C), is time-barred.
{¶ 3} We hold that the 12-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.111(C) applies to all civil actions arising from childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of the enactment of that subsection, August 3, 2006, if no prior claim has been filed and if the former limitations period had not expired before the effective date of that subsection. We further hold that pursuant to R.C. 2305.111(C), a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority. R.C. 2305.111(C) does not contain a tolling provision for repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse. ( Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, paragraph one of the syllabus, abrogated by statute.)
{¶ 4} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
{¶ 5} On April 14, 2008, Pratte filed a lawsuit against Stewart alleging that he sexually assaulted her on three occasions when she was a child, the most recent occasion happening in the fall of 1984. Pratte was 33 years old at the time she filed the lawsuit. She alleged that she had repressed memories of the sexual abuse until April 20, 2007, when a news event triggered the recovery of the memories.
{¶ 6} Stewart moved to dismiss Pratte's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. More specifically, Stewart argued that Pratte's complaint was time-barred by R.C. 2305.111(C), which requires that a claim of childhood sexual abuse be brought within 12 years after the cause of action accrues. Stewart relied upon the statute's specification that a cause of action for childhood sexual abuse accrues when the alleged victim attains the age of majority. Because Pratte reached the age of majority on July 13, 1992, Stewart argued that her claim must have been filed by July 13, 2004, and was untimely because it was not filed until April 14, 2008.
{¶ 7} Pratte countered that this court's holding in Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870-that the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations while a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse-remains viable despite the enactment of R.C. 2305.111(C). Because her memories of the alleged abuse were repressed until April 20, 2007, Pratte maintained that her claims were timely filed within one year of her recovery of the memories.
{¶ 8} The trial court granted Stewart's motion to dismiss, finding that the legislative intent in granting a minor 12 years after reaching majority in which to bring an action for childhood sexual abuse was to permit the minor a period of time to recall repressed memories. The trial court therefore rejected Pratte's arguments and held that her claim was filed beyond the time permitted by R.C. 2305.111(C).
{¶ 9} On Pratte's appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Second District found that “the legislature by enacting R.C. 2305.10(G) states that the twelve-year limitation period applies regardless of the previous rule of law established in Ault.” 2009-Ohio-1768, 2009 WL 1002039, at ¶ 17. The court of appeals further concluded that the legislature intended to apply R.C. 2305.111(C) retroactively. Id.
{¶ 10} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary appeal. 122 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2009-Ohio-4233, 912 N.E.2d 107. Pratte asserts four propositions of law for our consideration:
{¶ 11} (1) “R.C. 2305.111(C) does not apply retroactively to deprive a repressed memory childhood sexual abuse victim of her cause of action.”
{¶ 12} (2) “Repressed memory as a tolling mechanism of the civil statute of limitations remains viable after the effective date of R.C. 2305.111(C).”
{¶ 13} (3) “The statute of limitations period for sexual abuse in Ohio begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was sexually abused, or when through the exercise of ordinary diligence, the victim should have discovered the abuse.”
{¶ 14} (4) “The statute of limitations is tolled where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time.”
{¶ 15} A discussion of the history of the limitations period applicable to claims of childhood sexual abuse is useful to our resolution of Pratte's appeal.
{¶ 16} Prior to the enactment of the statute at issue, the General Assembly had not enacted a limitations period specifically for claims of childhood sexual abuse. In Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402, this court was asked to determine what statute of limitations applied to such actions. We concluded that a cause of action premised upon acts of sexual abuse was subject to the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery in former R.C. 2305.111. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 17} Having determined the relevant limitations period, we went on to address when a claim for childhood sexual abuse accrues. The defendants in Doe argued that such a claim accrued on the victim's 18th birthday, while the plaintiff sought application of the discovery rule. This court found that the facts of the case before it did not require us to consider whether to apply the discovery rule to toll the limitations period in cases involving childhood sexual abuse. Id. at 541, 629 N.E.2d 402. The court ultimately held, “A minor who is the victim of sexual abuse has one year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse where the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has occurred.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 18} In Ault v. Jasko, however, we were presented with facts requiring us to determine whether to apply the discovery rule in cases alleging childhood sexual abuse. The plaintiff, Kathy Ault, filed a complaint when she was 29 years old, alleging that she had been sexually abused as a child by her father. Ault v. Jasko, 70 Ohio St.3d at 114, 637 N.E.2d 870. Her father moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. Ault responded that her cause of action did not accrue until she was able to verify that she had been sexually abused and that her father was responsible for that abuse.
{¶ 19} This court held: “The discovery rule applies in Ohio to toll the statute of limitations where a victim of childhood sexual abuse represses memories of that abuse until a later time.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, this court held: “The one-year statute of limitations period for sexual abuse in Ohio begins to run when the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the victim should have discovered the sexual abuse.” Id. at...
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