Pribyl v. Standard Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1954
• Docket Number: No. 48617,48617
• Citation: 246 Iowa 333,67 N.W.2d 438
• Parties: Caroline PRIBYL, Appellee, v. STANDARD ELECTRIC COMPANY, Employer, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 438

67 N.W.2d 438

246 Iowa 333

Caroline PRIBYL, Appellee, v. STANDARD ELECTRIC COMPANY, Employer, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellants.

No. 48617.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 14, 1954.

Jordan & Jordan, Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

Barnes, Wadsworth, Elderkin & Locher, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case. The claimant's husband, a journeyman electrician and union member, was hired through the union by the employer, Standard Electric Company, of Cedar Rapids, to work at Coralville, in Johnson County. An existing contract between the union and certain contractors, among whom was the defendant employer, provided in part: 'On work outside Linn County the Employer shall furnish transportation.' Pursuant to conferences between the defendant employer and a union representative held to explore ways to obtain and transport some twenty-five needed workmen who would accept employment on the Coralville project, an agreement was reached and later approved by the union-employer's joint conference committee, whereby said employees would receive 8cents a mile for the 54 miles round trip in lieu of being actually transported by the employer in vehicles provided by him for that purpose. While driving his car to work at Coralville under such working agreement, the claimant's husband was fatally injured in an accident on December 1, 1952. On February 5, 1953, claimant filed her application for arbitration. The matter was tried before the deputy commissioner who found for the claimant, and the commissioner affirmed the findings. The district court sustained the ruling of the industrial commission and that decision is now before us for review.

The principal issue throughout these proceedings has been whether the injuries resulting in the death of Charles Pribyl arose out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant Standard Electric Company. Defendants urge that Mr. Pribyl lost his life following injuries he received going to his regular place of work to commence his work day, and that at the time of his injury he was not engaged in a place where his employer's business required his presence; that he was traveling to work in his own vehicle, under his own control, and was furnishing his own transportation under a separate agreement which changed or modified the original agreement by which the defendant employer had agreed to furnish transportation. The claimant denies those allegations and contends the proven facts, circumstances and inferences generated a question of fact for the commissioner, and his findings in favor of the claimant thereon are conclusive.

I. It is true, in the absence of fraud the findings of fact made by the industrial commissioner within his powers are conclusive and binding upon us. Section 86.29, Code 1954, I.C.A.; Bruner v. Klassi, 241 Iowa 1007, 1011, 44 N.W.2d 366, 368, and cases cited therein; Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., 230 Iowa 108, 114, 296 N.W. 800, 803.

II. However, the pertinent facts are not in dispute, nor may different inferences reasonably be drawn therefrom. Both parties relied upon the testimony in the transcript and its fair inferences relating to the negotiations before and by the joint conference committee as contractually establishing either (1) an acceptable method of furnishing transportation by the employer, or (2) an acceptable substitute therefor. It must therefore be evident the controlling question here is a law question, and we are of course not bound by the commissioner's findings or conclusions of law.

It is difficult at times to differentiate between findings of fact, and findings or conclusions of law in such cases, but where the ultimate conclusion can be arrived at only by applying a rule of law, the result so reached embodies a conclusion of law and is not then a finding of fact. Mallinger v. Webster City Oil Co., 211 Iowa 847, 234 N.W. 254; Ward v. Cardillo, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 135 F.2d 260; Lake v. City of Brideport, 102 Conn. 337, 128 A. 782; 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, § 13.

