Price v. Rust, Civ. No. H-81-268.

• Citation: 527 F. Supp. 569
• Decision Date: 27 October 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-81-268.
• Parties: Edmund W. PRICE v. Barbara B. RUST, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

527 F. Supp. 569

Edmund W. PRICE v. Barbara B. RUST, et al.

Civ. No. H-81-268.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

October 27, 1981.

Edmund W. Price, pro se.

Brenda A. Eckert, Peter F. Culver, Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

BLUMENFELD, Senior District Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1988. Plaintiff Edmund W. Price is a resident of the Town of Simsbury, Connecticut. Defendants are the Town of Simsbury and five of its employees and representatives: Barbara B. Rust, Chairman of the Conservation Commission of the Town of Simsbury; Douglas E. Cooper, Conservation Director of the Conservation Commission of the Town of Simsbury; Natalie C. George, Conservation Officer of the Conservation Commission of the Town of Simsbury; Marshall K. Berger, acting Town Counsel for the Town of Simsbury; and Thomas Hankard, Chief of Police of the Police Department of the Town of Simsbury.

The thrust of plaintiff's complaint is that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by enforcing the Inland Wetlands and Water Courses Regulations of the Town of Simsbury (hereinafter Wetlands Regulations), thereby causing plaintiff to terminate certain "maintenance operations" he was performing on a pond located on his property. Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of either the promulgation or the content of these regulations. Rather, plaintiff challenges the manner in which the regulations were enforced and the results of this enforcement.

More specifically, plaintiff alleges that:

(1) defendants Rust, Cooper, George, Berger and Town of Simsbury caused, or participated in, the surveillance and/or inspection of plaintiff's property in a manner that violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution;

(2) defendants Rust, Berger and Town of Simsbury caused to be instituted and participated in the litigation of state court actions to restrain plaintiff from violations of Simsbury's Wetlands Regulations, which actions have resulted in the diminution of value or decline in marketability of plaintiff's property, thereby constituting a taking of plaintiff's property within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments; and

(3) defendants Rust's and Town of Simsbury's failure to issue the plaintiff a permit for his maintenance operations constituted a denial of due process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.

This case is presently before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The defendants raise three arguments in support of their motion to dismiss: (1) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) that the court should dismiss the complaint under the doctrine of equitable restraint; and (3) that the acts alleged are not constitutional violations.

II. Equitable Restraint

The parties in this action are similar to the parties in a pending state action, Simsbury Conservation Commission v. Edmund W. Price, Civil No. 253149 (Superior Court Hartford-New Britain). In the state proceedings, the Town of Simsbury sought and obtained a temporary injunction restraining defendant Price from "conducting or continuing to conduct any regulated activity in wetlands or water courses without a permit." Simsbury Conservation Commission v. Price, supra (Memorandum of Decision of Judge O'Neill, April 10, 1981). Defendants in this case argue that plaintiff should not be permitted to maintain a case in federal court where he had, or continues to have the opportunity to raise the same constitutional issues in the state proceeding. In support of this position defendants rely on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and its progeny, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); including this court's decision in Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford v. Chaucer, 451 F.Supp. 210 (D.Conn.1978).

The present case is similar to Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. and Moore v. Sims where the state had initiated enforcement proceedings in state court and the defendant attempted to halt those proceedings by seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in a federal forum. The important difference between this case and those cited above, however, is that plaintiff in the instant case seeks only monetary damages. The question we must decide is whether the principles of Younger-Huffman should be extended to a civil action for damages alone.¹ For the reasons stated below, we conclude that this is an appropriate case for abstention. These proceedings are therefore stayed, pending resolution of plaintiff's constitutional claims in the state proceedings. Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

A. Development of the Doctrine

On first glance it may appear incongruous to invoke the doctrine of equitable restraint in the context of a suit for damages. The leading cases, however, indicate that the policy reasons underlying the doctrine are not limited to the "traditional principles of equity" nor primarily concerned with those principles.

In Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford v. Chaucer this court reviewed the development of the doctrine of equitable restraint.

The leading modern case in this area is Younger v. Harris, supra, in which a § 1983 plaintiff, asserting federal constitutional claims, sought to enjoin a prosecution pending against him in a California court. The Supreme Court held that a federal court must not enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution on the basis of constitutional objections, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, because the defendant can raise his federal claims as defenses in the state court.

The Younger decision was grounded in part on traditional principles of equity.... The court in Younger also stressed "the notion of `comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions," 401 U.S. at 44 91 S.Ct. at 750, as a basis for its decision. It noted that the federalist system requires the national government to avoid undue or unnecessary interference with the legitimate activities of the States. Therefore, "the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions." 401 U.S. at 45 91 S.Ct. at 751, citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926).

Younger arose in connection with a state criminal prosecution, and it was recognized that courts of equity had traditionally shown greater reluctance to intervene in criminal cases than in civil cases. See 401 U.S. at 55 n.2 91 S.Ct. at 757 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 63 S.Ct. 877, 880-881, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943). But one Justice, joined by two others, expressed the opinion that the considerations underlying Younger were equally applicable when civil proceedings were pending in state courts. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 561 92 S.Ct. 1113, 1126, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). Subsequently the Court held that equitable restraint was required in a case where state agents had initiated a public nuisance proceeding against the federal plaintiff in order to close an establishment where allegedly obscene films were exhibited. Though the proceeding was denominated as civil in nature, the state's interest in bringing it was similar to that involved in Younger, for the proceeding was "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials." Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977) (civil suit brought by state agency to recover welfare payments allegedly obtained through fraud). In 1977, Younger was applied where civil contempt proceedings were pending in a state court. Though the contempt order had arisen in the course of a civil action between private parties and was thus unrelated to the state's interest in criminal enforcement, the Court required equitable restraint because of the "State's interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system ...." Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 97 S.Ct. 1211, 1217, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977).

Aristocrat, 451 F.Supp. at 214-15.

Most recently in Moore v. Sims, Younger was applied to prevent interference with a state proceeding in which the state was seeking custody of children who had allegedly been abused by their parents. The Court noted that the state was a party to the state proceedings, and analogized the temporary removal of a child in a child abuse context to the public nuisance involved in Huffman. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 423, 99 S.Ct. at 2377. The Court summarized saying: "the only pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims, and Texas law appears to pose no procedural barriers." Id. at 430, 99 S.Ct. at 2381.

A cohesive outline of the scope and limits of equitable restraint in civil litigation has not yet emerged from these Supreme Court cases. Attempting to follow Younger and its progeny, the lower federal courts have stressed several different criteria.... Most have agreed since the Huffman decision that the distinction between civil and criminal cases is no longer crucial. The application of "notions of comity, equity and federalism"

"should never be made to turn on such labels as `civil' or `criminal' but rather upon an analysis of the competing interests in each case. Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230, 1232-1233 (5th Cir. 1972); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.), application for stay denied, 409

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