Prescott v. Anthony, 2D00-4700.

Decision Date28 December 2001
Docket NumberNo. 2D00-4700.,2D00-4700.
PartiesGerald T. PRESCOTT, as Trustee of the Gerald T. Prescott Revocable Inter Vivos Trust u/a/d 10/9/95, and Mary Lou Prescott, as Trustee of the Mary Lou Prescott Revocable Inter Vivos Trust u/a/d 10/9/95, Appellants, v. John J. ANTHONY, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Aubrey O. Dicus, Jr., and Ka'lmi Lani Jones, St. Petersburg, for Appellants.

Eddy R. Resnick, Tampa, for Appellee.

SALCINES, Judge.

Gerald T. Prescott, as Trustee of the Gerald T. Prescott Revocable Inter Vivos Trust u/a/d 10/9/95, and Mary Lou Prescott, as Trustee of the Mary Lou Prescott Revocable Inter Vivos Trust u/a/d 10/9/95 ("the Prescotts"), appeal the trial court's order denying their motion for attorneys' fees. The Prescotts, who were the defendants below, sought fees and costs from the plaintiff, John J. Anthony, after he voluntarily dismissed his specific performance complaint and released his notice of lis pendens. We reverse because the Prescotts were prevailing parties who had timely raised their entitlement to contractual attorneys' fees.

In December 1999, FlightSim Systems International, Inc., entered into a contract to purchase residential real property from the Prescotts. FlightSim thereafter assigned its interest in the contract to Anthony. When the Prescotts refused to close on the contract, Anthony filed an action for specific performance of the contract in early January 2000. Anthony also filed a lis pendens.

The Prescotts filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. When the trial court denied that motion in mid-March, the parties agreed that the Prescotts could defer answering the complaint while the parties attempted to settle the lawsuit. While the parties were still negotiating and without prior notice to the Prescotts, Anthony voluntarily dismissed his complaint without prejudice in early May and released the lis pendens.

Within thirty days of the voluntary dismissal and release, the Prescotts filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The motion was based on the following clause in the real estate contract:

R. ATTORNEY'S FEES; COSTS: In any litigation, including breach, enforcement, or interpretation, arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party in such litigation shall be entitled to recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses.

The trial court denied this motion because it concluded that the filing of the voluntary dismissal without prejudice did not end possible litigation. Thus, it concluded that the Prescotts were not prevailing parties. The trial court relied primarily upon MX Investments, Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640 (Fla.1997).

We conclude that the trial court erred by relying upon MX Investments in a context not involving an offer of judgment. In MX Investments, the supreme court held that the language of the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), does not support an award of attorneys' fees unless the case is dismissed with prejudice. MX Investments simply did not address entitlement to attorneys' fees under a contract or under other statutory provisions.

The general rule is that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the defendant is the prevailing party. See Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914, 919 (Fla.1990)

; Landry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 731 So.2d 137, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). When attorneys' fees are provided for by statute or agreement...

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8 cases
  • Alhambra Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Asad
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 13, 2006
    ...any attorney's fees after a plaintiff voluntarily dismissed a specific performance action without prejudice. See Prescott v. Anthony, 803 So.2d 835, 836-37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Ajax Paving, 824 So.2d at These post-Thornber district court of appeal cases find support in Caufield v. C......
  • JGT INC. v. ASHBRITT INC.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • April 5, 2011
    ...required as a precondition to prevailing party status when determining whether attorney's fees are applicable. See Prescott v. Anthony, 803 So.2d 835, 836-7 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The Court has examined the standards for an award of reasonable attorney's fees under both Mississippi and Florida......
  • AJAX PAVING INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Hardaway Co., 2D01-4362.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 30, 2002
    ...for purposes of attorney's fees. Thornber v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914, 919 (Fla. 1990); see also Prescott v. Anthony, 803 So.2d 835, 836-37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Dam v. Heart of Fla. Hosp., Inc., 536 So.2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Landry, 731 So.2d at 139-40; Oakwood Plaz......
  • HOLIDAY SQUARE OWNERS ASS'N INC. v. Tsetsenis
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 2002
    ...to recover attorney's fees as the "prevailing party," if attorney's fees are provided for by the declaration. Prescott v. Anthony, 803 So.2d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Casarella, Inc. v. Zaremba Coconut Creek Parkway Corp., 595 So.2d 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Vidibor v. Adams, 509 So.2d 973 (Fl......
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