Presley v. State
| Decision Date | 28 January 1911 |
| Citation | 54 So. 367,61 Fla. 46 |
| Parties | PRESLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Criminal Court of Record, Walton County; C. O. Andrews Judge.
G. D Presley was convicted of burglary, and brings error. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
An allegation that the defendant did unlawfully break and enter a 'certain building, to wit, the warehouse of Stearns & Culver Lumber Company, a corporation,' followed by an allegation of an intent to steal goods of the same corporation in said building, is sufficient as an allegation of the ownership of the building, in a prosecution for breaking and entering.
An acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering a 'commissary' does not prevent a trial on a charge of breaking and entering a 'warehouse,' unless they are the same building.
Where two counts of an information relate to the same transaction and the counts were properly joined, it is not error to deny a motion to require the state to elect between the counts.
A challenge of the panel goes to some matter by which the panel was formed, and not to the disqualification of individuals on the panel.
A motion to strike evidence is properly overruled, when it includes legal and relevant testimony.
Where a part of a conversation is admitted, all of it, heard by the witness, that is relevant, should be admitted.
The trial judge should not, in his charge to the jury or otherwise, so pointedly aim at the credibility of the defendant as a witness for himself as to impress the jury with the idea that the judge, because of the defendant's interest in the case, questioned his credibility.
S. K. Gillis, for plaintiff in error.
Park Trammell, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was convicted in the criminal court of record for Walton county on an information charging the breaking and entering on May 13, 1910, of 'a certain building, to wit, the warehouse of Stearns & Culver Lumber Company, a corporation,' with intent to commit a felony, viz., 'to steal and take and carry away the goods and chattels of Stearns & Culver Lumber Company, a corporation, then and there being found in said building,' and also charging in a separate count larceny of certain goods and chattels of Stearns & Culver Lumber Company, a corporation. Upon a verdict of 'guilty as charged,' the court by judgment imposed a sentence of three years in the state prison, and a writ of error was taken. A motion to quash the information was denied.
The contention that the information is fatally defective in the allegation of ownership of the building is unavailing. An allegation that the defendant did unlawfully break and enter a 'certain building, to wit, the warehouse of Stearns & Culver Lumber Company, a corporation,' followed by an allegation of an intent to steal goods of the same corporation in said building, is sufficient as an allegation of the ownership of the building for the purposes of this statutory offense. The purpose of the statute is to punish for an offense involving the possessory property rights of another.
A demurrer to a plea of autrefois acquit was properly sustained. The plea sets up a trial and acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering a certain building, to wit, 'the commissary of Stearns & Culver Lumber Company, a corporation,' with intent, etc., on July 11, 1910. While the plea states that the two informations charge the same acts and the same offense, it is not stated that the commissary and the warehouse were the same building, and the transcript shows they were different buildings. An acquittal on a charge of breaking and entering a 'commissary' does not prevent a trial on a charge of breaking and entering a 'warehouse,' unless they are the same building. Proof of the breaking and entering of a 'warehouse,' as alleged in the second information, would not have warranted a conviction under the...
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State v. Laundy
...v. State, 143 Tenn. 168, 226 S.W. 189; Gantling v. State, 40 Fla. 237, 23 So. 857; Murray v. State, 25 Fla. 528, 6 So. 498; Presley v. State, 61 Fla. 46, 54 So. 367; v. Evanoff (Cal.App.) 187 P. 54; People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507; Hayworth v. State, 14 Ind. 590. Turning to chapter 12, Laws 19......
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Anderson v. State, 77-213
...in structures and conveyances, as opposed to ownership rights therein. Potter v. State, 91 Fla. 938, 109 So. 91 (1926); Presley v. State, 61 Fla. 46, 54 So. 367 (1911); Vasquez v. State, 350 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Jackson v. State, 259 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Gagne v. St......
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Studstill v. State
... ... made to strike the whole of the testimony given. Most, if not ... all, of such testimony was pertinent and material. It at ... least tended to prove the charge contained in the indictment, ... and should not, therefore, have been stricken. Presley v ... State, 61 Fla. 46, 54 So. 367; Sims v. State, ... 59 Fla. 38, 52 So. 198; Putnal v. State, 56 Fla. 86, ... 47 So. 864; Thompson v. State, 52 Fla. 113, 41 So ... 899; Freeman v. State, 50 Fla. 38, 39 So. 785 ... [83 ... Fla. 626] By motion in arrest of judgment the ... ...