Premdor Corp. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 14 November 2003
• Citation: 880 So.2d 1148
• Parties: PREMDOR CORPORATION v. Renelda K. JONES.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

880 So.2d 1148

PREMDOR CORPORATION v. Renelda K. JONES.

2011258.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

November 14, 2003.

Brent A. Tyra of Smith, Tyra & Thomas, LLC, Alabaster, for appellant.

Neil Taylor, Jr., Russellville, for appellee.

MURDOCK, Judge.

Premdor Corporation appeals from a judgment entered by the Marion Circuit Court in favor of Renelda K. Jones finding that Jones was permanently totally disabled as a result of an injury she sustained in the course of her employment with Premdor.

Jones began working for Premdor in October 1996. In the spring of 1999 Jones became a buggy loader at Premdor's plant; a buggy loader loads pieces of wood used in the manufacturing of doors into carts and pushes the carts to another work station. A fully loaded cart could weigh up to 2,200 pounds, and, by her estimation, Jones had to push the carts approximately 50 feet. Jones contended that on May 9, 2000, she injured her lower back while pushing one of the carts. She admitted that she did not inform her supervisor of the injury, but she claimed that approximately one hour after she sustained the injury she informed plant manager Larry Cagle, who happened to be walking through the plant, that she had hurt her back.

Premdor has a policy that states that if an employee sustains a job-related injury, "it is imperative that [the employee] contact [his or her] supervisor immediately." The supervisor would then fill out paperwork on the injury for workers' compensation purposes. Jones admitted to being aware of the policy, and evidence was introduced showing that she had followed the policy on two previous occasions when she had sustained workplace injuries to a foot and an elbow. No paperwork was filled out regarding Jones's lower-back injury at any time before the filing of this action by Jones.

Jones testified that on May 6, 2000, the Saturday before the Tuesday on which she allegedly sustained the workplace injury at issue, she was mowing the grass at her mother's house. Jones stated that, "just as I started to mow ..., I felt a sharp pain, and I hadn't done anything really yet." However, she also testified in response to questions from her attorney that she "[got] over the grass pain before the Premdor pain" and that her back felt fine on May 9 before she started pushing the cart that allegedly caused her injury. Id.

Following the alleged injury on May 9, Jones finished her shift and went home. In the early morning of May 10, 2000, Jones was taken to Carraway Northwest Medical Center's emergency room by her husband because of her complaints of intense back pain. Jones was referred that day to her family physician; however, because her family physician was unavailable, she was seen by another doctor, Dr. Miller, for evaluation. Dr. Miller recommended that Jones see Dr. Palmer, a chiropractor. On May 15, 2000, Jones was seen by Dr. Palmer's partner, Dr. Marino, who cleared her to return to work on light duty for a day starting on May 22, followed by a resumption of her regular duties the following workday. Jones claimed that she reaggravated the injury on May 23 and that she told her supervisor, Kenny Price, that she had hurt her back. Price testified that Jones never informed him that she had injured her back at any time.

Jones left work that day and again visited Dr. Marino; he did not take Jones off work, but he did refer her to Dr. Jeffrey Long. Dr. Long diagnosed Jones with a lumbar sacral sprain, but he did not take her off work. Jones returned to work on May 25, and she worked for two weeks without reporting any other injuries to her supervisor or to anyone else. On June 6, 2000, Jones was unable to get out of bed because of pain in her back, and, thus, she did not go to work. She called Premdor and reported that she was feeling hurt and would not be reporting to work that day. Jones visited her family physician, Dr. Gary Fowler, two days later on June 8. Dr. Fowler took Jones off work for a few days; Jones had a note from Dr. Fowler relieving her of work duty delivered to Premdor by her daughter. By Jones's own admission, this note and subsequent notes from doctors did not reference an on-the-job injury.

On June 12, 2000, Jones visited Dr. Leslie Fowler, an orthopedic surgeon who had previously treated Jones for her foot problems. Dr. Fowler referred Jones to Dr. Bryan Givhan, a neurosurgeon; however, before the date of that appointment, Jones visited Carraway Northwest Medical Center's emergency room on July 12, 2000. On July 28, 2000, Jones visited Dr. Chester Boston, another orthopedic surgeon, on referral from Dr. Gary Fowler. After three visits, Dr. Boston released Jones to return to work without any restrictions; however, Jones did not return to work. During this same time, Jones was also being seen by Dr. Leslie Fowler for her foot problems and, on August 21, 2000, Dr. Fowler performed surgery on Jones's left foot to remove a bunion. Jones was excused from work for the surgery.

