Price v. City of Ocala

• Decision Date: 22 April 2019
• Docket Number: Case No: 5:19-cv-39-Oc-30PRL
• Citation: 375 F.Supp.3d 1264
• Parties: Joel PRICE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF OCALA, FLORIDA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

375 F.Supp.3d 1264

Joel PRICE, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF OCALA, FLORIDA, Defendant.

Case No: 5:19-cv-39-Oc-30PRL

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Ocala Division.

Signed April 22, 2019

Scott R. Dinin, Scott R. Dinin, P.A, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Patrick G. Gilligan, Gilligan, Gooding & Franjola, PA, Ocala, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

Joel Price is a blind Florida resident. He visited the City of Ocala's website, www.ocalafl.org, but could not access all of it because portions were incompatible with his screen reader. Price is suing the City under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et. seq. ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504").¹ The City argues Price lacks standing because he has no injury-in-fact or threat of immediate future injury.

There is a dearth of case law addressing standing in a case like this: a Title II ADA case in which the alleged violation involves a website. The overwhelming majority of case law addressing ADA website violations involve claims under Title III, which this Court concludes is inapposite to Title II cases. So relying on basic standing principles and this Circuit's case law on ADA standing generally, the Court will explain what factors it finds relevant to determining standing in Title II ADA website cases. After considering those factors, the Court concludes Price lacks standing because there is no threat of immediate future injury.

BACKGROUND

In December 2018, Price visited the City's website, www.ocalafl.org, to "educat[e] himself about the quality of life and governmental functioning in City of Ocala" and "to find out more about programs, services and activities available to visitors and residents of City of Ocala." (Doc. 1, ¶ 33). Some items on the City's website were incompatible with Price's screen reader software, although Price does not specify precisely what documents were inaccessible.² The inability to access some documents on the City's website "resulted in Plaintiff suffering from feelings of segregation, rejection, and isolation as Plaintiff was left excluded from participating in the community services, programs and activities offered by City of Ocala in a manner equal to that afforded to others who are not similarly disabled." (Doc. 1, ¶ 34). Price alleges he again visited the City's website on January 20, 2019, but still could not access portions of the website.

Price does not allege where he lives in Florida or that he is a citizen of the City. Nor does he allege that he has any concrete plan to visit or move to the City.

DISCUSSION

The City argues Price lacks standing to bring his claims alleging its website violates Title II of the ADA. While a seemingly straightforward proposition, the issue is more complicated than it appears. So the Court will discuss standing generally, then address the differences between Title II and Title III ADA cases, then explore the peculiarities of claims involving websites, and finally undertake an analysis of Price's standing.

A. General Principles of Article III Standing

"In every federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow , 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 572 U.S. 118, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014). To do so, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things:

First, he must show that he has suffered an "injury-in-fact." Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the challenged action of the defendant. Third, the plaintiff must show that "the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." These requirements are the " ‘irreducible minimum’ required by the Constitution" for a plaintiff to proceed in federal court.

Shotz v. Cates , 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ; and Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville , 508 U.S. 656, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) ). When seeking an injunction, a plaintiff must also demonstrate "a real and immediate—as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical—threat of future injury." Id. (emphasis in original); see also Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc. , 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). To satisfy the future injury requirement, a plaintiff must espouse more than a "some day" intention. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

To plead an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must allege facts showing "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Aaron Private Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry , 912 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (explaining that a plaintiff must "clearly ... allege facts demonstrating each element" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ). "While the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed." Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (citation omitted).

B. Distinction between Title II and Title III Standing under the ADA

With that primer, the Court notes that the application of those principles is different depending under which portion of the ADA the claim is brought. "The ADA covers three main types of discrimination, each of which is addressed in one of the statute's three main subchapters: Title I prohibits discrimination in private employment; Title II prohibits discrimination by public entities (state or local governments); and Title III prohibits discrimination by a ‘place of public accommodation,’ which is a private entity that offers commercial services to the public." A.L. by & through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc. , 900 F.3d 1270, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018). For our purposes, Titles II and III are relevant.

1. Title II cases and future injury

Title II of the ADA provides that no person with a qualified disability shall "be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) that he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) that he was ‘excluded from participation in or ... denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity’ or otherwise ‘discriminated [against] by such entity;’ (3) ‘by reason of such disability.’ " Shotz , 256 F.3d at 1079 (quoting § 12132 ).

Most Title II cases in this Circuit that have analyzed whether a plaintiff met the future injury requirement of standing are premised on alleged ADA violations at specific governmental facilities. For instance, in Shotz , plaintiffs alleged they were discriminated against in violation of the ADA at the Levy County Courthouse because one plaintiff was initially told he could not bring his service dog into the courthouse and because of architectural barriers at the courthouse. Id. at 1078–79. In another case, a former patient sued a hospital that failed to provide a professionally trained sign language interpreter. McCullum v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc. , 768 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2014). In both cases, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims for lack of standing based on the failure of the plaintiffs to show a clear intent to return to the governmental facilities. Shotz , 256 F.3d at 1081–82 ; McCullum , 768 F.3d at 1145–46. There is little case law addressing the future injury requirement in Title II cases not associated with a specific government facility.

2. Title III cases and future injury

Title III prohibits discrimination against the disabled by private entities at "any place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182. To state a claim under Title III, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that the plaintiff is disabled; (2) that the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) that the defendant denied the plaintiff—on the basis of the disability—full and equal enjoyment of the premises." Bell v. FTMC, LLC , No. 8:17-CV-3100-T-23AAS, 2018 WL 4565745, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2018) (Merryday, J.).

Title III applies to both tangible and intangible barriers to accessing a "place of public accommodation." Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd. , 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) ; see also J.A.M. v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc. , 646 F. App'x 921, 925 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Title III covers both tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers that would prevent a disabled person from entering an accommodation's facilities and accessing its goods, services and privileges, and intangible barriers, such as discriminatory policies and procedures that restrict a disabled person's ability to enjoy the defendant entity's goods, services and privileges."). Regardless of the barrier, there must be some nexus between the alleged violation and a physical, concrete place of public accommodation. See Rendon , 294 F.3d at 1284 (concluding the plaintiffs stated a claim that a game show's telephone screening system violated Title III and explaining in dicta that plaintiffs had shown a nexus between the discriminatory telephone screening and the physical theater in which the game show was recorded).

In considering the future injury element of standing in Title III cases, district courts in this Circuit apply a four-factor test that this...