President Inn Props., LLC v. City of Grand Rapids

• Decision Date: 17 February 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 294452.
• Citation: 291 Mich.App. 625,806 N.W.2d 342
• Parties: PRESIDENT INN PROPERTIES, LLC v. CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

291 Mich.App. 625

806 N.W.2d 342

PRESIDENT INN PROPERTIES, LLC

v.CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS.

Docket No. 294452.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 1, 2011, at Grand Rapids.Decided Feb. 17, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.

Peter N. Rigas, Grand Rapids, for petitioner.

Nadine R. Klein, Assistant City Attorney, for respondent.

Before: OWENS, P.J., and MARKEY and METER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner appeals by right the final opinion and judgment of the Tax Tribunal establishing for the tax years 2004–2006 the true cash value (TCV), the state equalized value (SEV), and the taxable value (TV), of two parcels of property on which petitioner operates a hotel. We affirm but remand for correction of clerical errors regarding the identification number of one parcel (41–14–05–276–009) and the 2006 TV of the other parcel ($678,864).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A hearing referee conducted a three-day hearing at which petitioner presented evidence that the TCV of each of the properties was less than the amount listed on the assessment rolls, and respondent presented evidence that the TCV of each of the properties was more than that listed on the assessment rolls. Because the hearing referee found petitioner's evidence and valuation method more persuasive than that of respondent, he issued a proposed opinion and judgment adopting the valuations of petitioner's expert. See MCL 205.726. Respondent filed objections to the hearing referee's proposed opinion and judgment. On review of the record and the parties' pleadings, the Tax Tribunal ruled that the hearing referee had improperly credited petitioner's appraiser, stating that two of the appraiser's appraisals should have been accorded little or no weight. The tribunal mainly discredited the two appraisals because the same appraiser had prepared a third appraisal for purposes of obtaining financing and it was strikingly different. But the tribunal otherwise adopted the hearing referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the referee's finding that respondent's evidence that the value of each of the properties was greater than that listed on the tax rolls should also be discounted. The Tax Tribunal's findings read, in part:

5. Respondent's Exhibit E (Petitioner's 2002 Appraisal for Finance Purposes with Exhibits) was properly admitted into evidence. However, the POJ [the hearing referee's proposed opinion and judgment] failed to state that Exhibit E was admitted solely for impeachment purposes. Although Exhibit E was not admitted for valuation purposes, the [hearing referee] still failed to take the appraisal into consideration in the rendering of its [sic] decision.

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9. Ultimately, Petitioner's appraiser should have been awarded little credibility for the large differences in the two appraisals. The disparity in the two reports is not explained by the September 11th bombing of New York, the unemployment, the location or the factors that were not cited in the original appraisal that would not have changed given the short time span between the reports as asserted by Petitioner. The inconsistencies between the reports cast enough uncertainty that the Tribunal finds that Petitioner's December 31, 2003 appraisal is given very minimal weight.

10. The [hearing referee's] analysis of why Respondent's appraisal was given little weight is adopted. As such, the Tribunal finds that Respondent's assessments for the subject properties for the tax years at issue are affirmed. Petitioner failed to carry the burden of establishing the true cash value of the property. Conversely, Respondent failed to meet its burden of proving the subject property's assessments should be changed from that reflected on the tax rolls. Therefore, the true cash, state equalized, and taxable values for the subject property are as follows:

+-------------------------------+
                ¦Parcel Number: 41–14–05–276–011¦
                +-------------------------------+
                

Year        TCV                     SEV                 TV
                2004        $1,528,400              $764,200            $642,403
                2005        $1,595,600              $797,800            $657,178
                2006        $1,595,600              $797,800            $672,293 1
                

11. Given the above, the Tribunal modifies the Proposed Opinion and Judgment, as indicated herein, and adopts the modified Proposed Opinion and Judgment as the Tribunal's final decision in this case. See MCL 205.726. The Tribunal also incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the modified Proposed Opinion and Judgment in this Final Opinion and Judgment.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the property's values for the 2004, 2005 and 2006 tax years shall be as set forth in this Final Opinion and Judgment. [Final Opinion and Judgment, pp 5–9 (Michigan Tax Tribunal Docket No. 310739, entered September 17, 2009).]

