Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 49S05-1705-PL-285

• Decision Date: 28 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 49S05-1705-PL-285,49S05-1705-PL-285
• Citation: 80 N.E.3d 170
• Parties: Mary PRICE, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES; Director of Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

80 N.E.3d 170

Mary PRICE, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES; Director of Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 49S05-1705-PL-285

Supreme Court of Indiana.

August 28, 2017

Attorneys for Appellant : Kenneth J. Falk, Gavin M. Rose, ACLU of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN

Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General, Frances Barrow, Andrea Rahman, Matthew R. Elliott, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A05-1602-PL-380

Slaughter, Justice.

Judicial mandate is an extraordinary remedy—available only when the law imposes a clear duty upon a defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. The law at issue here, Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5, imposes strict caseload limits for family case managers at the Indiana Department of Child Services. This statute compels a particular outcome—no case manager can oversee more than seventeen children at a time who are receiving services—but does not require the Department to perform one or more specific, ministerial acts for achieving it. Thus, the statute is not amenable to a judicial mandate. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.

Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff, Mary Price, works for the Department of Child Services as a family case manager. Her job requires that she monitor and supervise active cases where the Department has been presented with evidence that a child is suffering from abuse or neglect. Such children and their families are entitled to receive various services from the Department, including, but not limited to, protective services, abuse/neglect prevention, and family-preservation services. These services are intended to ensure a child's safety and promote family stability. See Ind. Code §§ 31-25-2-7 ; 31-25-2-11(b), (c) (Supp. 2015).

Our legislature imposes staffing thresholds to ensure family case managers such as Price have manageable caseloads. Under the governing statute, Price's ongoing-services caseload cannot exceed seventeen children.

Sec. 5 (a) The department shall ensure that the department maintains staffing levels of family case managers so that each region has enough family case managers to allow caseloads to be at not more than:

(1) twelve (12) active cases relating to initial assessments, including investigations of an allegation of child abuse or neglect; or

(2) seventeen (17) children monitored and supervised in active cases relating to ongoing services.

(b) The department shall comply with the maximum caseload ratios described in subsection (a).

Id. § 31-25-2-5 (Supp. 2015). To help the legislature track compliance with these caps, the Department must submit yearly reports "provid[ing] data and statistical information regarding caseloads of family case managers." Id. § 31-25-2-4. If caseloads exceed the statutory limits, the Department must provide "a written plan that indicates the steps that are being taken to reduce caseloads". Id. § 31-25-2-6(4).

Price filed a proposed class-action lawsuit in July 2015 alleging her caseload had ballooned to forty-three children—more than twice the statutory cap. Her claim, which is based on Section 31-25-2-5, names the Department and its director as defendants and seeks an "order mandating or enjoining [D]efendants to take all necessary steps to comply with [Section 5]." Defendants moved to dismiss Price's complaint on two grounds: lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(B)(6) for failing to state a claim. A divided Court of Appeals reversed as to the mandate. Price v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs. , 63 N.E.3d 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The Department then sought transfer, which we granted. Because the sought-after class has not yet been certified, we resolve only Price's claim.

Standard of Review

A 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The rule requires that we "accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint." Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Indiana , 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006) (citation and brackets omitted). We review 12(B)(6) motions de novo and will affirm a dismissal if the allegations "are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances". Thornton v. State , 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). We also will affirm a dismissal if the decision "is sustainable on any basis in the record." Id.

Discussion and Decision

Before turning to the merits of Price's request for mandate, we briefly address subject-matter jurisdiction. The Department invoked Rule 12(B)(1) in its motion to dismiss, but did not thereafter argue that ground for dismissal to any court. Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived, and we would be obliged to address it ourselves without prompting if jurisdiction were absent. Suffice it to say, the Marion Superior Court, as a court of general jurisdiction, is empowered to hear Price's mandate action and, were such relief warranted under applicable law and facts, to order it. See Ind. Code § 33-29-1-1.5 (Supp. 2015). See also Mishler v. County of Elkhart , 544 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Ind. 1989) (stating presumption that courts of general jurisdiction have subject-matter jurisdiction). It goes without saying that a court's power to award relief and a claimant's entitlement to relief on the merits are very different things. We hold the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction here. It follows that our jurisdiction, which derives from the trial court's, is secure.

