Pribble v. Stanley

• Citation: 81 S.E. 577,74 W.Va. 75
• Parties: PRIBBLE v. STANLEY.
• Decision Date: 07 April 1914
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

81 S.E. 577

74 W.Va. 75

PRIBBLE v. STANLEY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

April 7, 1914

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a tenant denies his landlord's title, refuses to pay rent and holds over after his term, in this case from month to month, the landlord may maintain unlawful detainer to recover possession.

A tenant is estopped to deny his landlord's title to the leased premises to the extent necessary to support his own lease.

A tenant who by his contract of lease has authority to erect on the leased premises buildings or fixtures, and to remove the same at the end of his term, has a reasonable time after the expiration of his lease to remove such buildings or fixtures.

And when such lease is extended with right to so continue to occupy the leased land for an increased rental, until the land occupied is required by the landlord for particular purposes, such tenant is entitled to notice to quit and a reasonable time thereafter to remove such building or fixtures.

In such action of unlawful detainer begun before a justice and appealed by the defendant to the circuit court, the circuit court, on the verdict finding for plaintiff damages for rent accrued to plaintiff may in addition to pronouncing judgment for possession, and pursuant to sections 172 and 218, chapter 50, Code 1913, give judgment also in favor of plaintiff, and against defendant and those who signed his appeal bond as sureties, for the amount of such damages, though in excess of the amount of damages claimed in the summons of the justice.

Error to Circuit Court, Ritchie County.

Unlawful detainer by F. P. Pribble against S. Stanley. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Robinson & Prunty, of Harrisville, for plaintiff in error.

J Newman, of Cairo, and R. S. Blair, of Harrisville, for defendant in error.

MILLER P.

This is an action of unlawful detainer, begun before a justice by plaintiff against defendant, to recover possession of "part of one house and lot of land" in the town of Cairo, Ritchie County, West Virginia, further described as "being a part of a two story, frame, house, situated near the Oil Well Supply Co.'s shop, * * * commonly known as the A. S. Lemon house, situated on a lot of land 20 feet wide and 50 feet long, heretofore leased by the C. & K. V. R R. Co., to E. Overton, by agreement dated September 2 1902." The writ also demanded ten dollars damages. Defendant filed an affidavit that the title would come in question, which was met by a counter affidavit, and the justice overruled the point.

The judgment of the justice was for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. On the trial in the circuit court on appeal, defendant again moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the title to the real estate would come in question, which the court overruled.

On the trial in the circuit court the jury found for plaintiff the premises described in the summons, and assessed his damages at eighty and 50-100 dollars; and the judgment thereon complained of was that plaintiff recover from defendant possession of the premises, and also from defendant Stanley, and Shaffer and Fetty, sureties on his appeal bond, the sum of eighty and 50-100 dollars, the damages found by the jury, together with his costs in that court and also in the justice's court expended.

On the motions to dismiss we think the judgment of the justice and of the circuit court thereon were clearly right. The title to the real estate was not controverted. It was conceded that the title to the lot was in the railroad company; and the only question was as to Stanley's right to hold the property as against plaintiff, under whom he originally entered and occupied the same.

The railroad company originally leased the lot to Overton; Overton assigned to Caton, and he to Lemon, who after the expiration of the lease continued to occupy the lot with the house built thereon, but under a new contract with the railroad company, and paid the rent. In April, 1908, he executed a deed of trust on the house and certain other personal property therein described to secure plaintiff the payment of a debt of $204.00, under which trust in July, 1910, the house was sold by the trustee and purchased by plaintiff, who before that had been given possession of the property by Lemon.

The new contract with the railroad company was proven by the agent as follows: "No, sir. It was not continued. The lease expired in September, 1907. The lease was for one dollar a month, and expired in September, 1907, and about a month prior to that Mr. Lemon came to me and asked to renew the lease, and I told him I would ask the superintendent about it and report to him, which I did, and I told him that under the superintendent's instruction, we wouldn't renew the lease, but we would allow him to remain there, and leave his house there for one dollar and a half, payable monthly, as long as we didn't need the ground for extension of tracks or something else. And this seemed to be satisfactory to him, and he paid the ground rent for it, after the expiration of the lease, for one dollar and a half, as long as he did pay it." The original lease from the railroad company to Overton was unconditional, no time being specified to remove the house from the lot. It is not pretended that the railroad company ever gave notice to Lemon or plaintiff to vacate the lot, or remove the house therefrom, either before or since this suit was brought. True the deed of trust covered only the house on the...