Pressley v. Industrial Commission
Decision Date | 13 July 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 5431,5431 |
Citation | 72 Ariz. 299,233 P.2d 1082 |
Parties | PRESSLEY v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Hall, Catlin & Molloy, of Tucson, for petitioner.
H. S. McCluskey, of Phoenix, for respondents Industrial Commission; Robert E. Yount and Donald J. Morgan, of Phoenix, of counsel.
Richey & Herring, of Tucson and Douglas, by Norman Herring, of Douglas, amicus curiae.
DE CONCINI, Justice.
Petitioner, Frank M. Pressley, on March 9, 1950, was in the employ of Pioneer Constructors, a firm engaged in construction of a sewer line in Tucson, Arizona. At about one o'clock, p. m. that day he was seriously injured by a gas explosion in a manhole where he was working. He was taken to a hospital, where he remained until April 15th, and was finally discharged by his physician on June 9th. The initial report of accident required by law was filed with the Industrial Commission on March 13th, together with the report of the attending physician. On March 22nd a workman's claim for compensation was filed with the commission, signed 'Frank Pressley, by E. L. Kettenback, M. D.' Both the doctor and Pressley testified that the latter never requested Dr. Kettenback to sign the application or to file the same.
On March 29th the commission entered findings that petitioner suffered an injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and ordered that Pressley was entitled to compensation under the Act, and accepted responsibility for the medical benefits and compensation provided thereby. On the same day, the commission wrote Pressley that his claim for compensation was not properly signed and enclosed application forms partially filled in by the commission. Pressley signed these forms on March 31st and returned them, but did not fill in any of the remaining blanks, among which were questions inquiring if any third party was liable for the accident. They were filed with the commission and thereafter it paid, for medical benefits, the sum of $859. On April 5th the commission sent petitioner a check for compensation which was returned by him on about April 28th. On May 1st the petitioner executed, on a form provided by the commission, an election of remedies as follows
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'The said claimant, in making said election of remedies, under 2 or 3, consents and agrees to all of the provisions of the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Law and the Arizona Occupational Disease Disability Law in the matter of accident benefits, and compensation; and agrees to follow any competent and reasonable surgical treatment, or medical aid, found to be necessary by The Industrial Commission of Arizona for the relief, cure, or improvement of the condition of said claimant.'
and on May 6th filed a petition containing, among other things, the following:
'3. That your petitioner did on March 31st, 1950 sign a 'Workmen's Claim for Compensation for Injuries or Occupational Disease' and a 'Workman's Supplemental Claim for Compensation' which instruments were duly filed with the Commission and are hereby referred to for all purposes.
and asked that his medical benefits be continued but that his claim for compensation be held in abeyance pending final decision of his suit against the Tucson Gas, Electric Light & Power Company under section 56-949, supra. On June 12th the commission made an award retaining jurisdiction of the case and in effect denied petitioner the right to sue said third party.
A petition for rehearing was duly filed and on September 5th the commission affirmed the previous award. Application was made for a writ of certiorari to the supreme court and the writ was granted. The matter is now before the court on the answer to the writ.
The situation presented is somewhat peculiar. Petitioner claims the commission is primarily liable only for accident benefits but secondarily liable for compensation benefits under section 56-949, supra, and then only to the extent he fails to recover from a third party as much as he would be entitled to recover from the commission under the Act; while the commission insists that it is primarily liable for both accident benefits and compensation to the full extent of the Act.
The questions involved require a construction of various sections of the compensation Act and of the constitution of Arizona. In construing them there are certain principles which we must always keep before us: They must be considered as a whole so as to effectuate the purpose of the legislature and of the people as set forth in the constitution and the Act, and, so far as statutes are concerned, are to be construed liberally and remedially. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 32 Ariz. 265, 257 P. 641. The purpose of the compensation Act and of article 18, section 8, of the constitution, as amended, was to dispense, so far as possible with litigation between employer and employee and to place upon industry the burden of compensation for injuries caused by the employment. Sims v. Moeur, 41 Ariz. 486, 19 P.2d 679.
In passing upon the assignments of error, we think it best to dispose of them according to the legal questions raised thereby rather than the formal assignments as presented in the briefs.
The first question is whether petitioner is entitled to accident benefits even though he elects to sue a third party whom he claims is responsible for the accident.
Section 56-930, A.C.A.1939, provides:
At first blush this section would appear to indicate that the term 'compensation' was intended to include the term accident 'benefits' and that the latter are a component of the former. An examination of the Act in its entirety renders this interpretation of section 56-930, supra, incongruous with its subsequent provisions. Section 56-938(a), A.C.A.1939, details the various benefits to which every injured employee is entitled, such as surgical and hospital treatment, and nursing and medical supplies, and terms them 'accident benefits.' Subsection (b) sets up a separate accident benefit fund and provides that the compensation fund shall not be liable for such benefits. Sections 56-940, 941, and 942, A.C.A. 1939, further provide for the operation and administration of the accident benefit fund. From these sections, as from the entire Act, it can be seen that the legislature, notwithstanding section 56-930, supra, intended to treat 'compenastion' and 'accident benefits' as two separate and distinct entities, independent of one another. That the legislature so intended to differentiate between compensation and accident benefits was established by this court in the case of Paramount Pictures v. Ind. Comm., 56 Ariz. 217, 106 P.2d 1024. After a careful study of all of the various sections of the Act, particularly sections 56-920, 931, 932, 936, 938, 940, and 942, we hold that an employee who elects to sue a third party under section 56-949, supra, is nevertheless entitled to receive 'accident benefits' from the commission. This is so because section 56-938, supra, in particular provides that every injured employee shall receive 'accident benefits.' No distinction is made between employees who elect to pursue their remedy against a third party under section 56-949, A.C.A.1939, and those who elect to receive compensation. The only logical assumption, then, is that the legislature intended that all injured employees should receive accident benefits including those who elect to pursue a third party. Therefore section 56-950, supra, which provides that an employee who makes an application for an award waives his right to pursue a third party, by necessity refers to an application for an award for compensation and not to an application for an award for accident benefits. Under section 56-938, supra, an application for an award for accident benefits is not a waiver of the employee's right to pursue his remedy against a third party.
The second question is the one raised by amicus curiae, that an injured employee retains both the right of full recovery under the Act and also the common law...
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