Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris

• Decision Date: 19 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2--56711,2--56711
• Citation: 226 N.W.2d 232
• Parties: The PRESBYTERY OF SOUTHEAST IOWA, a corporation, Appellee, v. Pleasant HARRIS et al., Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 232

226 N.W.2d 232

The PRESBYTERY OF SOUTHEAST IOWA, a corporation, Appellee, v. Pleasant HARRIS et al., Appellants.

No. 2--56711.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 19, 1975.

William L. Meardon, of Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes, Iowa City, for appellants.

Oehler, Radig & Hoy, Iowa City, for appellee.

Heard en banc.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

Plaintiff commenced a quiet title action. Some of the named defendants, as alleged holders of a reversionary interest, challenge applicability and constitutionality of The Code 1971, Section 614.24, quoted Infra. On motion by plaintiff a summary judgment was ultimately entered adverse to defendants and those appearing now appeal. We affirm.

By petition filed July 28, 1971, the Presbytery of Southeast Iowa, a Corporation asserts in relevant part: (1) H. B. and Elizabeth Cline, by warranty deed bearing date November 18, 1898, conveyed lots 9 and 10, Block 5, Cline's Addition to Hills Siding, Johnson County, Iowa to the First Presbyterian Church of Iowa City; (2) the aforesaid conveyancing instrument contains this pivotal provision:

'It is further agreed that if said church building is not erected on said premises within two years from No. 1st, 1898, or if erected and services shall be permanently discontinued, then said premises shall revert to the grantors or their heirs and assigns.'

(3) Presbytery acquired title to said property January 17, 1970, under warranty deed given by the First Presbyterian Church of Iowa City; (4) defendants, as holders of an alleged reversionary interest under the aforesaid 1898 deed, claim a right in the real estate therein described by reason of a breach of the quoted provision which apparently occurred sometime after July 4, 1965; and (5) any such claim asserted by defendants stands extinguished because of their failure to comply with the provisions of Code § 614.24.

Five of the named defendants, as heirs of H. B. and Elizabeth Cline, allege by answer they possess a reversionary interest in the above described property. They also thereby aver Code § 614.24 is inapplicable to their interest and alternately, if applicable, is 'unconstitutional as far as any extinguishment of the rights and interests of these Defendants in the above described real estate is concerned for the reason that it deprives these Defendants and other owners or holders of reversionary interests in real estate of their property and rights without notice and without due process of law contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Iowa.'

May 11, 1972, plaintiff moved for an adjudication on law points (Iowa R.Civ.P. 105) regarding the constitutionality of Code § 614.24.

June 19th trial court adjudged said enactment constitutional and applicable to defendants.

July 17, 1973, plaintiff filed motion for summary judgment thereby alleging defendants had not filed notice as to any claimed reversionary interest within one year after July 4, 1965, as required by § 614.24.

August 21st trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiff from which this appeal is taken.

In support of a reversal defendants Faye Amish, H. Ray Cline, Robert Cline, Thomas B. Cline, William Cline and Marjorie Harr, here contend § 614.24(1) unconstitutionally impairs contract rights; (2) is unconstitutionally vague; (3) authorizes a divestment of property rights in violation of substantive due process; (4) is violative of procedural due process in that no reasonable notice is afforded a claimant, owning a reversionary interest, of his obligation to record said interest in order that the same may not be extinguished.

Since the first two assignments above set forth are here asserted for the first time they will not be entertained save and except as incident to a determination of other issues properly presented. See Schnable v. Display Sign Service, Inc., 219 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 1974); State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1974).

As to the first contention see, however, Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290, 7 L.Ed. 679 (1830); Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955); Evans v. Finley, 166 Or. 227, 111 P.2d 833, 836--837 (1941).

And with regard to the second assertion see generally Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 772 (Iowa 1971); 'Marketable Title Legislation--A Model Act for Iowa', 47 Iowa L.Rev. 389 (1962); Code §§ 4.1(2), 4.2, 4.4.

The third and fourth assignments will be considered in their respective order.

