Preble v. Maine Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1893
• Citation: 85 Me. 260,27 A. 149
• Parties: PREBLE et al. v. MAINE CENT. R. CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

27 A. 149

85 Me. 260

PREBLE et al.

v. MAINE CENT. R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 17, 1893.

(Official.)

Emery, J., dissenting.

Report from supreme judicial court, Sagadahoc county.

Action by Israel J. Preble and another against the Maine Central Railroad Company to recover land. Heard on report Judgment for defendant.

Spaulding & Buker, for plaintiffs.

Baker, Baker & Cornish, for defendant.

WHITEHOUSE, J. In this writ of entry the plaintiffs seek to recover a small piece of land, triangular in shape, now covered by a portion of the defendant's freight platform at the Richmond station. The case is presented on report, and discloses no material controversy respecting the facts. The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined by applying the established principles of law to the fair and reasonable inferences drawn from the facts proved or admitted.

The original location of the defendant's railroad in 1848 was made four rods in width at the point in question, its westerly boundary being the easterly line of the premises then owned by the plaintiff's father. But in 1852 the company purchased of the plaintiffs, who had in the mean time acquired title to the property, an additional strip, two rods in width, extending across their lot and adjoining the original location on the westerly side. At the same time the fence which had been erected on the supposed boundary line in 1848 was moved westerly by the defendant's servants for the purpose of inclosing the two rods then purchased; but the plaintiff Israel Preble testifies that in rebuilding the fence in "1864 or 1866" he moved it two feet further onto his own land. Prior to 1889 the defendants had used only a part of this additional strip, and hence there had been no occasion for an accurate survey of the land; but when, at the last-named date, it became necessary to enlarge the freight platform, measures were taken to have the boundary line between the parties definitely ascertained and fixed. It was then discovered from the record of the original location that the "centra or directing line" of the railroad was not in the center of the 4 rods of land taken for the construction of the road, but was 28 feet from the easterly line and 38 feet from the westerly line of the location. It accordingly appeared that the true boundary of the defendant's land on the west was 38 feet and 2 rods, or 71 feet, from the center of the main track of the railroad. By this measurement the boundary line was found to be west of the existing fence a distance of 2.8 feet at the southerly end, and 8 feet and 10 inches at the northerly end. Whether the mistake made by the defendant's servants respecting the distance the fence should have been moved in 1848 arose in part from an erroneous assumption that the central line of the track was the center of the location, or otherwise, does not appear, and it is not material to inquire. There is not only no evidence that the main track has been moved at this point since the original location, but it is satisfactorily shown that it has not been moved; and the simple process of drawing a line 71 feet westerly from the center of the main track and parallel with it now establishes beyond a doubt the location of the westerly line of the 2-rod strip. The triangular piece in controversy is thus conclusively shown to be wholly on the east side of the true line, and hence a part of the land purchased of the plaintiffs in 1852.

But Israel Preble, the surviving plaintiff, claims that he cannot at this date satisfactorily locate his easterly line by measurement, and says that he has continually occupied the land to the fence as it existed in 1889, upon the understanding and belief that it marked the true line, and he now claims title to the disputed piece by adverse possession; and the question is, can this claim on the part of the plaintiff be sustained on the facts here presented? Clearly not, unless the rule established by an unbroken line of the decisions of this court covering a period of nearly 70 years is now to be overturned. That rule is that one who by mistake occupies for 20 years or more land not covered by his deed, with no intention to claim title beyond his actual boundary, wherever that may be, does not thereby acquire title by adverse possession to land beyond the true line. Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126; Ross v. Gould, 5 Me. 204; Lincoln v. Edgecomb, 31 Me. 345; Worcester v. Lord, 56 Me. 266; Dow v. McKenney, 64 Me. 138.

We are aware that the soundness of this doctrine has been questioned in other jurisdictions. It has been said that the possession is not the less adverse because the person possessed intentionally though innocently; and the further objection has been made that it introduces a new principle, by means of which the stable evidence of visible possession under a claim of right is complicated with an inquiry into the invisible motives and intentions of the occupant. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439; Wood, Lim. Act. § 263, and authorities cited. It is manifest, however, that those holding these views have not critically distinguished the decisions of our court upon the subject, and hence have failed to apprehend their true import and exact limitations.

A frequent recurrence to elementary truths in any science is the greatest safeguard against error, and in the ultimate analysis...