Prejean v. State
| Decision Date | 29 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-187,89-187 |
| Citation | 794 P.2d 877 |
| Parties | Jerry Ken PREJEAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Wyoming Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Thomas J. Alisankus, Student Intern, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
The primary question we resolve in this appeal is whether an individual, upon being incarcerated following a violation of parole, is entitled to credit for time that he served as a residential inmate in a community correctional facility. A secondary question that is posed is whether one who is committed to the state penitentiary is entitled to credit for pre-sentence confinement against both the maximum and minimum sentence. The district court, upon sentencing Jerry Ken Prejean (Prejean) after he violated his parole, refused to give him credit for the time served in the community correctional facility and also concluded that he should receive no credit for pre-sentence confinement against either his maximum or minimum sentence. We must reverse and remand the case with instructions to credit Prejean with all of his pre-sentence confinement, including the time served in the community correctional facility, against both the maximum and minimum sentence.
In his brief, as appellant in this case, Prejean articulates the following issues:
The State of Wyoming, in its Brief of Appellee, prefers this statement of the issues:
In June of 1988, Prejean was charged with one felony count of fraud by check in violation of § 6-3-702(a) and (b)(iii), W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp.1987). He waived preliminary examination and was arraigned upon the information filed in the district court on June 30, 1988. He then entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency, and he was referred to the Wyoming State Hospital for an evaluation. Subsequently, on September 28, 1988, Prejean changed his plea to guilty, and he then was sentenced by the district court to a term of not less than four years and not more than seven years in the Wyoming state penitentiary. Imposition of the sentence was suspended, and Prejean was placed on probation for five years, subject to the condition that the first-year probation be served in the community correctional facility in Cheyenne as a residential inmate.
Prejean completed nearly six months at the community correctional facility, but he then failed to return from a furlough. Subsequently, he was apprehended and charged with escape from detention in violation of § 6-5-206(a)(i), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.). He pleaded guilty to that charge and was sentenced to a term of not less than two years nor more than three years in the Wyoming penitentiary, which was to be served concurrently with any other sentence imposed in Albany County. Thereafter, the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for Albany County, revoked Prejean's probation and reimposed the original term of four to seven years without affording credit for pre-sentence confinement or for any time served as a residential inmate in the Cheyenne community correctional facility. Prejean appeals from the sentence.
We can dispose readily of the second claim that presentence confinement 1 should be credited against both the maximum and minimum term. In Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491 (Wyo.1990), this court held unequivocally that, when a sentence to a term of imprisonment is imposed, pre-sentence confinement must be credited against both the maximum term and the minimum term. We recognized that the trial courts could control the time actually served by simply augmenting the maximum and minimum term to encompass pre-trial confinement so long as the statutory maximum term was not exceeded and the appropriate differential maintained between maximum and minimum term. Renfro, and the cases there cited, dispose of this issue and require that Prejean's sentence be reversed so that appropriate credit against both the maximum and minimum terms can be afforded upon resentencing.
Apparently, there is a collateral question with respect to credit for the time spent at the Wyoming State Hospital pending examination. In our view, that time must be included in the pre-sentence confinement time for which credit must be given. That is the effect of Lightly v. State, 739 P.2d 1232 (Wyo.1987).
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