Price v. City of Alexandria, Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-1200 (RDA/IDD)
| Decision Date | 09 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-1200 (RDA/IDD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | COURTNEY PRICE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the Court on a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendant City of Alexandria ("City") in this Title VII employment discrimination case. Dkt. 45. The Court has dispensed with oral argument as it would not aid in the decisional process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Loc. Civ. R. 7(J). This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. Considering the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 45), the City's Memorandum in Support (Dkt. 46), Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition (Dkt. 51), the City's Reply (Dkt. 57), it is hereby ORDERED that the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. For the reasons that follow, judgment will be entered against Plaintiff on his hostile work environment claim because he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. This matter will proceed to trial on Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
Although the parties dispute certain facts, the following facts are undisputed and are considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff except where noted. See Stipulation of Uncontested Facts (Dkt. 66); Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. 46, 2-12); Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Material Facts and Dispute of Defendant's Material Facts (Dkt. 51, 2-20); Defendant's Specific Responses to Plaintiff's Opposition (Dkt. 57-1); Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Additional Facts (Dkt. 57-2). Courtney Price, the Plaintiff in this case, is a male who was once employed by the City of Alexandria in its Transportation and Environmental Services Department. Dkt. 46, 1. Plaintiff learned of a job opening with the City from his girlfriend, Jennifer Bell ("Bell"), who also worked for the City of Alexandria and served as the human resources liaison for the Transportation and Environmental Services division. Id.
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in September 2018, and his employment was ultimately terminated by the City of Alexandria in January 2019. Dkt. 51, 1, 3. Bell worked under Yon Lambert, a City employee who also oversaw Heather Diez. Diez worked as Deputy Director of Development and Right of Way Services and supervised Plaintiff. Diez and Lambert were unaware that Plaintiff was romantically involved with Bell, another City employee. Neither Plaintiff nor Bell told these supervisors of their dating relationship when Plaintiff was hired. Dkt. Nos. 46, 3; 57-1, 1. Together, Lambert and Diez interviewed various candidates for a department engineering position and hired Plaintiff after obtaining authorization from the Human Resources department despite Plaintiff's lack of a college degree—a typical requirement. Dkt. 46, 3. Plaintiff was ultimately hired for the job of Permits Manager, albeit on a probationary basis, and he worked under Diez and Lambert in this role. In his job, Plaintiff was responsible for processing right-of-way-permits and overseeing employees who supported the permits center. Id. at 2.
Shortly after he started his job with the City of Alexandria, Plaintiff met his supervisor, Heather Diez. Communication between Plaintiff and Diez was frequent. Plaintiff states that Diez contacted him on a daily basis and sometimes communicated with him after hours on his work-issued cell phone, a point the City contests. Dkt Nos. 51, 7; 57-2, 15. Diez allegedly told Plaintiff that she could break up happy homes because she had a "mean sex game, blond hair, and blueeyes" and referred to her own breasts as "baking bread," see Dkt. 51, 4, which the City disputes. See Dkt. 57, 3 n.5. Plaintiff maintains, but the City contests, that Diez also engaged in behavior that included: telling Plaintiff that she could seduce another city employee by "showing off her bust with low-cut shirts and giving him "the look"; showing Plaintiff a photo of her former supervisor and, among other things, bragging to Plaintiff that this former supervisor wanted to leave his wife for Diez but could not afford it; touching Plaintiff without his consent, specifically his shoulders, back, and arms on a near-daily basis; and at least once per week, brushing up against Plaintiff with her chest. See Dkt. 51, 4-5, 8. Diez also directed Plaintiff to add the time that they talked on the phone after work hours to his timesheets. See id. at 7; Dkt. 57-2, 16.
