Pressley v. Mobile & G.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1882
• Citation: 15 F. 199
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
• Parties: PRESSLEY v. MOBILE & G.R. CO.

15 F. 199

PRESSLEY v. MOBILE & G.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, M.D. Alabama.

May Term, 1882

D. S Troy and H. C. Tompkins, for plaintiff.

David Clopton and J. T. Norman, for defendant.

BRUCE J.

This is an action for damages for a malicious prosecution, instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant, a corporation organized under the laws of Alabama and doing business in the state of Alabama. The declaration alleges that the defendant on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1881, at Pollard, in the county of Escambia, in the state of Alabama, the circuit court for said county being then and there in session, * * * by its duly-authorized agent, W. J. Van Kirk, upon oath wrongfully, falsely, and maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, * * * charged the plaintiff with having committed the crime of grand larceny; * * * that the defendant caused and induced the grand jury to find a bill of indictment against him; and that upon a writ issued he was arrested and held for trial upon the indictment, and afterwards, upon a plea of not guilty, he was tried in said court and acquitted, and the prosecution ended. To this declaration the defendant corporation plead not guilty.

The verdict of the jury was for plaintiff, and the main question made upon the motion for a new trial is, whether the defendant railroad company can be held responsible in damages for what Van Kirk did in the institution of the prosecution against the plaintiff, even if he was the agent of the defendant in the collection of rents, stumpages, and to sell and take charge of the lands of the company, and acted in the matter without probable cause.

It is not claimed that the agent, Van Kirk, had from the defendant railroad company any express authority to do what he did do in the matter of the institution of the prosecution of the plaintiff, nor is it claimed that there was on the part of the corporation, by any of its officers or agents, any subsequent ratification, approval, or sanction of what Van Kirk had done in the matter of the prosecution and the proposition of the defendant railroad company is that it cannot be held for the malicious acts of its agent, Van Kirk, upon any implied authority to do what he did in the matter of the prosecution of plaintiff, and that it can only be held responsible upon proof showing express authority or subsequent ratification of his (the agent's) acts.

Van Kirk's employment was that of a land agent for the company, and he had and exercised supervision over the lands of the railroad company in Escambia and other counties in Alabama. He was in charge of their lands; made leases, collected rents, stumpage, and even negotiated sales of lands for the railroad company.

The question then is, can an agent, acting under such an authority, institute against parties a criminal prosecution for larceny or other offense against the criminal laws, committed in reference to the property in his custody as agent, and so bind his principal in damages for a malicious prosecution, if it shall be shown that the prosecution was without probable cause and malicious?

It is settled law that corporations are liable for torts committed by their agents in the discharge of the business of their employment, and within the proper range of such employment. Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 645; Redf. Railw. Sec. 130, and authorities there cited.

It was formerly held that a railroad company could not be held for the willful act of its employe, unless the act was previously ordered or subsequently ratified by the corporation. That rule has been modified, and in the recent case of Gilliam v. S. & N.A.R. Co., in manuscript, the supreme court of Alabama, after saying that the rule has never been fully satisfactory, say:

'The precise modification is that if the agent, while acting within the range of his employment, do an act injurious to another, either through negligence wantonness, or intention, then for such abuse of the authority conferred upon him, or implied in his appointment, the master or employer is responsible in damages to the person thus injured; but if the agent go beyond the range of his employment or duties, and of his own will do an unlawful act injurious to another, the agent is liable, but the master or employer is not.'

To this proposition many authorities are cited. The court proceeds:

'The older cases follow the doctrine declared in McMannus v. Crocket, 1 East, 106, and relieve the master or employer from liability for tortious acts of the agent if intentionally done, although within the range of his duties, unless the tortious act was commanded or adopted by the master. In Railroad Co. v. Webb, 49 Ala. 240, this court held that a railroad company cannot be sued in trespass for the willful tort of its employe unless the act was previously ordered or subsequently ratified by the corporation. We think the principle there announced should be so far modified as to limit its application to tortious acts of the agent done outside of his employment; to this extent we adopt the modified rule as applicable to railroads and their employes.'

The question, then, is, not whether the agent, Van Kirk, had been...