On September 7, 2000, Jones finally visited Dr. Givhan based on the referral from Dr. Leslie Fowler. Jones visited Dr. Givhan three times, with the last visit occurring in late October or early November 2000. On the third visit, Dr. Givhan released Jones to return to work without placing any restrictions on her. Jones testified that during her treatment with Dr. Givhan she went to the Premdor plant with her next-door neighbor, Carol Guyton, and informed the general manager of Premdor, Willie Hilliard, that she had injured her back on the job while pushing one of the carts. She testified that Hilliard told her that she would have to prove her claim. Guyton testified that she accompanied Jones to Premdor and as to the substance of Jones's conversation with Hilliard; she was unable to recall when the conversation took place beyond stating that it occurred either at the end of 2000 or the beginning of 2001.

Following her treatment by Dr. Givhan, Jones was next seen by Dr. Farouk Raquib, another neurologist, on November 28, 2000, and December 13, 2000. Finally, Jones was treated by Dr. David Longmire, a neurosurgeon, starting on February 14, 2001. Jones testified that Dr. Longmire restricted her from returning to work on a permanent basis due to her back injury; however, in his deposition, Dr. Longmire stated that he did not place any restrictions on Jones. Jones admitted that, aside from her belief that Dr. Longmire had placed her on work restrictions, none of the other doctors she had visited had permanently restricted her from returning to work.

Jones filed her initial complaint for workers' compensation benefits on April 2, 2001, alleging that she had been injured while working at Premdor on June 6, 2000. Glenda Peak, Premdor's payroll clerk, testified that this complaint was the first notice she received that Jones was claiming workers' compensation benefits for a back injury. She testified that ordinarily the payroll department is informed of such claims through paperwork filed by an employee's supervisor immediately following an accident. Jones filed an amended complaint on July 9, 2001, alleging that she had been injured on May 9, 2000, while on the job. The case proceeded to trial on February 20, 2002. On August 12, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Jones, finding that she had sustained a back injury on May 9, 2000, which was "the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of her said employment" with Premdor. The trial court further found that Premdor had "received proper notice of said injury and accident within the time required by law" and that Jones thereafter received medical treatment for the injury with Premdor's knowledge. The trial court concluded that Jones had sustained a 100% permanent total disability that prevented her from obtaining other gainful employment. Premdor appeals.

Premdor first argues that the trial court's finding that Jones's injury occurred on the job is not supported by substantial evidence and is against the great weight of the evidence. Section 25-5-81(e)(2), Ala.Code 1975, states that "[i]n reviewing pure findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial evidence." "`Substantial evidence' is defined as `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'" Edwards v. Kroger Co., 681 So.2d 223, 225 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)). Further, as this court has stated, "`[A] trial court's factual findings based upon conflicting ore tenus evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless such findings are "clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence."'" Cleckler v. A & C Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 820 So.2d 830, 833 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (quoting Lindsey v. Watson Van Lines, 722 So.2d 774, 776 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), quoting in turn American Petroleum Equip. v. Fancher, 708 So.2d 129, 132 (Ala.1997)). See also Bethea v. Bruno's, Inc., 741 So.2d 1090, 1092 (Ala.Civ.App.1999)

.

Premdor's argument centers on the evidence presented of the various doctors' evaluations of Jones. As was recounted above, Jones's first medical visit following her injury was to the Carraway Northwest Medical Center's emergency room. The medical report from that visit states that Jones complained of "back pain [which] started on Monday [May 8, 2000]," and that it became worse during the night. It also states that she "denies injury." Jones testified that she did not say that to the emergency-room personnel and that she "did not know what [the doctor] was writing." She stated that she told the doctor that she "had mowed the grass on Saturday and that [she] had had a few twinges, but [she] had had those before but they went away." Id.

Dr. Miller's notes from...