Price v. Owen

• Decision Date: 20 March 1942
• Docket Number: 29337.
• Citation: 19 S.E.2d 529,67 Ga.App. 58
• Parties: PRICE v. OWEN et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

19 S.E.2d 529

67 Ga.App. 58

PRICE v. OWEN et al.

No. 29337.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

March 20, 1942

Syllabus by the Court.

The powers of officers whose duties lie wholly outside the domain of courts of justice are "quasi judicial powers" or "discretionary powers" which lie midway between judicial and ministerial powers.

If an act for which recovery is sought is judicial or quasi judicial in its nature, the officer acting is exempt from liability.

A quasi judicial officer cannot be called on to respond in damages to a private individual for the honest exercise of the officer's judgment within his jurisdiction, however erroneous his judgment may be.

The warden of a public works camp, under authority from the prison commission, has charge and custody of the camp, its buildings, tools, trucks, implements, and all other property pertaining thereto, and it is his duty to superintend internal police and discipline of the camp as required by general rules prescribed by the commission. Code, §§ 77-307 77-311, 77-313.

The prison commission, and through it, the warden, is invested by statute with a discretion as to superintendence and control of public works camps and the convicts confined therein. Code, §§ 77-307, 77-311, 77-313.

The prison commission is authorized to make such rules as the commission may deem expedient for the good government of public works camps, and thus there is at least an implied authority given the warden during day light, to employ convicts outside the bounds of the camps in cutting and hauling wood in a truck from farms near camp to the camp. Code, §§ 77-307, 77-311, 77-313.

A warden has the discretion to determine how and in what manner convicts employed outside the confines of a camp, doing work in connection with the operation of the camp, should be suffered to go at large, and wardens acting in that discretionary capacity, are not liable, unless guilty of willfulness, fraud, malice or corruption for the acts of the convicts, unless the wardens knowingly act wrongfully, and not according to their honest convictions of duty. Code, §§ 77-307, 77-311, 77-313.

Warden of public works camp was not liable for alleged tort of allegedly intoxicated convicts in driving truck of county commissioners into motorist's automobile, merely because warden allegedly permitted convicts to haul logs from farms to camp without guard to prevent convicts from obtaining access to intoxicating liquor. Code, §§ 77-307, 77-311 77-313.

1. A warden of a public works camp will not be held liable for the torts of convicts on the mere averment that he was negligent "in permitting said convicts to roam the roads of this county and State at large [in a truck], without any guard," whereby injuries resulted from a collision of the trucks with the plaintiff's car. Under the statute with reference to the regulation and control of convicts Code, §§ 77-307, 77-311, 77-313, it was discretionary with the warden to determine how and in what manner convicts employed outside the confines of the camp doing work in connection with the operation of the camp should be suffered to go at large. And wardens, as here, acting in a discretionary capacity, will not be liable unless guilty of wilfulness, fraud, malice, or corruption; or unless they knowingly act wrongfully, and not according to their honest convictions of duty.

2. Under the ruling just stated, the action seeking damages against the warden for injuries caused by the negligent acts of convicts, was properly dismissed on general demurrer.

A quasi judicial officer cannot be called on to respond in damages to a private individual for the honest exercise of the officer's judgment within his jurisdiction, however erroneous his judgment may be.

The action for damages for personal injuries was brought against the board of commissioners of roads and revenue of Henry County and E. Q. Owen, individually and as warden of Henry County. The judge dismissed the action on general demurrer and the plaintiff excepted. This appeal, as stated in plaintiff's brief, is concerned only with the liability of Owen, individually and as warden of Henry County. The petition alleged that the plaintiff sustained injuries under the following circumstances: On August 29, 1938, the plaintiff was in her automobile returning to her home. At a point within a few hundred yards from her home she was confronted by a truck coming in the opposite direction, which belonged to the board of commissioners of Henry County and was loaded with pine logs, and which was being driven by a white man, a convict, who was accompanied by another convict a negro. "Immediately upon observing the truck approaching her, your petitioner, upon ascertaining that it was travelling at a rapid rate of speed and while at the time she was operating her car carefully and at a slow rate of speed, turned her car out of the road to the extreme right-hand side of the road, and then suddenly, to her utter astonishment, and when she saw that the truck was keeping on her side of the road and was proceeding directly toward her, and while she was on the right-hand side of the road, and at a time when your petitioner had almost stopped her car, the said convicts, while driving said loaded truck, lunged forward and struck your petitioner's car in front, completely demolishing the car and injuring your petitioner to the extent that she was unconscious, and to the extent that your petitioner was with much force hurled about between the wreckage of said car." At the time of the wreck the convicts were under the influence of intoxicants, were incapable of operating said truck, and deliberately drove the truck into the plaintiff's car, even though there was sufficient room to pass on their side of the road. It was further alleged that on the occasion in question the defendant was responsible for the personal conduct, acts and doings of the convicts, and had released them from the camp and permitted them to use the truck to haul logs from certain farms to the public-works camp in McDonough, without a guard or an official, and the truck "was being operated with defective brakes, and so defective and worn, that said truck was being operated practically without the use of any brakes. That by permitting said convicts to so act, as described in the preceding paragraph of this petition, they were thereby permitted without any restriction whatsoever to obtain access to intoxicating liquor. That said convicts did obtain intoxicating liquor, which they could not have done had it not been for the said defendant Owen's permitting them, two convicted convicts, to operate dangerous machinery on the public highways of this State and without any custody and control over their acts or without placing any guards over them." The plaintiff alleged that she was free from fault and that the negligence of Owen in permitting said convicts to roam the roads of this county and State at large without any guard was the proximate cause of the injury. The question before this court is whether the petition set forth a cause of action against the warden.

C. N. Davie, of Atlanta, and R. O. Jackson, of McDonough, for plaintiff in error.

Ernest M. Smith, of McDonough, for defendants in error.

MacINTYRE, Justice (after stating the foregoing allegations of the petition).

After a diligent study of the petition we...