Preston v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 14-4733 (KM) (JBC) |
| Parties | ROBIN PRESTON, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN GROUP PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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The plaintiff, Robin Preston, brought this action against her insurer, Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan"). She alleges that Metropolitan under-investigated and underpaid her claims for damage to her house caused by Superstorm Sandy. This, says Preston, was a breach of the insurance contract. Now before the court is Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 16) Because the claim was filed outside of the contractual one-year limitations period, the motion will be granted.
Preston owns a home at 1101 Third Avenue, Asbury Park, New Jersey. Preston had a homeowner's insurance policy underwritten by Metropolitan, under the policy number 1427978921 ("Policy"). (Id. ¶¶ 5-8; Certification of John Robertelli, Esq. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated June 23, 2015, Dkt. No. 16-2 ("Robertelli Cert.") Ex. C) Preston originally obtained the Policy in 2010, and it was renewed yearly through 2015. On October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy caused wind damage to Preston's home. (Compl. ¶ 11) Preston submitted a claim to Metropolitan on November 3, 2012, under the claim number JDC93472. (Id. ¶ 14; Robertelli Cert. ¶ 13) Metropolitan inspected Preston's property and generated an adjustment report and estimate of damage dated November 19, 2012. (Robertelli Cert. ¶ 14, Ex. H) The Property was re-inspected twice thereafter, the final inspection taking place in January of 2013. (Id., Ex. F) Metropolitan paid Preston for the claim in a series of seven checks sent from December 3, 2012, to February 4, 2013, in the total amount of $14,721.06. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. D) There were no further payments by Metropolitan or additional claims by Preston after the February 4, 2013 check. (Id.) Preston, through her counsel, contacted Metropolitan by letter dated August 14, 2013, requesting a copy of the Policy and adjuster reports. (Id., Ex. E) Metropolitan responded on April 24, 2014, with the requested documents, but Preston did not make a claim to Metropolitan or ask for a readjustment. (Id., Ex. F)
Preston filed her complaint on May 8, 2014, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County. The original complaint asserted causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith. The bad faith claim was dismissed with prejudice on consent by order entered July 29, 2014. (Robertelli Cert., Ex. B) Metropolitan removed the action to this court on July 29, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1) Metropolitan answered the Complaint on August 18, 2014. (Dkt. No. 6)
On June 16, 2015, Magistrate Judge James B. Clark, III granted Metropolitan leave to file this summary judgment motion and stayed discovery pending its resolution. (Dkt. No. 13) Metropolitan filed its motion (Dkt. No. 16); Preston opposed (Dkt. No. 17); and Metropolitan filed a reply (Dkt. Nos. 18, 19). Metropolitan was granted leave to file a supplemental affidavit and did so on August 6, 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 21, 22) Preston filed a response to that supplemental submission on August 14, 2015. (Dkt. No. 23)
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
a. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (). "[U]nsupported allegations ... and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment." Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138(3d Cir. 2001) (). If the nonmoving party has failed "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, ... there can be 'no genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
This action was filed on May 8, 2014. Metropolitan moves for summary judgment, stating that Preston's claim is barred by the one-year suit limitation period in the insurance policy. The Policy provides:
Lawsuits Against Us. No suit or action may be brought against us by you unless there has been full compliance with all of the policy terms. Under Section I of this policy, any suit or action seeking coverage must be brought within twelve months of the loss.
(Policy, Robertelli Cert. Ex. C p. 41) (emphasis in original).
Preston does not dispute that the one-year limitations period is reasonable and enforceable.1 Rather, the parties disagree on when the clock was running.
Preston's contentions rest on tolling rules under New Jersey law. For insurance claims, the limitations period begins to run on the date of casualty or accident. It is tolled, however, "from the time the insured gives notice until liability is formally declined." Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 498, 521 (N.J. 1970). That is, the time when the claim is being negotiated or processedby the insurer is not counted against the insured. Where the insurer has not (as in Peloso) declined liability, but the parties disagree on the settlement amount, the limitations period is still suspended while the claim is pending—i.e., through the last settlement payment. See Gahnney, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
The hurricane that damaged Preston's house occurred on October 29, 2012. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations began to run on that date, at the earliest. It took Preston only five days—from October 29 until November 3, 2012—to file her original claim.
Under Peloso, the limitations period was tolled from the time Preston gave Metropolitan notice of the damage until the time Metropolitan made the final payment to Preston.2 Thus the tolling ceased, and the limitations period began running again, on February 4, 2013, the date that Metropolitan paid Preston the last settlement check. The action was not filed within one year of that date; some 15 months passed before it was filed on May 8, 2014.
But Preston has another argument. Equitable tolling, she says, should apply because it was not clear to her at the time that the check of February 4, 2013, was the final check. Preston seems to argue that the final check should have announced itself in some way; otherwise, she says, a series of checks is simply an "invitation to submit additional evidence to recover for the loss as well as a promise to make future payments." (Br. p.10)
Equitable estoppel is a flexible doctrine, but some principles are well established:
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