Press v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 June 1914 |
| Citation | 211 N.Y. 489,105 N.E. 826 |
| Parties | MASON-HENRY PRESS v. AETNA LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
Action by the Mason-Henry Press against the AEtna Life Insurance Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department (155 App. Div. 876,139 N. Y. Supp. 1133), unanimously affirming a judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint entered on an order of the Trial Term directing a nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
George W. O'Brien and Albert J. Oct, both of Syracuse, for appellant.
Charles E. Spenser, of Syracuse, for respondent.
The respondent issued to the appellant a contract of insurance commonly known as an employers' liability policy, agreeing to indemnify it against loss or expense from claims arising out of injuries to employés. This policy, in most of its essential parts at least, was in the ordinary form of such contracts, and for the purposes of this discussion special attention need be called to only a few of its provisions.
In substance it provided for notice to the insurer of any accident, for delivery to the latter of any summons or complaint in an action for injuries and control by it of such litigation, with the right to call on the insured for co-operation; also prohibited the insured from assuming any liability or interfering in any negotiations for settlement or in any legal proceedings, or from settling any claim except at its own cost without the consent of the insurer.
It also contained the following provision, which was denominated a ‘Condition,’ and which is the important clause in this action:
‘This policy does not cover loss or expense arising on account of or resulting from injuries or death to, or if caused by (1) any person employed in violation of law.’
In its business appellant operated a printing press, and after the issue of the policy, and while the same was in full force, a boy in its employ was injured while operating the press. Subsequently he served on appellant a notice of claim under the Employers' Liability Act (Consol. Laws, c. 31, §§ 200-204), and still later commenced an action to recover damages. Both in his notice and in his complaint he alleged various derelictions and acts of negligence, and amongst them that at the time of the accident he was 15 years of age, that no certificate as required by law had been issued permitting him to work in a factory or upon printing presses, and that he was therefore employed by the appellant in violation of the Labor Law (Consol. Laws, c. 31), and that said violation caused said accident. An answer was served by the respondent in that action in the name and behalf of the appellant, denying all allegations of negligence and liability.
At the trial the trial justice dismissed all other grounds of complaint and permitted the case to go to the jury on the sole charge that the boy had been employed by the insured in violation of law, and the jury on said ground found a verdict in his favor awarding a substantial sum for damages on which judgment was entered. This respondent refused to pay such judgment on the ground that it resulted from the violation by the insured of the Labor Law, and therefore came within the condition or exemption above quoted.
To retrace our steps somewhat, the insured, appellant here, promptly notified this respondent of the accident as soon as it happened, and there was some discussion with the latter's agent concerning the age of the boy. When the notice of claim and the summons and complaint in that action were served, they were promptly transmitted to this respondent. On receipt of the former the latter wrote to the appellant that it noticed the allegation in the notice ‘that injured was fifteen years of age,’ and asking it to advise respondent whether it had on file at its office a copy of an employment certificate. To this appellant replied that it had on file a statement from the boy's father that he was 16 years of age, which would avoid any violation of the Labor Law. On receipt of the summons and complaint respondent wrote the appellant a letter, stating in substance that it noticed the allegation in the complaint that the injured was under 16 years of age, and that no certificate as required by law had been issued, and calling the attention of the assured to that provision of the policy already quoted providing that the policy did not cover any case where a person had been employed in violation of the law, and stating that, if it developed on the trial of the case that ‘injured was employed contrary to law, this case would not fall to use for attention.’
On receipt of this letter appellant's officer had a conversation with respondent's agent in which the former in substance stated that he did not understand this latter notice; that they had a statement from the boy's father that the boy was over 16 years of age, and thought ‘that they were lying when they say the boy is under sixteen,’ and in which the agent, on the other hand, stated:
Subsequently this respondent, continuing an investigation of the boy's age, discovered a baptismal record indicating that he was under 16 years of age as claimed, and therefore had been employed by appellant in violation of law. It mailed to the appellant a copy of this certificate, and on receipt thereof the latter's officer again went to respondent's office, where the following conversation occurred:
Respondent's manager:
Appellant's officer: ‘Well, that is a matter entirely for the AEtna Insurance Company to consider.’
Respondent's manager: ‘Would not your concern favor contributing towards a settlement?’
Appellant's office: ‘Certainly not; we have the written statement of the father that the boy was 16 years of age; we have hired him in perfectly good faith; we have paid our premiums to the company regularly; and we shall expect the company-insurance company-to take care of us and protect us according to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sauriolle v. O'Gorman
...before the plaintiff has been prejudiced by the delay. Doolan v. U. S. Fid. & G. Co. (N. H.) 161 A. 39; Mason-Henry Press v. Ætna Insurance Co., 211 N. Y. 489, 105 N. E. 826; Meyers v. Continental Casualty Co. (C. C. A.) 12 F.(2d) 52, 55. Ordinarily, and in the absence of agreement of the p......
-
Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., Inc.
...of the policy, the insurer is bound to undertake the defense of the action for the benefit of the assured (Mason-Henry Press v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 211 N.Y. 489, 105 N.E. 826; Ross v. Maryland Casualty Co., 11 A.D.2d 1002, 205 N.Y.S.2d 951, aff'd 9 N.Y.2d 876, 216 N.Y.S.2d 695, 175 N.E.2d 82......
- Weinberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Flaumenbaum
...to reserve rights, which reservation might have rebutted the implications of its acts as insurer (Mason-Henry Press v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 211 N.Y. 489, 105 N.E. 826 (1914); Frank Knauss, Inc. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 270 N.Y. 211, 200 N.E. 791 (1936); O'Dowd v. Am......