President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Stone

• Decision Date: 06 June 1932
• Docket Number: No. 5406.,5406.
• Citation: 59 F.2d 875,61 App. DC 200
• Parties: PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF GEORGETOWN COLLEGE v. STONE et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

61 App. DC 200, 59 F.2d 875 (1932)

PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF GEORGETOWN COLLEGE v. STONE et al.

No. 5406.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.

Argued April 5, 1932.

Decided June 6, 1932.

George E. Hamilton, John J. Hamilton, George E. Hamilton, Jr., Edmund Brady, and Henry R. Gower, all of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Charles V. Imlay and George G. McLeish, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and GRONER, Associate Justices.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

An appeal from a decree setting aside an order of the deputy compensation commissioner, which rejected a claim for compensation for the death of claimant's husband while an employee of appellant, arising, as alleged, out of and in the course of such employment. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 (33 USCA §§ 901-950); District of Columbia Compensation Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600 (D. C. Code 1929, T. 19, §§ 11, 12, 33 USCA § 901 note).

The plaintiff below, Lillie M. Stone, regularly filed with the Compensation Commission of the District of Columbia a claim for compensation for the death of her husband within the provisions of the statute. The deputy commissioner, after an investigation and hearing, reported his finding of facts on the evidence, and rejected the claim.

The essential facts upon which the claim is based are stated in the finding of the deputy commissioner as follows: "* * * That on said day the employee while in the employ of the employer above named as a laborer at Georgetown University Hospital sustained personal injuries which occurred in the course of his employment, but which did not arise out of the said employment; that while so employed and in the act of defrosting cans in an ice plant of the employer wherein he was using a hot water hose for this purpose, the employee was found lying upon his back on the floor in the said plant and his physical appearance and other evidence showed that he was suffering at that time from an epileptic seizure; that the employee had been subject to epileptic seizures for some time prior to said day and had on several occasions received treatment therefor; that during said seizure on the day above mentioned by reason of the tonic contracture of the muscles of the body the employee grasped and held upon his chest the hose emitting hot water which he had been using in defrosting the cans in the refrigerator plant and that the hot water which ran over his face and shoulders caused the employee to suffer from second-decree burns over the upper one-half of his body, which burns were the direct cause of his death, which occurred at Georgetown Hospital on June 7, 1930; that the proximate cause of the injury and subsequent death of this employee as related herein was the epileptic seizure which had no causal relation whatever to the employment, nor did the employment aggravate this pre-existing epileptic susceptibility. * * *"

The claimant sought a review of the deputy commissioner's order of rejection by proceedings under the statute in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The court held that the order of the deputy commissioner based upon the facts found by him was not in accordance with law. It was therefore set aside, with directions that an award of compensation be made to the claimant. An appeal to this court was taken.

It is contended by appellant that the decree of the lower court has the effect of setting aside the order of the deputy commissioner upon a pure question of fact, and that this is beyond its authority, inasmuch as the statute empowers the court to set aside a compensation order only when it is not in accordance with law. Section 21 (b), Act of March 4, 1927, supra (33 USCA § 921 (b). This contention virtually raises the only question properly before this court upon the record, to wit, whether the facts as found by the deputy commissioner disclose as a conclusion of law that the...