Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach

• Decision Date: 06 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-13694,19-13694
• Citation: 996 F.3d 1110
• Parties: Mr. Eddie I. SIERRA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF HALLANDALE BEACH, FLORIDA, Defendant - Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

996 F.3d 1110

Mr. Eddie I. SIERRA, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.CITY OF HALLANDALE BEACH, FLORIDA, Defendant - Appellee.

No. 19-13694

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 6, 2021

Marc Charmatz, National Association of the Deaf, Law and Advocacy Center, SILVER SPRING, MD, Juan Courtney Cunningham, J. Courtney Cunningham, PLLC, MIAMI, FL, Michael Steven Stein, Stein & Vargas LLP, WASHINGTON, DC, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Christopher J. Stearns, Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman, PA, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL, for Defendant - Appellee.

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Eddie Sierra appeals the district court's dismissal, for lack of standing, of his claims against the City of Hallandale Beach (Hallandale Beach or the City) under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 – 12134, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court erred (1) in relying on the test articulated in Price v. City of Ocala , 375 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2019), to determine if Sierra suffered an injury in fact; and (2) in finding that Sierra did not have standing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Eddie Sierra is a deaf individual who lives and works in South Florida. He is active in local government and various community organizations.¹ Because of these engagements, Sierra keeps apprised of the current policies and procedures of local governments in South Florida.

Sierra visited Hallandale Beach's website, www.hallandalebeachfl.gov, in 2017. He watched videos posted on the website, but some of the videos did not contain closed captions. Sierra was unable to comprehend the aurally delivered information in those videos. Thus, in July 2017, he emailed Joy Cooper, then-Mayor of Hallandale Beach, notifying her that he was deaf and that he could not understand some of the videos on the City's website. He requested that the videos include captions, explaining that this was the best auxiliary aid available to him under the ADA. Sierra also asked that if the Mayor was the wrong person to contact regarding this issue that she provide the identity of the correct person to contact. The Mayor never responded to this email, so in September 2017, Sierra's attorney mailed a letter and a copy of the email to the Mayor's office via the United States Postal Service. Neither the Mayor nor any official from Hallandale Beach ever answered Sierra's request.

After Hallandale Beach ignored Sierra's requests, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Initially, Sierra sought an injunction and compensatory damages. Hallandale Beach filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion, but we vacated the district court's decision on appeal. Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach , 904 F.3d 1343, 1353 (11th Cir. 2018).

In April 2019, Hallandale Beach passed a resolution to remove non-captioned videos from its website. Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Hallandale Beach primarily claimed that Sierra lacked standing and that his claims were moot. Sierra then sought only compensatory damages, refuted Hallandale Beach's motion, and moved for partial summary judgment, claiming he was discriminated against as a matter of law.

The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing because Sierra failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on Price , a district court case concerning a blind plaintiff's ADA claim for injunctive relief. 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. In dicta, the district court stated that even if Sierra had standing, he could not succeed on his claim, and that Sierra failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Hallandale Beach acted with discriminatory intent; the City was merely negligent.

Sierra appeals the district court's order. He argues (1) that the district court applied an improper test in determining he did not suffer an injury in fact; (2) that he did suffer an injury in fact and thus has standing; and (3) that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Hallandale Beach intentionally discriminated against him.

II.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a case for lack of standing. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006).

III.

A.

Before reaching the merits of any case we are obligated to determine if we have jurisdiction to consider the matter. Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. , 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020). Article III of the Constitution establishes that federal courts only have jurisdiction over "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Standing doctrine falls within this constitutional requirement. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). We look to three elements to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.

Id. The primary issue on this appeal is whether the first element, injury in fact, is met. To establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

First, there must be a concrete and particularized injury. Id. An injury is particularized when it "affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 n.1. To be concrete, the injury must be "real, and not abstract." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The term concrete, however, is not necessarily synonymous with the word tangible—intangible injuries can be concrete. Id. at 1549.

Second, the harm must be actual or imminent. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Our analysis here often depends on the type of relief the plaintiff seeks. A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 925 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2019) ; see also Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc. , 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013) ("The ‘injury-in-fact’ demanded by Article III requires an additional showing when injunctive relief is sought."). When the plaintiff seeks damages, we consider whether an alleged past harm occurred. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (explaining that plaintiff must show past harm to recover in an action for damages). On the other hand, when the plaintiff is seeking an injunction, we determine whether he or she adequately demonstrates that a future injury is imminent—that there is "a sufficient likelihood that he [or she] will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future." Koziara v. City of Casselberry , 392 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004) ; see also id. at 1306 (finding that because the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief the injury analysis "is concerned with future harm, not past harm"); Houston , 733 F.3d at 1328.

An individual who suffers an intangible injury from discrimination can establish standing if he personally experienced the discrimination. See Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 757 n.22, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) ; Aaron Priv. Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry , 912 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2019). "[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’ or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’ ... can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group." Heckler v. Mathews , 465 U.S. 728, 739–40, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984). We call this "stigmatic injury." Allen , 468 U.S. at 757 n.22, 104 S.Ct. 3315. In order to sufficiently allege stigmatic injury, a plaintiff still must meet the constitutional standing requirements. See id. (explaining that plaintiffs alleging stigmatic injury must have personally experienced the discrimination and must satisfy the causation and redressability requirements to have standing); see also Berry , 912 F.3d at 1338 (finding that an organizational plaintiff that alleged stigmatic injury did not have standing because it did not adequately allege "it [was] among the class of persons whose concrete interests [were] affected by discriminatory treatment").

B.

The district court erred in relying on the Middle District of Florida's decision in Price v. City of Ocala to analyze whether Sierra suffered an injury in fact. Since Price is a district court opinion, it does not constitute binding precedent. Even if we were bound by it, Price is unhelpful here because it is fundamentally different from this case. In Price , a blind individual sued the City of Ocala seeking an injunction under Title II because certain documents on Ocala's website were not accessible to visually impaired individuals. 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1267. The court considered three nonexclusive factors to decide whether the plaintiff was likely to suffer a future injury.² Id. at 1274–75. While the underlying facts in Price are similar to the case at hand, the cases differ in a significant respect: the remedy sought for the alleged ADA violation. The Price factors were used to consider claims for injunctive relief. They are not instructive in this case. Here, Sierra is now seeking only compensatory damages. Accordingly, we must assess Sierra's past harm.

C.

Sierra has standing to bring his claim under Title II, as he adequately alleged a stigmatic injury....