Price v. High Pointe Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 21 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 143831,143831 |
| Parties | BECKIE PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HIGH POINTE OIL COMPANY, INC, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Chief Justice:
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Justices:
Michael F. Cavanagh
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
David F. Viviano
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
Reporter of Decisions:
John O. Juroszek
PRICE v HIGH POINTE OIL COMPANY, INC
Docket No. 143831. Argued November 15, 2012 (Calendar No. 1). Decided March 21, 2013.
Beckie Price brought an action in the Clinton Circuit Court against High Pointe Oil Company, Inc., claiming, among other things, noneconomic damages for the mental anguish, emotional distress, and psychological injuries that she sustained when High Pointe negligently pumped 400 gallons of fuel oil into the basement of her house. The incident created an environmental hazard that required the razing of the house. Before the jury trial, High Pointe moved for summary disposition, in part on the issue of noneconomic damages, arguing that noneconomic damages resulting from real property damage were not compensable. The court, Randy L. Tahvonen, J., denied that part of High Pointe's motion, concluding that noneconomic damages could be recovered in a negligence action. The jury awarded Price $100,000 for noneconomic damages, after which High Pointe moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remittitur. The court denied the motion and High Pointe appealed. The Court of Appeals, BECKERING, P.J., and FORT HOOD and STEPHENS, JJ., affirmed, concluding that a plaintiff may recover mental anguish damages naturally flowing from damage to or the destruction of real property. 294 Mich App 42 (2011). The Supreme Court granted High Pointe's application for leave to appeal. 491 Mich 870 (2012).
In an opinion by Justice MARKMAN, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARY BETH KELLY and ZAHRA, the Supreme Court held:
Michigan common law has long provided that the appropriate measure of damages in cases involving the negligent destruction of property is the cost of replacement or repair of the property. Because that rule is sound, any change in the rule must come by legislative alteration.
1. The common-law rule with respect to damages recoverable in an action alleging the negligent destruction of property is that if the injury is permanent or irreparable, the measure of damages is the difference in the property's market value before and after the injury, but if the injury is reparable and the expense of making repairs is less than the value of the property, the measure of damages is the cost of making repairs. Because replacement and repair costs reflect economic damages, the logical implication of this rule is that the measure of damages excludes noneconomic damages. No previous case in the history of Michigan's common law has approvingly discussed the recovery of noneconomic damages for the negligent destruction of property. Further, recent Court of Appeals precedent has disallowed recovery of damages for emotional injuries suffered as a consequence of personal property damage. There was no legallyrelevant basis that would logically justify prohibiting the recovery of noneconomic damages for the negligent destruction of personal property but allow it for the negligent destruction of real property.
2. A common-law rule remains the law until modified by the Michigan Supreme Court or the Legislature. Alteration of the common law by the Court should be approached cautiously with the fullest consideration of public policy and should not occur through sudden departure from longstanding legal rules. While the destruction of property or property damage will often engender considerable mental distress, the present rule denying recovery for that distress is rational and justifiable as a matter of reasonable public policy. Given the lack of any compelling argument for altering the common law, retention of the rule was appropriate.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed and case remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in High Pointe's favor.
Justice CAVANAGH took no part in the decision of this case because of a familial relationship with counsel of record.
Justices MCCORMACK and VIVIANO took no part in the decision of this case.Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Justices:
Michael F. Cavanagh
Stephen J. Markman
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CAVANAGH, MCCORMACK, and VIVIANO, JJ.)
The issue in this case is whether noneconomic damages are recoverable for the negligent destruction of real property. No Michigan case has ever allowed a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages resulting solely from the negligent destruction of property, either real or personal. Rather, the common law of this state has long provided that the appropriate measure of damages in cases involving the negligent destruction of property is simply the cost of replacement or repair of the property. We are not persuaded of the need for change and therefore continue to adhere to this rule.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in defendant's favor.
In 1975, plaintiff and her now ex-husband built a house in DeWitt, Michigan. The house was originally heated by an oil furnace located in the basement, but in 2006 plaintiff replaced the oil furnace with a propane furnace. Plaintiff canceled her contract with defendant oil company's predecessor when the propane furnace was installed. Although the oil furnace was removed, the oil fill pipe remained.
Somehow, in November 2007, plaintiff's address was placed on defendant's "keep full list." True to the name of the list, while plaintiff was at work, defendant's truck driver pumped nearly 400 gallons of fuel oil into plaintiff's basement through the oil fill pipe before realizing his mistake and immediately calling 911. Plaintiff's house and many of her belongings were destroyed. Between defendant's and plaintiff's insurers, the site was remediated, a new house was built on the property in a different location, plaintiff's personal property was cleaned or replaced, and plaintiff was reimbursed for all temporary-housing-related expenses. It is undisputed that plaintiff was fully compensated for her economic losses.
Nevertheless, plaintiff filed suit in August 2008, alleging claims for negligence, gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, nuisance, trespass, and a private claim under the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 324.101 et seq. However, plaintiff's only claim to survive to trial was for the recovery of noneconomic damages for defendant's negligent destruction of her real property. Aftertrial and over defendant's objection, a jury found in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $100,000 for past noneconomic damages. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remittitur, arguing that plaintiff had failed to present sufficient proofs to support the verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published decision, explaining:
Noneconomic damages are generally recoverable in tort claims, and we are not convinced that noneconomic damages stemming from damage to or destruction of real property must or should be excepted from that general rule. We conclude that in negligence actions, a plaintiff may recover mental anguish damages naturally flowing from the damage to or destruction of real property. [Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 294 Mich App 42, 60; 817 NW2d 583 (2011).]
Defendant applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave and subsequently heard oral argument. Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 491 Mich 870 (2012).
Whether noneconomic damages are recoverable for the negligent destruction of real property presents a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. See 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 488 Mich 136, 143; 793 NW2d 633 (2010).
The question in this case is whether noneconomic damages are recoverable for the negligent destruction of real property. Absent any relevant statute, the answer to that question is a matter of common law.
As this Court explained in Bugbee v Fowle, the common law "'is but the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain whatis right and just between individuals in respect to private disputes[.]'" Bugbee v Fowle, 277 Mich 485, 492; 269 NW 570 (1936), quoting Kansas v Colorado, 206 US 46, 97; 27 S Ct 655; 51 L Ed 956 (1907). The common law, however, is not static. By its nature, it adapts to changing circumstances. See Holmes, The Common Law (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1991), p 1 ( that the common law is affected by "[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, [and] intuitions of public policy" and that it "embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries"). And as this Court stated in Beech Grove Investment Co v Civil Rights Comm:
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