Price v. High
| Decision Date | 20 July 1899 |
| Citation | 33 S.E. 956,108 Ga. 145 |
| Parties | PRICE v. HIGH et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
What purports to be a brief of evidence in this case, being extensively interspersed with statements and arguments of counsel and colloquies between counsel and the court and between counsel, and also with statements of the stenographer and by the court, none of which in any wise throws any light upon the testimony in the case, does not constitute such a brief of evidence as is required by law. The only error complained of is that the court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment of the court below must therefore be affirmed, as this court will not consider such an alleged brief of evidence, and cannot, without so doing determine whether or not the court erred in its direction of the verdict.
Error from city court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.
Action between Annie Price and J. M. High & Co. From the judgment Annie Price brings error. Affirmed.
Walter P. Andrews and T. P. Westmoreland, for plaintiff in error.
Arnold & Arnold and W. T. Moyers, for defendants in error.
The number of cases brought to this court for review has been increasing for many years. The number on the dockets for the October term, 1898, and the March term, 1899, shows no diminution, but an increase over any other two consecutive terms in the history of the court. The constitution of the state requires this court to decide every case brought here at the first or the second term. In order to decide them properly, it is absolutely necessary for this court to read the records, and thus become familiar with the evidence and the questions made in the cases. More than 900 cases, civil and criminal, have been brought to these last two terms of the court, and it was necessary for us to read the records in nearly all of these cases. To do so takes much time and study. This court many years ago advised and even importuned counsel to make briefs of evidence which included only the material facts in the cases. Counsel failed to heed the request made by the court, and the general assembly, by the act of 1889, prescribed how a brief of evidence should be made up. It declared that a brief of evidence should be Civ. Code, § 5488. Counsel still failed to obey, not only the mandate of this court, but of the general assembly, and continued to file briefs which included everything said and done in the trial of the cases whether material or immaterial. Questions of counsel and the answers of the witness, colloquies between counsel and the court and between the counsel on the one side and the other were included; and this court, for its own protection, and in accordance with the act above referred to, announced in numerous instances the rule that it would not look at or scrutinize a brief of evidence so made, but would take it for granted that the verdict was right. Some of the many decisions made before and after the passage of this act are Chambers v. Walker, 80 Ga. 644, 6 S.E. 165; Wiggins v. Norton, 83 Ga. 148, 9 S.E. 607; Tate v. Griffith, 83 Ga. 153, 9 S.E. 719; Mehaffey v. Hambrick, 83 Ga. 597, 10 S.E. 274; Brown v. Moore, 83 Ga. 605, 10 S.E. 277; Bowe v. Lumber Co., 86 Ga. 17, 21, 12 S.E. 177; Stubbs v. State, 86 Ga. 773, 13 S.E. 107; Ryan v. Kingsbery, 88 Ga. 361, 14 S.E. 596; Price v. Bell, 88 Ga. 740, 15 S.E. 810; Hart v. Respess, 89 Ga. 87, 14 S.E. 910; Porter v. State, 89 Ga. 422, 15 S.E. 495; Rutland v. State, 90 Ga. 102, 15 S.E. 813; Harris v. McArthur, 90 Ga. 216, 217, 15 S.E. 758; Cooper v. Whaley, 90 Ga. 285, 15 S.E. 824; Huff v. State, 91 Ga. 5, 16 S.E. 99; Farmers' Alliance Exchange v. Crown Cotton Mills, 91 Ga. 178, 16 S.E. 985; Cash v. Lowry, 91 Ga. 197, 17 S.E. 121; Roberts v. State, 92 Ga. 451, 17 S.E. 262; Whigham v. Davis, 92 Ga. 574, 18 S.E. 548; Lester v. Mortgage Co., 92 Ga. 576, 17 S.E. 675; Horne v. Seisel, 92 Ga. 685, 19 S.E. 709; Smith v. Ray, 93 Ga. 253, 18 S.E. 525; Dawson v. Briscoe, 94 Ga. 723, 21 S.E. 589; Gaslight Co. v. Farley, 95 Ga. 997, 23 S.E. 119; Ingram v. Clarke, 96 Ga. 777, 22 S.E. 334; Hitchcock v. Latham, 97 Ga. 253, 22 S.E. 997; Williams v. Cheatham, 97 Ga. 341, 22 S.E. 971; Batchelor v. Batchelor, 97 Ga. 425, 24 S.E. 157; Swift v. Van Dyke, 98 Ga. 726, 26 S.E. 59; Railroad Co. v. Williams, 99 Ga. 75, 24 S.E. 852; Shoe Co. v. Bordeaux, 99 Ga. 144, 25 S.E. 38; Dickey v. Railway Co., 99 Ga. 244, 25 S.E. 410; Smith v. Compress Co., 99 Ga. 131, 24 S.E. 875; Southern Banking & Trust Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 99 Ga. 635, 25 S.E. 831; Henslee v. Henslee, 102 Ga. 554, 27 S.E. 676; Moss v. Birch, 102 Ga. 556, 28 S.E. 623; Jones v. Cemetery, 103 Ga. 560, 29 S.E. 710; Bank v. Vandiver, 104 Ga. 168, 30 S.E. 650; Henson v. Derrick, 104 Ga. 856, 31 S.E. 199. With a full knowledge of these cases, counsel still adhered to the practice of failing to brief the evidence as required by law. Some persisted in presenting for the approval of the court below the full stenographic report of questions and answers and colloquies of the court and counsel. Others pretended to comply with the Code by simply striking out the questions of counsel, and leaving the answers without any explanation, so that some of them were entirely unintelligible. In these so-called briefs of evidence fact after fact is stated and reiterated time after time. One immaterial fact is stated over and over again by a witness, and frequently a material fact is repeated many times in the brief of evidence. We are aware that in the trial of a case it is frequently necessary, in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, to ask many questions which when answered are found to be immaterial; but all such questions and answers should be excluded from the brief of evidence, because they throw no light upon the questions at issue, although the propounder of the question may have sought an answer different from that given. When he failed in his object, there was no reason or sense in incumbering the record with such questions or answers. Some cases have been brought to this court in which counsel put the whole brief of evidence in the bill of exceptions, and then specified it as a part of the record. All of these matters have been dealt with in some of the cases above cited; yet, with all these before the profession, some of them still fail to make such briefs as the law requires. The case now under consideration is a notable example, in its disregard of the rules of this court and of the law in regard to making briefs of evidence. This record contains the objections made by counsel to the admission of testimony, the speeches of counsel thereon, colloquies between counsel and court, and the opening address of one of counsel to the jury, and is interspersed with colloquies between the counsel themselves and between them and the court. At the conclusion of the so-called brief is a statement of the arguments of counsel on the motion made to the court to direct a verdict. As was said in the case of Wiggins v. Norton, 83 Ga. 148, 9 S.E. 607, this court is willing to do all in its power to decide cases properly, but is not willing to devote time to reading such a brief of evidence as this one, when that time could be devoted to other cases properly brought here. We say now, as we said then, that we will not consider any case where it depends solely upon the evidence, and that evidence is not briefed according to law. Of course, if points of law are made in the record which could be decided without reference to the evidence, we will decide them, as we have always done since the act of 1889. Many cases, however, are to be found where the points of law have been decided, and the court has then declined to look into the evidence where the latter had not been properly briefed. Counsel, in preparing their records for this court, should take into consideration the enormous amount of work that is placed upon this court by the constantly increasing number of cases, and should endeavor...
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