We are satisfied here the court must consider and conclude as a matter of law whether or not under the facts a new or separate agreement existed. The trial court considered this question and pointed out that it was 'the final decision to hire the man's car at 8cents a mile,' and that 'it was mutually agreed on * * * that he (the employer) was going to hire the men's cars at 8cents a mile and let them drive their own car to the job.' (Emphasis ours.) It construed the contract as singular and not separate and distinct, as simply further providing how the employer would carry out his obligation to provide transportation. We are satisfied and agree with this construction. That this conclusion is supported by substantial evidence we have no doubt. The employer did not have adequate facilities to transport the number of employees he needed to Coralville, as required under the provisions of his contract with the union. The union representative and the employer did discuss various possibilities whereby sufficient men could be obtained and transported for that job. Several suggestions, including one that the employer would buy Buicks or Pontiacs to haul the men, were rejected. The joint conference committee records show: 'It was the unanimous decision of the Joint Conference Committee that a rate of 8cents per mile using map mileage by the most direct route shall be adequate transportation.' (Emphasis ours.)

The claimant's husband with three others formed a 'car pool', met at a designated place for the trip to Coralville, and took turns in using their cars. Under the unionmanagement agreement they received no pay for the time consumed in the journey. Defendants' burden of establishing a new and different agreement is not convincingly carried in view of the testimony of Mr. Summers, the union representative, that such agreements in the past were designated as 'hiring the man's car.' The precedent for this arrangement was established the year before on similar employment at the Veterans Hospital in Iowa City. 'On that job it was decided the contractor hire the man's car and pay him on a mileage basis' to fulfill the transporation obligation. (Emphasis ours.) Mr. Shea, an attorney representing the union, and chairman of the joint conference committee concerned herewith, also recalled 'That the rate of 8cents per mile using map mileage by the most direct route would be considered as adequate transportation.' (Emphasis ours.)

These and other circumstances surrounding the agreement are sufficient and competent evidence to convince us, as they did the commissioners and the district court, that there was no effective release of the employer's firm obligation to provide transportation. We attach no special significance to the commissioner or his deputy's use of the phrase '* * * as an alternative the employees would furnish their own transportation * * *.' It does not indicate a finding that the original agreement was dissolved and a new one formed, for in view of their conclusion it is clear the commissioners meant in lieu of actual transportation. Regardless, it is not binding on us for the reasons set out in Division I hereof.

III. Section 85.3 Iowa Code 1954, same in 1950, I.C.A., makes compensable 'all personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of the employment.' Section 85.61(6) defines these words to include 'injuries to employees whose services are being performed on, in, or about the premises * * *, and also injuries to those who are engaged elsewhere in places where their employer's business requires their presence and subjects them to dangers incident to the business.' Unless it can be fairly said the employee, while going to or from his regular place of employment, is engaged in a place where his employer's business requires his presence, his injury en route is not compensable. Otto v. Independent School Dist., 237 Iowa 991, 23 N.W.2d 915, 916. 'Arising in the course of' has a well-defined meaning, and all authorities hold that it refers to arising during the period of employment and at a place where the employee may be performing the duties of his employment or doing something incidental thereto. See 71 C.J. 647, 659, sections 397, 404; 28 R.C.L. 797, § 89; Bushing v. Iowa Railway & Light Co., 208 Iowa 1010, 1018, 1019, 226 N.W. 719; majority opinion in Otto v. Independent School Dist., supra. So cases involving an injury from a highway accident suffered while en route to or from work require a determination whether the employee was engaged in his employer's business at the time and whether there was a causal relation between the injury and such employment.

Ordinarily an employee whose work begins when he arrives in the morning is engaged in his own business when he travels to work at the regular time. He is not then pursuing his master's business. But the same employee would be pursuing his master's business if his trip to and from the employer's premises were a special trip made in response to special request, agreement, or instructions to go from his home to the plant to do something for the employer's benefit. In that case it is clear the entire trip would be his master's business and by all authorities would be held to be in the course of the employment. The reason for the so-called general rule announced by Chief Justice Hughes is that ordinarily the hazards the workmen encounter in such journeys are not incident to the employer's business. But he said: '* * * this general rule is subject to exceptions which depend upon the nature and circumstances of the particular employment.' Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162, 53 S.Ct. 380, 382, 77 L.Ed. 676.

It is therefore important in cases of this nature to ask: Whose business was he pursuing at the time of the injury? To obtain the answer we must review all the facts in the case.

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