Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1915 |
| Docket Number | No. 19259[174].,19259[174]. |
| Citation | 153 N.W. 115,130 Minn. 121 |
| Parties | PRESLEY FRUIT CO. v. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; William Louis Kelly, Judge.
Action by the Presley Fruit Company against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff. From an adverse order, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Generally a common carrier is an insurer of the safe delivery at destination of property committed to it for transportation. There are some exceptions. One exception is that, when the property suffers injury of a character arising out of the inherent nature or tendency of the property to decay, the carrier is not liable if his own negligence did not occasion the injury.
In such cases, if the property is delivered to the carrier in good condition, and arrives at destination in damaged condition, a prima facie case of negligence of the carrier is made out. It is error to instruct the jury that such facts raise a strong presumption of negligence of the carrier.
An expression of opinion by the court upon disputed questions of fact is not reversible error, if the issue of fact is clearly submitted to the jury for its determination; but the court may not give to the jury an improper rule of law for their guidance in determining the facts.
Where, on a sale of goods not specific, which are to be selected and appropriated to the contract by the seller, the seller selects and ships goods, taking a bill of lading to the buyer as consignee, prima facie the title passes.
If he reserves possession of the bill of lading, drawing on the buyer for the price, and forwarding through a bank the draft with the bill of lading attached, with instruction to deliver the bill of lading only on payment of the draft, prima facie title does not pass until payment.
The question is, however, one of intention of the parties, and where the goods are sold f. o. b. cars at point of shipment, and the buyer is required to furnish the seller a bank guaranty before shipment, and he does so, depositing the price with the guaranteeing bank to secure the guaranty, it is proper to instruct the jury as a matter of law that the title passes on delivery to the carrier. Briggs, Thygeson & Everall, and Monte Appel, all of St. Paul, for appellant.
T. P. McNamara, of St. Paul, for respondent.
This action is brought to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by reason of the negligence of defendant in carrying a car load of strawberries from Bald Knob, Ark., to St. Paul, Minn., in May, 1913. Plaintiff had a verdict. Defendant appeals.
1. Defendant is a common carrier. The general rule is that a common carrier is an insurer of the safe delivery at destination of goods committed to it for transportation, and it is liable for their loss in transit, whether the loss results from its fault or negligence or not. The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 19 L. Ed. 772; Agnew v. Str. Contra Costa, 27 Cal. 426, 87 Am. Dec. 87; Mershon v. Hobensack, 22 N. J. Law, 372. This is true, whatever may be the nature of the goods, whether they be strawberries or cobblestones.
The rule, however, is subject to some exceptions. This absolute liability is in all cases qualified where loss or damage results from the nature and inherent tendencies of the thing carried. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Dever, 112 Md. 296, 75 Atl. 352;White v. Minneapolis & Rainy River Ry. Co., 111 Minn. 167, 126 N. W. 533. In undertaking to carry strawberries the carrier assumes the obligation to deliver safely, having due respect to the tendency of strawberries to deteriorate and decay. The carrier is not liable for deterioration or decay of the property transported, resulting from natural causes, merely because the goods are being carried upon its cars. Where goods shipped suffer injury of a character arising out of their inherent nature, the liability of the carrier depends upon negligence, and the carrier is not liable if his own negligence did not occasion or contribute to the injury. 6 Cyc. 381(35); Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 13 Am. Rep. 42;Brown, Shipley & Co. v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564;Janney v. The Tudor Co. (D. C.) 3 Fed. 814;Brandeis v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co. (Iowa) 146 N. W. 825.
2. The evidence in this case is conflicting, but there is evidence which we believe sufficient to submit to a jury that the berries were delivered to defendant at Bald Knob in good condition and that they arrived in St. Paul heated, moldy and decayed. The learned trial court charged the jury that they would ‘be justified in finding that such condition is strong presumptive evidence that the defendant company was negligent.’ Exception was taken to this portion of the charge. We consider this instruction erroneous. The facts stated do raise a presumption of negligence; Fockens v. United States Express Co., 99 Minn. 404, 109 N. W. 834;Brennisen v. Penn. R. Co., 101 Minn. 120, 111 N. W. 945; Whitaker v. C., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 115 Minn. 140, 131 N. W. 1061;Ammon v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 120 Minn. 438, 139 N. W. 819, but when the articles transported are as prone to decay as are strawberries shipped for long distances in the month of May, we are of the opinion that it is error to instruct the jury as a rule of law that their decay in transit furnishes a strong presumption of negligence of the carrier. These facts raise only a prima facie presumption of negligence, and in the case of such highly perishable goods if the presumption were to be characterized at all we should consider it weak rather than strong. This instruction gave to the jury an improper rule of evidence, and it was...
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