Presley v. Carribean Seal
| Decision Date | 26 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. G-81-56. |
| Citation | 537 F. Supp. 956 |
| Parties | James R. PRESLEY, Plaintiff, v. The vessel CARRIBEAN SEAL, etc., in rem, and Caribe Company, Seal Fleet, Inc., Geophysical Service, Inc., and Sealcraft Operators, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
William R. Edwards, Edwards & Perry, Corpus Christi, Tex., for plaintiff.
Eugene J. Silva, Vinson & Elkins, Houston, Tex., for defendants.
The plaintiff, James R. Presley, commenced this action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime law against his employer, Geophysical Service, Inc., the M/V CARRIBEAN SEAL, and her owners, Caribe Company and Sealcraft Operators, Inc., for injuries allegedly sustained in the course and scope of his employment on board the vessel. Geophysical Service, Inc., has moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's claims against it under the Jones Act and general maritime law are precluded by the Oceanographic Research Vessels Act (ORVA), 46 U.S.C. § 441 et seq.
In issue here is section 4 of the ORVA, 46 U.S.C. § 444, which provides that scientific personnel on oceanographic research vessels shall not be considered seamen under the provisions of Title 53 of the Revised Statutes and acts amendatory or supplementary thereto. While the Act does not expressly encompass the Jones Act or general maritime law, defendant argues that its language and legislative history evidence congressional intent to exclude scientific personnel from the class of persons entitled, under the Jones Act and general maritime law, to maintain an action for damages for personal injury brought about by the negligence of the employer or the unseaworthiness of a vessel.1 Plaintiff, to the contrary, argues from the legislative history of the Act that Congress could not have intended such a result. The Court agrees.
In enacting the Oceanographic Research Vessels Act in 1965, Congress recognized that oceanographic research vessels, and personnel aboard them engaged in specialized scientific work in the marine sciences, required differing treatment under regulatory and safety laws than did other vessels and their personnel engaged in the usual pursuits of commercial passenger and cargo carrying. H.R.Rep.No.599, 89 Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 2383, 2384. See S.Rep.No.1276, 88 Cong. 2d Sess. 1. The objective of the legislation was to exempt research vessels from the strict inspection and personnel protection laws mandated for commercial crews which hindered the mission of technical or scientific personnel. South Corp. v. United States, 531 F.Supp. 180, 185 (C.I.T. 1982).
The classification of scientific personnel under existing laws and regulations administered by the United States Coast Guard2 was a major legislative concern. H.R.Rep. No.599, supra; Oceanographic Research Vessels Exemption: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 3419 and H.R. 7320, 89 Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (May 4-5, 1965). Research vessels were generally subject to statutory provisions as passenger or cargo vessels, depending on the number and type of personnel carried. In either case, the vessels and their personnel were subject to certain laws relating to vessel inspection, manning, and licensing. For these purposes, the complement of scientific personnel on board the vessels were required to be designated either as passengers or crew members.
Unless scientific personnel were designated as "crew members" or "seamen," the vessels as a practical matter were limited in the number of such personnel that might be carried in order to remain within the statutory category of "cargo or miscellaneous" vessels rather than "passenger" vessels, which were subject to more rigorous regulation than cargo vessels. Classifying scientific or technical personnel as seamen, however, subjected them to statutes involving attainment of merchant mariners' documents and other regulations ill-suited to their function. Oceanographic Research Vessels Hearings, supra, at 11-12 (statement of Commander Benkert, U. S. Coast Guard) & 49 (position paper of the Research Vessel Operator's Council).3
The ORVA sought to clarify the status of scientific personnel to permit oceanographic research vessels to operate unimpeded by artificial limitations as to the number of scientific personnel carried or the requirements of laws pertaining to seamen that were not geared to the duties of onboard scientists. After defining the terms "oceanographic research vessel" and "scientific personnel" in section 1 of the Act,4 Congress in section 2 excluded oceanographic research vessels from the category of passenger vessels under the provisions of the laws relating to the inspection and manning of merchant vessels, thereby insuring that scientific personnel on board would not be considered passengers.5
Congress, however, did not exempt oceanographic research vessels from the laws applicable to "merchant" or "cargo and miscellaneous" vessels. United States v. Blue Water Marine Industries, Inc., 661 F.2d 793, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1981). See Oceanographic Research Vessels Hearings, supra, at 15; H.R.Rep.No.599, supra ().6 Oceanographic research vessels thus remained subject to Titles 52 and 53 of the Revised Statutes, and scientific personnel, "seamen" within the meaning of the statute defining the term in Title 53, see 46 U.S.C. § 713,7 remained subject to the regulations pertaining to seamen.
Congress adopted section 4 of the Act8 to ensure that scientific personnel employed upon research vessels would not be considered as seamen or members of a vessel's operating crew for such purposes. That much is clear from the legislative history of the Act, and from the Coast Guard regulations promulgated thereunder. See 46 C.F.R. § 188.05-33 (1981).9 Whether Congress also envisioned the exclusion of scientific personnel from consideration as seamen for purposes of the Jones Act and general maritime law is less clear.10 Several courts have held that the reference in section 4 to acts "amendatory" or "supplementary" to Title 53 must be deemed inclusive of the Jones Act. Castro v. M/V LAFAYETTE, No. 76-H-755 (S.D. Tx, March 2, 1978) (unpublished opinion); Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.La.1971). If the Act, however, is to be interpreted in view of "the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained," Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158, 55 S.Ct. 46, 48, 79 L.Ed. 254 (1934), it is the opinion of this Court, for the reasons stated herein, that a narrower construction of the statute is required.
Although the ORVA has been law for nearly two decades, only a handful of district courts have considered the issue before this Court today. The Court is aware of two cases, both holding that the ORVA precludes scientific personnel from maintaining damage actions under the Jones Act. Castro v. M/V LAFAYETTE, supra; Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., supra. See also Delahoussey v. Western Geophysical Co. of America, 476 F.Supp. 54 (S.D.Miss.1979) ().11
The leading case is Sennett v. Shell Oil Company. In Sennett, Judge Alvin B. Rubin, then a district court judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, held that the ORVA did not affect the status of scientific personnel as seamen under general maritime law. The court, however, concluded that the reference in section 4 of the Act to "Title 53 of the Revised Statutes and Act amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto" was sufficiently broad to encompass the Jones Act and foreclose its remedy to scientific personnel aboard oceanographic research vessels.
After examining the purpose and provisions of the Act, the Sennett court concluded that scientific personnel had been classified as non-seamen under Title 53 so as to relieve research vessels from the requirements of certain statutory regulations pertaining to seamen that Congress found hampered their oceanographic research mission. The court did not interpret the statute, which neither states nor implies that scientific personnel are not seamen for any purpose, as changing the provisions of general maritime law with respect to either the traditional maritime crew or the scientific personnel on board research vessels. The Act provided only that such personnel would not be considered seamen under Title 53 and amendatory acts. 325 F.Supp. at 4, 6.
The district court also noted that the Jones Act was not enacted as part of Title 53 of the Revised Statutes. However, the court concluded as a matter of statutory construction that the Jones Act was an act "amendatory" to Title 53; therefore, by virtue of section 4 of the ORVA, the congressionally created action for damages at law in favor of a seaman injured by the negligence of his employer was unavailable to scientific personnel:
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