Presley v. Graham
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12–CV–374–WKW. |
| Citation | 936 F.Supp.2d 1316 |
| Parties | Christina PRESLEY, Plaintiff, v. James P. GRAHAM, Jr., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas, Jon Craig Goldfarb, Lachlan William Smith, Wiggins Childs Quinn & Pantanzis, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.
Alan Thomas Hargrove, Jr., Ronald Gregg Davenport, Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett PC, Bethany Lynn Bolger, Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Emily Coody Marks, Tabor Robert Novak, Jr., Ball Ball Matthews & Novak PA, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Christina Presley, a former city police officer, brings this action against the City of Phenix City, Alabama (“City”), and City Attorney James P. Graham, Jr., alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state-law claims. Before the court are Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. (Docs. # 7, 9); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Ms. Presley filed a response (Doc. # 15), and Mr. Graham filed a reply brief (Doc. # 17). For the reasons to follow, the court finds that the motions are due to be denied.
Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court “must accept the well pleaded facts as true and resolve them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Paradise Divers, Inc. v. Upmal, 402 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir.2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Moreover, while generally the “ ‘scope of the review must be limited to the four corners of the complaint’ ” in Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings, Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2002)), there are exceptions to this general rule. Two such exceptions are relevant in this case. First, in addition to considering the properly pleaded allegations of the complaint, a court can consider “an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” Id. Second, a court can take “judicial notice of its own records.” ITT Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 651 F.2d 343, 345 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (); see alsoFed.R.Evid. 201 ().
This federal lawsuit arises out of Ms. Presley's settlement of another federal lawsuit. See Presley v. City of Phenix City, No. 3: 10cv821 (M.D. Ala., filed Sept. 29, 2010) (“ Presley I ”). The facts are best understood in light of the proceedings underlying Presley I, and that is where the court begins.1
Ms. Presley began her career as an officer with the Phenix City police department in 1997. Fast forward twelve years to 2009, and Ms. Presley, who then worked as a criminal investigator, scored one of the top grades on a written promotional exam. That score earned Ms. Presley a promotion to sergeant. Before the promotion took effect, however, Ms. Presley engaged in conduct that her superiors deemed insubordination. In short, Ms. Presley refused her superior's directive to arrest a suspect because she believed the suspect had acted in self defense when he cut the alleged victim during an altercation. As a result of her decision, Ms. Presley lost her promotion and gained a three-day suspension.
Ms. Presley responded by filing Presley I, an employment discrimination lawsuit against the City, its police chief, and one of its police officers. She alleged gender discrimination on failure-to-promote and discriminatory-discipline grounds, contending that the police department treated similarly situated male officers more favorably in violation of federal law. Mr. Graham representedthe defendants in that lawsuit. After the court denied the defendants' summary judgment motion, but before trial, Ms. Presley and the defendants entered into a written settlement agreement that resulted in the dismissal of her lawsuit.2 The agreement's terms provided for payment of a substantial monetary sum to Ms. Presley and Ms. Presley's permanent resignation from the police department. The agreement also contained a “confidentiality of settlement” clause, which provided, in pertinent part:
Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants, their attorneys, or any person acting by, through, under or in concert with Plaintiff of [sic] Defendants, shall disclose any of the terms of the settlement to any individual or entity. If either the Defendants or Plaintiff is asked a question regarding the Lawsuit or this Agreement, all agree that they shall limit their remarks to saying simply that the matter has been settled or resolved to their satisfaction or the satisfaction of all parties.
Five days after the parties finalized the settlement agreement, a local newspaper reporter, who had been reporting on the lawsuit since its inception, contacted Mr. Graham. Mr. Graham divulged the monetary amount of the settlement, the division of the money between Ms. Presley and her attorney, and the fact that Ms. Presley's resignation was a term of the settlement. The reporter then wrote an article about the settlement that ran locally and through national wire services. That article divulged the settlement terms as relayed by Mr. Graham and also quoted Mr. Graham as calling Ms. Presley a “supervisor's nightmare.” (Compl. ¶ 16.)
This lawsuit followed. Ms. Presley's Complaint contains four causes of action and names the City and Mr. Graham. Count I alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Mr. Graham in his individual capacity. Counts II, III, and IV allege state-law causes of action against both Defendants for defamation, breach of contract, and fraud in the inducement.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. The court first addresses Mr. Graham's motion and then the City's. For the reasons to follow, both are due to be denied.
A. Mr. Graham's Motion to Dismiss1. § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claim
In Count I, Ms. Presley alleges that Mr. Graham retaliated against her in violation of her rights to freedom of speech and to petition for the redress of grievances under the First Amendment. She avers that Presley I constitutes protected speech and a petition for redress of grievances, and that Mr. Graham retaliated against her for having filed Presley I by breaching the settlement agreement that had resolved it.
Mr. Graham's first argument for dismissal boldly attempts to turn § 1983 on its head by insisting on dismissal because Ms. Presley accuses him of acting “under color of law.” (Doc. # 7, at 3.) But a cursory glance at the text of § 1983 reveals how that argument is flawed: Section 1983 provides for individual liability only against those who act under color of state law. See42 U.S.C. § 1983 (). The Complaint's allegation that Mr. Graham acted under color of law states an essential element of Ms. Presley's § 1983 claim; it does not provide a proper basis for dismissal.
“The right to petition the courts for redress implicates the First Amendment right of free speech and right to petition the government.” The Real Estate Bar Assoc. for Mass., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Info. Servs., 608 F.3d 110, 124 (1st Cir.2010). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a plaintiff alleging “retaliation for exercising rights protected by the First Amendment must allege ‘first, that his [or her] speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.’ ” Abella v. Simon, 482 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2005)). Mr. Graham challenges the first and second elements.
As the court understands Mr. Graham's argument with respect to element one, whether the retaliation claim is analyzed under the First Amendment's Speech Clause or the Petition Clause, Presley I must relate to a matter of public concern to warrant constitutional protection. In support of his argument, Mr. Graham cites First Amendment speech cases in the public-employment context, such as Brown v. School Board of Orange Cnty., 459 Fed.Appx. 817 (11th Cir.2012), and Williams v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 425 Fed.Appx. 787 (11th Cir.2011), for the proposition that an employee's personal grievance is not speech that touches on a matter of public concern. (Doc. # 7, at 6.) And, although not cited by Mr. Graham, the Supreme Court of the United States in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011), held that the “public concern” test also applies to...
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