On the merits, we hold that Price is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a judicial mandate. Under our mandate statute and case law interpreting it, such relief is available only to compel a specific, ministerial act, and only if the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. Price seeks to compel the Department (and its director) to comply with the strict caseload requirements set forth in Section 31-25-2-5. But this statute requires only a particular outcome—caseloads cannot exceed seventeen children per case manager—and does not require the Department to take specified steps to achieve that outcome. Thus, the statute is not susceptible to a judicial mandate to compel compliance with its terms. In addition, we reject Price's argument that Section 5 gives her a private right of action to enforce the statute's caseload limits. The Court of Appeals held that Price had no private right of action because Section 5 was intended to benefit the public generally and not particular individuals. Price , 63 N.E.3d at 22. We agree and summarily affirm that conclusion. We thus affirm the dismissal of Price's complaint under Rule 12(B)(6).

I. A judicial mandate will issue only when the law imposes a clear duty on the defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief.

Price styles her complaint as an action for mandate under Indiana Code section 34-27-3-1 (2014 Repl.), which provides:

Sec. 1. An action for mandate may be prosecuted against any inferior tribunal, corporation, public or corporate officer, or person to compel the performance of any:

(1) act that the law specifically requires; or

(2) duty resulting from any office, trust, or station.

As an aside, we doubt the Department itself (as opposed to its director) is a proper defendant to a mandate action, given the various definitions of "person" under Section 34-6-2-103. Cf. Couch v. State ex rel. Brown , 169 Ind. 269, 273, 82 N.E. 457, 459 (1907) ("In order to enable the court to enforce its mandate, or administer the proper penalty for disobedience, it is necessary that the officials derelict in performance of duty should be proceeded against personally.") (emphasis added). But Defendants did not raise this argument, so we will not address it.

Casting aside our doubt, we observe the mandate statute dates to the nineteenth century and tracks its antecedents almost verbatim. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Board of Comm'rs of Tippecanoe Cty. , 45 Ind. 501, 503 (1874) (prevailing statute instructed that mandate may be issued "to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, or a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"). Then, as now, the statute did not provide examples of when courts could issue mandate orders; rather, courts had to decide whether mandate was appropriate on a case-by-case basis, using the relevant statutes and applicable mandate case precedent as guides. Id.

A. Indiana law harbors a strong presumption against judicial mandates.

Our precedent cautions against issuing a mandate, calling it "an extraordinary remedy, viewed with extreme disfavor."

State ex rel. Civil City of South Bend v. Court of Appeals of Indiana—Third Dist. , 273 Ind. 551, 553, 406 N.E.2d 244, 245 (1980) (emphases added). See State ex rel. Drost v. Newton Super. Ct. , 275 Ind. 297, 302, 416 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (1981) (citing statutory mandate standards in original-action case); State ex rel. Reiman v. Kimmell , 212 Ind. 639, 648, 10 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1937) (citing original-action standards in statutory mandate case). Judicial mandate is appropriate only when two elements are present: (1) the defendant bears an imperative legal duty to perform the ministerial act or function demanded and (2) the plaintiff "has a clear legal right to compel the performance of [that] specific duty." City of Auburn v. State ex rel. First Nat. Bank of Chicago , 170 Ind. 511, 528-29, 83 N.E. 997, 1003 (1908). See also State ex rel. Winkler v. Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 3 , 248 Ind. 424, 428, 229 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1967). These two elements represent the "narrow limits" placed upon judicial mandates. State ex rel. Hunter v. Winterrowd , 174 Ind. 592, 595-96,...