Stanworth, In re

• Decision Date: 23 December 1982
• Citation: 187 Cal.Rptr. 783,33 Cal.3d 176,654 P.2d 1311
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 654 P.2d 1311 In re Dennis STANWORTH on Habeas Corpus. Crim. 22522.

Page 783

187 Cal.Rptr. 783

33 Cal.3d 176, 654 P.2d 1311

In re Dennis STANWORTH on Habeas Corpus.

Crim. 22522.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 23, 1982.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, Karl S. Mayer and John Runde, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Michael R. Snedeker and Smith & Snedeker, San Francisco, for respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

May a defendant who has been sentenced to a "life" imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) (former Pen.Code, § 1168, repealed eff. Jan. 1, 1977) be entitled to parole release consideration under both ISL and the administrative guidelines which were in effect at the time he was sentenced and also under the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 (DSL) (Pen.Code § 1170 et seq.) and its implementing regulations? Concluding that ex post facto principles require that his right to parole be considered under both laws, we will affirm the trial court's grant of habeas corpus relief.

In 1966 defendant Dennis Stanworth was sentenced to death following his plea of guilty to two counts of first degree murder. He also pled guilty in the same proceeding to counts charging aggravated and simple kidnaping, forcible rape, oral copulation, and robbery. The convictions followed a series of crimes involving the brutal murders and abuse of multiple victims. After a jury trial on the issue of penalty, sentence was fixed at death on each of the murder counts and at life imprisonment without possibility of parole on the aggravated kidnaping count. We have reviewed defendant's case twice before. In People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889, we reversed the death penalty which had been imposed because certain prospective jurors were excused for cause in violation of principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776. In 1974, following a second penalty trial, and imposition of a second death penalty, in People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058, we modified the death judgments to provide for "life imprisonment" on each murder count because of our intervening opinion in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, in which we held that the then California death penalty law was impermissibly cruel. We further reversed the count which charged kidnaping for the purpose of committing robbery with bodily harm. (See People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225.)

Defendant was considered and rejected for parole release by the Adult Authority (Authority) in 1974, 1976, and 1977. Following the operative date of the DSL he was reconsidered and again rejected in 1977 and 1978. Finally, in 1979, the Community Release Board (successor to Authority and predecessor of the present Board of Prison Terms [hereinafter Board] ) found defendant parole-ready. In reaching its decision, the Board stressed the following factors in defendant's personal history: (1) lack of prior serious criminal history or history of violent conduct; (2) institutional behavior, including cell study even while on death row, excellent work record, obtaining an associate of arts degree and a certificate in data processing, and six years of participation in therapy programs; (3) defendant's only disciplinary infraction occurred 10 years before while he was on death row; (4) no psychiatric contraindications (the reports of several psychotherapists who had worked closely with defendant in prison were uniformly laudatory); (5) realistic parole plans, including a $12,000 irrevocable educational trust fund set up in his behalf, and a personal $3,000 savings account.

When it found defendant parole-ready in 1979, the Board also fixed his term of imprisonment. It chose a 17-year term for the base offense of first degree murder. It added two years for the personal use of a firearm, and, for the other crimes to which defendant pleaded, the following enhancements: seven years for the second murder, three years for forcible rape, and eighteen months for oral copulation, aggregating a total term of thirty and one-half years. Defendant was then given credit for postconviction behavior at the rate of either two or three months' credit for each year spent on death row, and four months for each year after leaving death row, totalling forty two months. Considering the postconviction and preprison credits, the board reached a total adjusted term of 23 years, 4 months and 9 days.

Defendant administratively appealed the fixing of his parole date on the ground that it had been reached by mechanical computation rather than by individualized consideration and thus was inconsistent with the ISL sentencing scheme which was in effect at the time his crimes were committed. He argued that the DSL's focus on the nature of the crime and its goal of uniformity of punishment among those committing similar crimes conflicted, to his prejudice, with the emphasis on individual rehabilitation of the former ISL.

Administrative relief was denied, and defendant sought habeas corpus relief in superior court arguing that application of DSL parole standards to him and the Board's refusal to consider his parole status under ISL standards was a violation of the ex post facto clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. He also contended that, as to him, the equal protection clauses of both Constitutions were violated. This latter constitutional argument focuses on these two facts: under the Board's policy, ISL life termers for whom no parole date had been set prior to the effective date of the DSL received only one hearing pursuant to DSL guidelines; similar life termers who had obtained parole dates prior to the DSL effective date received a second hearing under DSL guidelines, and were given the benefit of the earlier of the two release dates.

In granting habeas corpus relief, the trial court held that defendant was entitled to a second parole hearing under the ISL guidelines on both ex post facto and equal protection grounds. The People appeal, arguing primarily that (1) defendant's rights to a parole-release date had not vested until he was adjudged suitable for parole, (2) the 1978 administrative guidelines under which his parole-release date was determined were not "laws," and (3) in any event, the newer guidelines were not more onerous than their predecessors, and therefore no ex post facto violation occurred. The People also argue that neither the new regulations nor their application deprived defendant of equal protection.

Resolving the issues before us on an ex post facto analysis alone, we need not examine defendant's other constitutional arguments.

States are prohibited from adopting ex post facto laws under the Constitutions of both the United States (art. I, § 10, cl. 1), and the State of California (art. I, § 9). The federal Constitution similarly constrains the United States Congress. (Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.) In a very early case (Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648), Justice Chase, in the following manner, described those laws which were considered ex post facto: "1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." (3 Dall. at p. 390, 1 L.Ed. 648.) Thus, from its earliest interpretation, the ex post facto clause has barred imposition of a punishment which, after commission of the crime, was increased or made more burdensome.

Recently, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the ex post facto clause within the context of a statute which altered the availability of "gain time for good conduct." (Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17.) The Florida courts had denied Weaver habeas corpus relief on the ground that the allowance of such time " 'is an act of grace rather than a vested right and may be withdrawn, modified, or denied.' " (Id. at p. 28, 101 S.Ct. at 963.) The high court corrected that interpretation, noting that "... our decisions prescribe that two critical elements be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. [Citations.] Contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Florida, a law need not impair a 'vested right' to violate the ex post facto prohibition." (Id., at p. 29, 101 S.Ct. at 964, fns. omitted.)

Weaver thus quickly disposes of the People's claim that because no parole date had been set before the change in guidelines that defendant had no "vested right" to which the bar against ex post facto law attached. The high court responded to such an argument by saying: "The presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant .... Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." (450 U.S. at p. 30, 101 S.Ct. at p. 965.) In brief, "The critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date." (Id., at p. 31, 101 S.Ct. at p. 965.) The Supreme Court concluded that it was unnecessary for it to decide whether the prospect of gain-time was technically part of the inmate's sentence in order "to conclude that it in fact is one determinant of petitioner's prison term--and that his effective sentence is altered once...