Price v. Cate
| Decision Date | 11 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:02-cv-00077-JKS,2:02-cv-00077-JKS |
| Parties | JEFFREY PRICE, Petitioner, v. MATTHEW CATE,1 Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Jeffrey Price, a state parolee initially appearing pro se, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Price is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, in parole status.2 Respondent has answered, and Price has replied.
At Docket No. 68 this Court entered an Order holding this matter in abeyance pending the exhaustion of Price's state court remedies in connection with the reversal by the Governor of the Board of Parole Hearings' grant of parole in June 2009. At Docket No. 70, Price seeks reconsideration of that Order. Respondent opposes the Motion for Reconsideration, and Price has replied.
Following the entry of a guilty plea in July 1986, Price was convicted in the Los Angeles Superior Court of Murder in the Second Degree (Cal. Penal Code, §§ 187, 190), with a use of a firearm enhancement (Cal. Penal Code, § 12022.5). The trial court sentenced Price to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, to be served consecutive to a determinate two-year term for the firearm enhancement. Price does not challenge his conviction or sentence in this proceeding.
In December 1999 the Board of Prison Terms ("Board") declined to find Price suitable for parole. Price, appearing pro se, timely filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which was summarily denied.3 Price, proceeding pro se, then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, which was denied for failure to establish a prima facie case, citing Terhune v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal. App. 4th 409, 423;4 In re Stanworth (1982) 33 Cal. 3d 176, 183-185 ; In re Powell (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 894, 902-906 .5Price then filed a pro se petition for habeas relief in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied without opinion or citation to authority on September 26, 2001.6 Price, appearing pro se, timely filed his petition for relief in this Court on January 11, 2002.On September 20, 2005, Price's Petition was dismissed without prejudice as moot. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed and remanded. Price, appearing through appointed counsel and with leave of court, filed an amended petition. In his amended petition, in addition to the 1999 Board denial, Price challenges the reversal by the Governor in 2004 of the Board's finding of suitability for parole, and the subsequent 2005 denial by the Board to find him suitable for parole. The later proceedings are summarized below. This Court then stayed further proceedings in this action pending decision by the en banc panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hayward.7 The Ninth Circuit has issued its en banc opinion in Hayward8 2003 Parole Proceedings: In September 2003 the Board found Price suitable for parole, but did not set a parole date. The Governor reversed the Board's suitability finding in February 2004. Price, proceeding pro se, timely filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which denied his petition in an unpublished reasoned decision.9 The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, denied habeas relief stating: 10 On January 24, 2007, the California Supreme Court summarily deniedPrice's petition for habeas relief citing People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 .11 2005 Parole Proceedings: In June 2005 the Board, sitting en banc, declined to find Price suitable for parole.12 On January 24, 2007, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Price's petition for habeas relief citing People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 .13
In August 2007 the Board again declined to find Price suitable for parole. In January 2009 the Board found Price suitable for parole, but the Governor again reversed.14 In March 2010 Price again appeared before the Board for a parole-suitability hearing, and was once again denied parole.15 The 2007, 2009, and 2010 proceedings are not presently before this Court.
In his amended petition Price raises three grounds, with the first ground having four subgrounds: (1) a violation of due process in that (A) the Board is biased against granting parole to prisoners serving life terms, (B) the evidence does not support the Board's finding of unsuitability for parole, (C) the repeated refusals to find him suitable for parole based upon the unchanging circumstances of the commitment offense, and (D) the Governor's 2004 reversal of the Board's suitability finding breached his plea agreement; (2) denial of parole constitutes crueland unusual punishment; and (3) the Governor's reversal violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Respondent asserts no affirmative defenses.16
In his motion to reconsider the Order holding this matter in abeyance, Price contends that the Ninth Circuit's decision holding that the subsequent actions by the Board and the Governor did not moot the case is the law of the case. This Court should, therefore, decide the three actions properly before it, the denials by the Board in1999 and 2005 and the 2004 reversal by the Governor, on the merits.
Given the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Cooke, discussed further below, there does not appear to be any reason to defer ruling on Price's Petition. Therefore, this Court will vacate the Order entered at Docket No. 68 and address the Petition on the merits.
Generally, when a higher court issues new controlling authority after briefing is complete, this Court requests further briefing from the parties addressing the new authority. The Supreme Court decision in this case is so clear that further briefing would appear to unduly prolong this old case without any possibility of changing the result. The Supreme Court has limited federal habeas review to the procedures followed by the Board and the governor and defined with care what it meant by the applicable procedures. No longer may this Court consider how the California courts applied California law. Under these circumstances, further briefing would not aid the Court in reaching a decision.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" at the time the state court renders its decision or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."17 The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."18 The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.19 Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'"20 When a claim falls under the "unreasonable application" prong, a state court's application of Supreme Courtprecedent must be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous.21 The Supreme Court has made clear that the objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply believing that the state court determination was incorrect.22 In a federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.23 Price has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he merits habeas relief.24
In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court.25 Under AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.26
Price contends that the Board is biased against granting parole to "lifers." It does not appear that Price raised this issue in the state courts until he filed his petition for habeas relief inthe California Supreme Court in 2006, which petition was summarily denied without a reasoned opinion. When there is no reasoned state court decision denying an issue presented to the state court and raised in a federal habeas petition, this Court must assume that the state court decided all the issues presented to it and perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.27 The scope of this review is for clear error of the state court ruling on the petition:
[A]lthough we cannot undertake our review by analyzing the basis for the state court's decision, we can view it through the "objectively reasonable" lens ground by Williams.... Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law. Only by that examination may we determine whether the state...
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