Petitioner appeals by right, MCL 205.753(1), asserting that the Tax Tribunal committed several errors of law and also made several erroneous factual findings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court's ability to review decisions of the Tax Tribunal is very limited. Columbia Assoc., L.P. v. Dep't of Treasury, 250 Mich.App. 656, 665, 649 N.W.2d 760 (2002). Michigan's Constitution provides: “In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation.” Const 1963, art 6, § 28. Thus, this Court's “review of decisions of the Tax Tribunal, in the absence of fraud, is limited to determining whether the tribunal made an error of law or adopted a wrong principle; the factual findings of the tribunal are final, provided that they are supported by competent and substantial evidence.” Antisdale v. Galesburg, 420 Mich. 265, 277, 362 N.W.2d 632 (1984).

With respect to general valuation principles in the Tax Tribunal, the petitioner has the burden to establish the true cash value of property. MCL 205.737(3); Great Lakes Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp. v. Ecorse, 227 Mich.App. 379, 389, 576 N.W.2d 667 (1998). The burden of proof encompasses two concepts: “(1) the burden of persuasion, which does not shift during the course of the hearing; and (2) the burden of going forward with the evidence, which may shift to the opposing party.” Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. City of Warren, 193 Mich.App. 348, 354–355, 483 N.W.2d 416 (1992). Nevertheless, because Tax Tribunal proceedings are de novo in nature, the Tax Tribunal has a duty to make an independent determination of true cash value. Great Lakes Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 227 Mich.App. at 409, 576 N.W.2d 667. Thus, even when a petitioner fails to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the challenged assessment is wrong, the Tax Tribunal may not automatically accept the valuation on the tax rolls. Id. at 409, 576 N.W.2d 667. Regardless of the method employed, the Tax Tribunal has the overall duty to determine the most accurate valuation under the individual circumstances of the case. Meadowlanes Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. City of Holland, 437 Mich. 473, 485–486, 502, 473 N.W.2d 636 (1991).

This case also presents issues of statutory interpretation, which are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. Superior Hotels, LLC v. Mackinaw Twp., 282 Mich.App. 621, 628, 765 N.W.2d 31 (2009). Proper construction of a statute “begins by reviewing the text of the statute at issue; if the language is unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed, and judicial construction of the statute is not permitted.” Paris Meadows, LLC v. Kentwood, 287 Mich.App. 136, 141, 783 N.W.2d 133 (2010). Furthermore, “[n]othing may be read into a clear statute ‘that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner first argues that the Tax Tribunal erred as a matter of law and fact by stating in ¶ 5 of its final opinion and judgment that respondent's exhibit E was admitted into evidence. The record does not support petitioner's claim.

At the hearing before the hearing referee, respondent's exhibits were marked alphabetically and exhibit E was identified as a 2002 appraisal of the subject property prepared for petitioner by the same expert who testified for petitioner at the hearing and who also prepared two other appraisals (petitioner's exhibits 1 and 2) admitted into evidence for tax-valuation purposes. Respondent's attorney moved for the admission of exhibit E during the cross-examination of petitioner's appraiser “for purposes of impeachment, rebuttal, and to, for the witness's credibility.” Petitioner's attorney objected on grounds of relevancy and also because respondent could impeach the witness by simply questioning him about his appraisals. The hearing referee ruled regarding respondent's exhibit E:

[ Hearing Referee ]: As I said before, the respondent in this instance as to this witness is entitled to cross-examination. Part of cross-examination is to impeach the credibility of the witness.

* * *

[ Hearing Referee ]: Wait. And to that extent, this—let's put it this way: The admissibility is on the basis of its use in the impeachment of this witness.

* * *

[ Hearing Referee ]: Now, as to the ultimate value, it is not being considered for that purpose.

Thus, the record reflects that respondent's exhibit E was admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching petitioner's appraiser. This is the purpose for which the Tax Tribunal utilized exhibit E. The tribunal did not err as a matter of fact or law. That one page of exhibit E was admitted later in the hearing as part of another exhibit does not alter the fact that all of exhibit E had previously been admitted for the purpose of impeaching petitioner's appraiser.

Next, petitioner argues that the Tax Tribunal erred by revisiting the credibility of petitioner's appraiser and the...