Prentiss v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 19221,19221
• Citation: 256 S.C. 141,181 S.E.2d 325
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Virginia R. PRENTISS, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

Page 325

181 S.E.2d 325

256 S.C. 141

Virginia R. PRENTISS, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 19221.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 13, 1971.

N. H. Hamilton, Summerville, for appellant.

A. Baron Holmes, III, of Holmes & Thomson, Charleston, and Sidney B. Jones, Jr., of Walker, Walker & Jenkins, Summerville, for respondent.

Baskin & Baskin, Bishopville, amicus curiae.

MOSS, Chief Justice:

Virginia R. Prentiss, the appellant herein, instituted this action against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the respondent herein, to recover damages on account of certain alleged libelous words written of and concerning her by an officer of the respondent.

Harry Charles Prentiss, Sr., the husband of the appellant, pursuant to an application, had issued to him on February 17, 1968, an automobile liability policy. The said policy covered the appellant as an additional insured. The application for said liability policy stated that the appellant was not a driver of the automobile insured thereunder and that her husband had not had an automobile accident within five years. After the issuance of the policy, the respondent following its usual procedure and in the normal course of business, had an investigation of the insured, his wife, and other parties insured under the policy, made by a reliable independent investigative agency, and a record check was made with the South Carolina State Highway Department. The Highway Department reported that the appellant's husband had had an automobile accident on January 22, 1966. The independent agency reported to the respondent that the appellant was a driver of the automobile insured and that she was mentally retarded. As a result of the aforesaid investigation and record check, the respondent cancelled the automobile liability policy, within sixty days of its issue, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 46--750.51 et seq., as amended, by a letter dated March 21, 1968, and addressed to the appellant's husband, the insured. In this letter the insured was advised that under South Carolina law, Sec. 46--750.54, upon request in writing, that he was entitled to be informed as to the specific facts which caused the insurer to terminate coverage. The insured, by letter dated March 27, 1968, requested of the respondent the reasons for the cancellation of his automobile liability insurance policy. The respondent, by registered letter dated April 2, 1968, pursuant to the requirements of the statute, advised the insured of the reasons for the cancellation of his automobile liability policy, and we quote from the letter the reasons assigned:

'The application that you signed February 17, 1968, showed no accidents and no violations and that your wife was not a driver of your automobile. However, during a routine investigation that we conduct on all our policy holders and a check with the South Carolina Highway Department, it was reported to us that you had an accident January 22, 1966, that your wife is a driver of your automobile, and that she is mentally retarded. For these reasons, your Automobile insurance coverage was terminated.'

The appellant, in her complaint, alleges that by the letter of April 2, 1968, written by an officer of the respondent, that such contained false, malicious, defamatory and libelous language, by charging 'that she was mentally retarded.' The respondent, by its answer, alleges that the letter of April 2, 1968, was written and mailed to the husband of the appellant pursuant to the requirements of the applicable statutes and was a qualifiedly privileged communication.

This case came on for trial before The Honorable George T. Gregory, Jr., presiding judge, and a jury, at the 1970 April Term of the Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County. At the close of the testimony in behalf of the appellant, the respondent made a motion for a nonsuit on several grounds, and such was refused. At the close of all of the testimony, the respondent made a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the letter of April 2, 1968, was qualifiedly privileged and the appellant failed to prove express malice or malice in fact necessary to destroy such privilege. The trial judge granted the motion for a directed verdict and this appeal followed.

The question for determination is whether there was error on the part of the trial judge in directing a verdict in favor of the respondent.

It is provided in Section 46--750.53 of the Code that in every instance in which a policy or contract of automobile liability insurance is cancelled, the Insurance Company, or its duly authorized agent, shall at the written request of the named insured, specify the reason or reasons relied upon by the Insurance Company for such cencellation. This statute then provides:

'* * * that as...