I. At the threshold it is understood the above stated 1898 deed proviso created what is known as a 'possibility of reverter.' See Reichard v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 231 Iowa 563, 570, 1 N.W.2d 721 (1942); Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, Supra; 4A Thompson on Real Property, § 1978 (1961); Simes, Law of Future Interests, § 13 at 28 (2d ed. 1966); Restatement, Property, § 154(3); 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estates, §§ 182--183.

II. In approaching the task at hand we accord recognition to some other statutes not here directly involved because a reading thereof will disclose an underlying motivating purpose common to all. See Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d 788, 792--793 (Iowa 1970); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 56.02 (4th ed. 1973); 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, §§ 155--158; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366, p. 801.

Code § 614.17 has been described as the first of our 'Marketable Title Acts.' See 2 Patton, Titles, s563 at 443 (2d ed. 1957); I Flick, Abstract and Title Practice, § 357 at 345 (2d ed. 1958). In material part said statutory enactment recites:

'No action based upon any claim arising or existing prior to January 1, 1960, shall be maintained * * * to recover any real estate * * * or establish any interest therein or claim thereto * * * against the holder of the record title to such real estate in possession, when such holder of the record title and his grantors immediate or remote are shown by the record to have held chain of title to said real estate, since January 1, 1960, unless such claimant * * * shall within one year from and after July 1, 1970, file in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county wherein such real estate is situated, a statement in writing * * * describing the real estate involved, the nature and extent of the right or interest claimed, and stating the facts upon which the same is based.'

Standing under the spotlight in the case at hand is Code § 614.24, which provides:

'No action based upon any claim arising or existing by reason of the provisions of any deed or conveyance or contract or will reserving or providing for any reversion, reverted interests or use restrictions in and to the land therein described Shall be maintained either at law or in equity in any court to recover real estate in this state or to recover or establish any interest therein or claim thereto, legal or equitable, against the holder of the record title to such real estate in possession After twenty-one years from the recording of such deed of conveyance or contract or after twenty-one years from the admission of said will to probate Unless the claimant shall, by himself, or by his attorney or agent, or if he is a minor or under legal disability, by his guardian, trustee, or either parent or next friend, Shall file a verified claim with the recorder of the county wherein said real estate is located within said twenty-one year period. In the event said deed was recorded or will was admitted to probate more than twenty years prior to July 4, 1965, then said claim may be filed on or before one year after July 4, 1965. Such claims shall set forth the nature thereof, also the time and manner in which such interest was acquired. For the purposes of this section, the claimant shall be any person or persons claiming any interest in and to said land or in and to such reversion, reverter interest or use restriction, whether the same is a present interest or an interest which would come into existence if the happening or contingency provided in said deed or will were to happen at once. Said claimant further shall include any member of a class of persons entitled to or claiming such rights or interests.' (Emphasis supplied).

And Code §§ 614.29--614.38, collectively referred to as our 'Marketable Record Title Act', constitute the most recent and comprehensive legislative effort to simplify land transfers in this jurisdiction. See Marshall, Iowa Title Opinion and Standards, at 77--81 (Cum.Supp.1970).

We are persuaded the aforesaid statutes clearly represent a salutary attempt on the part of our General Assembly to keep pace with public demands for needed reforms in the field of land title conveyancing practices. As this court observed in Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d at 793, they are 'designed to shorten the period of search required to establish title in real estate and give effect and stability to record titles by rendering them marketable and alienable--in substance to improve and render less complicated the land transfer system.' See also Basye, Trends and Progress--The Marketable Title Acts, 47 Iowa L.Rev. 261 (1962); Aigler, Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 Mich.L.Rev. 185 (1951); American Bar News, Vol. 19, No. 10, at p. 1 (November 1974).

The necessity for such reformational action has been vigorously articulated by distinguished members of the legal profession In a 1974 Report of the Special Committee on Residential Real Estate Transactions of the American Bar Association is this relevant statement at 14--16:

'Our system of public land title records was designed to fit the needs of a rural community. It was invented by the Massachusetts colonists and has not been essentially changed in the interim. The records are so scattered in different offices or so badly indexed, or both, as to make th task of separating the...