Preston v. Champion Home Builders Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 November 1992 |
| Citation | 187 A.D.2d 795,589 N.Y.S.2d 940 |
| Parties | Kevin A. PRESTON, Respondent, v. CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS INC., Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Dykema Gossett (William B. Balke, of counsel), Detroit, Mich. and Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, Albany, for appellant.
Lester A. Sittler, Fly Creek, for respondent.
Before MIKOLL, J.P., and YESAWICH, MERCURE, CREW and CASEY, JJ.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Thomas, J.), entered December 27, 1991 in Otsego County, which denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
In November 1972, plaintiff was hired to work at defendant's manufactured home construction plant in the Village of Richfield Springs, Otsego County. Plaintiff admits that he was hired for an indefinite period of time and that his employment application contained no limitation on defendant's right to discharge him at any time.
As part of a consolidation effort, defendant's Richfield Springs plant was closed in 1979 and its operations were transferred to defendant's facility in the Town of Sangerfield, Oneida County, some 45 miles away. Plaintiff, who had begun working at the Sangerfield facility when the relocation occurred, continued to do so until February 1980, when defendant announced a pay raise which plaintiff found inadequate to compensate him for the extra distance that he had to travel to Sangerfield. He thereupon announced that he was quitting and gave two weeks' notice. As plaintiff, a group leader, was considered to be a valuable employee, the superintendent and plant manager, in the course of efforts to induce him to remain, told plaintiff that he would be promoted to assistant superintendent and given additional pay and benefits if he did not leave the company. Assertedly, plaintiff, who admittedly had no other job opportunities at the time, was still not ready to stay because job security was lacking. Plaintiff alleges that at this point he was assured that he could not be fired without warning and without good reason because he was "covered by the manual". He was given a copy of the 1979 employee manual to take home to review, and the next day he withdrew his resignation and accepted the position of assistant superintendent.
Thereafter, on two occasions, in 1985 and 1986, plaintiff signed certification forms agreeing to be bound by revised versions of the employee manual; the 1979 manual states that it "may be amended by [defendant] from time to time as [the employees'] job security and business conditions justify". In June 1986, a new plant manager was appointed to the Sangerfield facility. Problems arose between plaintiff and the new manager, and on August 26, 1988 plaintiff was fired. The separation notice lists the reasons for his dismissal as "[i]nability to work within company guidelines, causing disruption, of poor production, poor quality, and poor moral [sic ]". It is undisputed that plaintiff received no written warnings prior to his dismissal.
Plaintiff commenced this action charging that, by terminating him without just cause and without following the procedures outlined in the employee manual, defendant breached an alleged implied contract of employment. After issue was joined defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff was an employee at will and hence defendant had an absolute right to terminate him. Although Supreme Court denied the motion, its rationale for doing so is unknown as it did not issue a written decision or furnish an oral explanation on the record. Defendant appeals, and we reverse.
In New York, it is axiomatic that if an employment contract does not specify the length of employment, "an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party" (Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919). An employee...
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Waddell v. Boyce Thompson Inst. for Plant Research, Inc.
...the [940 N.Y.S.2d 333] successful plaintiff must sustain an ‘explicit and difficult pleading burden’ ” ( Preston v. Champion Home Bldrs., 187 A.D.2d 795, 796–797, 589 N.Y.S.2d 940 [1992], quoting Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d at 334–335, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919; see Matter of......
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Munn v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A.
...v. National Westminster Bank, U.S.A., 204 A.D.2d 676, 612 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (2nd Dept. 1994); Preston v. Champion Home Builders Inc., 187 A.D.2d 795, 589 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (3rd Dept.1992)). In this case, plaintiff claims that the following communications establish an express limitation on M......
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Estronza v. RJF Sec. & Investigations, Robert Foglia, Joseph Foglia, Lindsay Park Hous. Corp.
...to her and that her employment was secure does not raise a triable question of fact in this matter."); Preston v. Champion Home Builders, 589 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941-42 (App. Div. 1992) ("Plaintiff asserts that defendant's oral assurance that he would be covered by the manual, coupled with the wr......
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McCarthy v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF ERIE COMM. COLLEGE, 94-CV-616C(F).
...right to discharge the plaintiff at will was fatal to the plaintiff's case"). See also, Preston v. Champion Home Builders, Inc., 187 A.D.2d 795, 589 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Dept.1992); Dickstein v. Del Laboratories, Inc., 145 A.D.2d 408, 535 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93-94 (2d Dept. 1988), appeal denie......