Plaintiff asserts that he did not reciprocate this behavior. Dkt. 51, 11. On November 25, 2018, Diez emailed Plaintiff and told him he was "doing great!" while acknowledging that he was working on his "dedicated focus." Dkt. 51-36. Then, on November 27, 2018, Plaintiff text messaged Diez that he would "email her his time" as he could not access the payroll system while he was on vacation. Dkt. Nos. 51-31; 57-2, 19-20. Diez replied "I'll approve all" and instructed Plaintiff to ask Danyell Jones or someone else to "get in touch" with her. Id. The next day, Plaintiff sent a message to Jones, his subordinate, with information about his hours. Dkt. 51-32.
While Plaintiff was on vacation, Diez learned that Plaintiff and Bell were in a relationship. Id. When he returned to the office, Plaintiff maintains that Diez began "micromanaging" his workload and that she imposed new requirements on Plaintiff and limited his hours, Dkt. 51, 12, which the City contests. See Dkt. 57-2, 27. Plaintiff maintains that he complied with these newly imposed requirements. Dkt. 51, 12. On December 14, 2018, Bell spoke with Lambert about Diez's workplace behavior, Dkt. 57-2, 27, though it is not uncontested that she specifically addressedDiez's actions toward Plaintiff. See id. The City also has a policy that prohibits sexual harassment and requires reporting of sexual harassment claims. Dkt. Nos. 46, 11-12; 51, 16-17.
On January 3, 2019, Diez and Lambert met with Plaintiff. Dkt. 51, 15. At that meeting, Plaintiff received a letter that recommended his termination. Id. The grounds cited for Plaintiff's termination included his improper use of the official parking placard on his personal vehicle and for fraudulently submitting his time while away on vacation. See Dkt. 57, 19.
Next, on January 9, 2019, Plaintiff met with City human resource officers Steve Mason ("Mason") and Barbara DiRenzo ("DiRenzo") to explain that Diez had sexually harassed him since he began working for the City of Alexandria and that her reasons supporting her recommendation for termination were false. Id. Mason reportedly then said that he would handle the situation. Id. The City disputes that Plaintiff described his experience as harassment or made any allegations other than describing Diez's behavior after she learned of his relationship with Bell as "weird." See Dkt. 46, 10, 26, 30.
Finally, on January 23, 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from human resources indicating that his department's recommendation for termination was upheld, and that his termination would be effective January 25, 2019. Dkt. 51-41.
On May 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging retaliation and discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Dkt. 25-1. On June 19, 2019, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue letter. Dkt. 25-2. On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on September 17, 2019, asserting several claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983: sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his section 1983 claims. Dkt. 10. On December 19, 2019, Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. 12,which the Court granted on January 29, 2020. Dkt. 21. The Court authorized Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which he did on February 12, 2020. Dkt. 24. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff brought claims under Title VII for (1) sex discrimination and unlawful termination, (2) hostile work environment, and (3) retaliation. Defendant moved to dismiss the sex discrimination and unlawful termination count, as well as the hostile work environment count, for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the sex discrimination and unlawful termination claim, but denied Defendant's motion as to the hostile work environment claim. Dkt. 43.
On December 21, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 45. Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because the unwelcome conduct Plaintiff endured (1) was not sufficiently severe or pervasive, (2) Plaintiff cannot establish he subjectively believed he was being harassed, (3) Plaintiff's work performance was never affected, (4) the alleged conduct was not based on Plaintiff's gender, and (5) the Faragher-Ellerth defense bars Plaintiff's claim. Dkt. Nos. 46; 57. Defendant also contends that it is entitled to judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim because (1) Plaintiff did not engage in protected activity and (2) there is no causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. Id. Plaintiff opposes Defendant's motion, arguing (1) the conduct Plaintiff endured was severe and pervasive, (2) the harassing conduct is attributable to the City, and (3) Plaintiff's termination was an adverse action that occurred after he engaged in protected activity and is therefore actionable as a retaliation-based claim under Title VII. Dkt. 51.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows 'that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law." Hantz v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, 11 F. Supp. 3d 612, 615 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Fed. R....
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