Presbytery of Seattle, Inc. v. Rohrbaugh, 41167

• Citation: 79 Wn.2d 367,485 P.2d 615
• Decision Date: 03 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 41167,41167
• Parties: The PRESBYTERY OF SEATTLE, INC., a nonprofit Washington corporation, and William H. Goleeke, being a member of the Laurelhurst United Presbyterian Church and representing all others similarly situated, Respondents, v. James R. ROHRBAUGH et al., Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

Page 367

79 Wn.2d 367

485 P.2d 615

The PRESBYTERY OF SEATTLE, INC., a nonprofit Washington

corporation, and William H. Goleeke, being a member of the

Laurelhurst United Presbyterian Church and representing all

others similarly situated, Respondents, v. James R. ROHRBAUGH et al., Appellants.

No. 41167.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 3, 1971.

Rehearing Denied July 23, 1971.

Schweppe, Doolittle, Krug & Tausend, Peter E. Paget, Seattle, for appellants.

Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Douglas P. Beighle, Seattle, for respondents.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

The United Presbyterian Church is an association of local Presbyterian churches governed by a hierarchy with includes, in ascending order, the Session (composed of the pastor and the elders of the local church), the Presbytery (composed of all the pastors and at least one elder from each of the churches within a defined district), the Synod (composed of representative pastors and elders from the Presbyteries within a geographical region), and the General Assembly (composed of delegations of pastors and elders from all the Presbyteries). These governing bodies are called 'judicatories.'

The Laurelhurst United Presbyterian Church of Seattle had on its rolls approximately 600 members. The pastor and 183 members, including the trustees and all but one of the elders (the appellants herein), feeling aggrieved by certain doctrinal changes which were adopted in 1967 by the United Presbyterian Church as a part of its constitution, voted to withdraw as a body.

They requested that the Presbytery of Seattle strike the name of the church from its rolls and authorize them to use the church property for their own purposes. their requests were refused and the Presbytery further advised tht there was no authority in the constitution for the members of a church to withdraw as a body. The appellant Rohrbaugh was removed as minister and the Session was dissolved by the Presbytery, which appointed an administrative commission having the powers of Session to administer the affairs of the church for those members who had not withdrawn.

Although the constitution of the church provides for appeals to the judicatories of the Washington-Alaska Synod and the General Assembly of the church, no appeal was taken.

Instead, the appellants, who had apparently comprised most of the active membership of the church, refused to allow the administrative commission to enter the church or to operate with the powers of Session, and the appellant Rohrbaugh continued to act as pastor of the church.

This action was instituted by the Presbytery to obtain an adjudication of its right to control the use and disposition of the church property. That relief was granted by the trial court, which issued an order restraining and enjoining the appellants from interfering with the respondent Presbytery's use and control of the property of the church or diverting that property, and which ordered an accounting by the appellants of all the funds and properties of the church and delivery by them of all the property of the church, including its books and records and the deed to the church property.

The appellants first suggest that the respondents have no standing to bring this action, citing as authority for this proposition provisions in the church constitution which disclaim for the judicatories any civil jurisdiction. Nowhere in these provisions do the judicatories disclaim their right to petition the courts for relief in civil controversies. The provisions simply acknowledge what is a fact without that acknowledgment--the jurisdiction of church judicatories is ecclesiastical and not civil.

Furthermore, as the respondents point out, one of them is a member of the Laurelhurst United Presbyterian Church, representing in a class action all other members who did not withdraw from membership, and their interest in preserving the church property is not questioned. We disagree with the appellants' contention that the respondents do not have standing to bring this action.

Turning to the merits, we find that the appellants rest their appeal upon a contention that they are the 'record titleholders' of the property and that no further inquiry need be made by the courts to determine the question of who is entitled to use and control the property. It should be noted at this point that the record title is in the church. The appellants evidently conceive that they comprise the church; and for their claim to a proprietary interest they rely heavily upon a recent Georgia case, Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969).

The opinion in that case appears to be the final disposition of a case which arose in Georgia upon facts very similar to those involved in this case. The Georgia trial court submitted the case to the jury with instructions to determine whether the constitutional changes made by the entire church in 1967 constituted a 'substantial departure' from the doctrine espoused by that church when the local church was formed. The jury found that indeed such a departure had occurred, and the trial court ruled, applying Georgia law, that the local church did not hold title to the property upon an implied trust for the nationwide church.

This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Presbyterian Church in the United States petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, contending that the courts of Georgia had violated the 'establishment clause' of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Certiorari was granted and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that

the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion--the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role.

Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969).

However, the United States Supreme Court did not hold that civil courts have no power to determine controversies concerning church property. It expressly approved the holding of Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871), wherein the court refused to decree the termination of an implied trust because of departures from doctrine by the national organization. The court in Watson v. Jones, Supra, held that members who withdrew from a Presbyterian church, even though they included members of the Session and the trustees, forfeited any right to use the church property.

The church involved in that action was Presbyterian, having precisely the same hierarchical structure as that involved in this action. There legal title was vested in the trustees of the local church; here it is vested in a corporation having trustees, but in both c...