Price v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 10 December 1943 |
| Citation | 176 S.W.2d 271,296 Ky. 144 |
| Parties | PRICE v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; Watt M. Prichard, Judge.
Chester Price was convicted of stealing chickens of value of more than $2, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
C. F. See, Jr., of Louisa, for appellant.
Hubert Meredith, Atty. Gen., and Guy H. Herdman, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellee.
At the trial of appellant in the Lawrence Circuit Court--under an indictment charging him, Wilson Meade and Oscar Haven Runyon Jr., of stealing chickens of the value of more than $2 from the owner, Vent Walters--he was convicted and punished by confinement in the penitentiary for one year. His motion for a new trial was overruled and from the judgment pronounced on the verdict he prosecutes this appeal.
His sole ground for reversal, as urged by his counsel in this court, is, that the testimony of his guilt as given by his two codefendants was not corroborated as is required by section 241 of the Criminal Code of Practice, which prescribes that: 'A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; * * *.' In construing that section it was frequently held in some opinions of this court that the corroboration therein prescribed should of itself--and wholly independent of the testimony of the accomplice--be sufficient to sustain a conviction after eliminating entirely the testimony of the accomplice, but which, as pointed out in the case of Williams v. Com., 257 Ky. 175, 77 S.W.2d 609, was in direct conflict with the prevailing rule and also with some prior opinions rendered by this court. We held in that (Williams) opinion that to follow the interpretation requiring the corroborating testimony to be itself sufficient to sustain a conviction was not required by the language of the section of the Criminal Code requiring such corroboration which, as it will be perceived, is, that the corroborating testimony necessary to sustain a conviction should only tend 'to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.' As defined in the text in 14a C.J. 1428, it is: 'Evidence which aliunde tends to prove the prisoner's guilt independent of his declarations; evidence which tends to connect the accused with the particular crime under investigation; evidence which would tend to establish the disputed facts by other circumstances; additional evidence, of a different character, to the same point, it must have relation to and connection with the crime as to furnish some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of its commission.' See also 20 C.J.S., page 238, Corroborate.
Among the various various definitions of the word 'tend' as given in the text of 62 C.J. 577 are: 'to contribute, or conduce in some degree or way * * *; to have a more or less direct bearing or effect; to have or give leaning to; to influence.' The same definition, in substance, is also given by Mr. Webster and other lexicographers. The same authorities point out that it is not synonymous with 'burden of proof', or 'required sufficiency to sustain a conviction.' From the foregoing it may be correctly said that the necessary degree of corroboration is reached if it lies somewhere between facts creating only a bare suspicion, and testimony sufficient to sustain a verdict finding the accused guilty. Therefore if the corroborating testimony is of such a nature and character as to inspire belief in a reasonable and unprejudiced mind that it points toward guilt and links up with the principal fact under investigation, then the corroboration required by the rule contained in the section of the Criminal Code supra, is fully met. It is usually a question for the jury as to whether the required corroborating evidence has been produced under a proper instruction submitting that issue. But if it is clear that the testimony offered in substantiaction of the required corroboration has no foundation, but rests entirely in surmise or speculation, it then becomes the duty of the court to disregard it and to direct an acquittal of the defendant on trial for want of necessary corroboration. The Williams opinion gave a complete history of the origin and purpose of requiring testimony of an accomplice in criminal cases to be corroborated. The whole court considered the case and it was finally concluded that the Code section supra should be interpreted as therein made.
The two accomplices in this case who were jointly indicted with defendant were themselves convicted and they testified at the trial of appellant that he participated in the stealing of the chickens in this case. Their testimony, as well as that of defendant, proved that the three defendants in the indictment resided in the same locality, and at least one of them resided in the same village in which appellant resided. The evidence shows that the larceny of the chickens was committed between ten and eleven o'clock p. m.; that early the following morning Runyon and Meade appeared at the country store operated by John Brown. They brought with them some thirteen or more old hens which they proposed to and did sell to Brown for $13. It was between four and five o'clock a. m. but appellant did not accompany the other two in their visit to Brown's store. In going to it they crossed a small stream flowing by it and recrossed it after receiving the price of the chickens. Brown observed a third man standing on the opposite side of the stream, but it was too dark for him on that February morn to identify that person. However, he saw Meade and Runyon meet with the third individual across the stream and all three of them departed together. A witness, Bennie Cook, testified that he met between the hours supra, all three of the accused in the indictment somewhere on the road 'just below Mr Walters' house'. He recognized Price and Meade but said he did not know Runyon at that time. Defendant in giving his testimony admitted that he was with his two codefendants...
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...and unprejudicial mind that it points toward guilt and links up with the principal fact under investigation'. Price v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 144, 176 S.W.2d 271. See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110; Roberts v. State, 43 Ga.App. 108, 157 S.E. 887; People ......
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