Prestonsburg Superior Oil Gas Co. v. Vance

• Decision Date: 08 June 1926
• Citation: 284 S.W. 405,215 Ky. 77
• Parties: PRESTONSBURG SUPERIOR OIL GAS CO. v. VANCE ET AL.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

284 S.W. 405

215 Ky. 77

PRESTONSBURG SUPERIOR OIL GAS CO. v. VANCE ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 8, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Floyd County.

Action by George W. Vance and another against the Prestonsburg Superior Oil Gas Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Joseph D. Harkins, of Prestonsburg, for appellant.

C. B Wheeler, of Prestonsburg, for appellees.

SANDIDGE J.

The appellees George W. and Dewey Vance recovered judgment for $2,500 against appellant, Prestonsburg Superior Oil Gas Company, in the Floyd circuit court in an action by them against it for damages resulting from a fire which destroyed their dwelling house alleged to have been the result of its negligence. Hence the appeal.

Appellant's chief ground for reversal is that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict in its favor at the close of the evidence. The facts are these: Appellant supplies natural gas to the city of Prestonsburg. Appellees owned a dwelling house within that city. They had applied for gas service, and servants of appellant were engaged in piping the residence and installing the meters. It was necessary to install two meters because the first and second floors of the residence were occupied by different families. A single line of pipe from the gas main in the street carried the gas to the basement of the residence. By the use of a Tjoint the gas was led from it through separate lines and meters to the two apartments. All connections had been made to the upstairs apartment. Nothing remained to be done to complete the piping to the first floor apartment except to make the connection at the T. A plug was unscrewed from the T, and, while the connection to it was being made, an explosion occurred which shook the house considerably, and burned the three workmen engaged in making the connection, one of them very painfully and severely. In the excitement which followed it was discovered that a fire had ignited in the room immediately over where the explosion occurred. The two workmen who were not so severely injured and others who had responded to the alarm threw water on and put out the fire. There is a difference between the testimony for appellant and that for appellees as to the extent to which the fire had ignited and burned before it was put out. The witnesses for appellant testified that the fire was confined to some loose newspapers which were on the floor of the room immediately above where the explosion occurred. The testimony for appellees tended to establish that the fire also ignited and burned part of the canvas and paper on one wall and on the ceiling. Everybody present thought that all of the fire was extinguished. There is quite a variance in the testimony as to when the explosion occurred, some of the witnesses estimating the time as early as 3 o'clock in the afternoon, while others place it as late as 5 p. m. We feel safe in assuming that it was about 4 o'clock p. m.

Appellee George W. Vance occupied the first floor apartment and was away from home at the time the explosion occurred. He returned, however, about 7 o'clock, and, of course examined the premises and satisfied himself that the fire had all been extinguished. He and his family retired about 9:30 o'clock. Mr. C. B. Wheeler and his wife occupied the second-floor apartment, and they appear to have just moved into it and not then to have finished the placing of their furniture and household effects. They were both in their apartment when the explosion occurred, and both were present and took part in what was done to extinguish the fire discovered shortly after the explosion. Between that time and the time when they retired for the night they appear to have gone several times to the part of the house affected by the explosion and fire to assure themselves that it had all been extinguished. They remained up until 11:30 or 12 o'clock that night, and immediately before retiring descended to the first floor of the building and went again into the room where the fire had been to see that it had not broken out afresh. Observing no signs of fire, they returned to their apartment and retired.

At approximately 2 o'clock the inmates of the house were awakened to discover that it was afire, and the fire then was so far advanced that they were able to escape only in their nightclothing, and were unable to save from the building any of its contents. The testimony all establishes that the fire when discovered was in that portion of the house beneath which the explosion had occurred in the afternoon, and in which the fire, discovered immediately after the explosion, had ignited.

Appellant does not seriously contend that there was not sufficient evidence to make it a question for the jury whether the explosion at 4 o'clock in the afternoon was the result of its negligence. Appellant's servants who were doing the work testified that the explosion occurred after they removed the plug from the gas line and while they were connecting it with the line to the meter. They admitted that they did that without having turned off the gas and while the gas at full pressure was in the lines. These facts and the fact of the explosion were sufficient to take the case to the jury on the question of appellant's negligence, regardless of the further testimony by its employees that they did not strike any matches or do anything to cause the explosion. The circumstances here are very much the same as in Louisville Gas Co. v. Guelat et al., 150 Ky. 583, 150 S.W. 656, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 703, where, under authority of Smith v. Boston Gas Co., 129 Mass. 318, it was held that a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the gas company was made.

Appellant bases its right to have had a directed verdict at the close of the testimony upon the contention that there is a total absence of proof in the record that the fire which occurred at approximately 2 o'clock at night which destroyed the residence was the direct and proximate result of its negligence, if such be conceded, which caused the explosion and fire in the afternoon. The argument for it is that since everybody present, including appellee, who occupied the lower apartment, and Wheeler, who occupied the upper apartment threw water on and extinguished all the fire visible and threw water into the walls of the building where it was thought possible fire might have ignited, and satisfied themselves thoroughly that all the fire caused by the explosion had been extinguished, that all of it was extinguished, and that the fire which ignited later and destroyed the dwelling house came from some other cause. The evidence, however, discloses that the heat from the explosion was sufficient to inflict severe and...