Price v. Smith
Decision Date | 15 October 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 1695.,1695. |
Citation | 109 S.W.2d 1144 |
Parties | PRICE et al. v. SMITH et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Mitchell County; A. S. Mauzey, Judge.
Suit by R. P. Price and others against Jack Smith, administrator, and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Thomas R. Smith, of Colorado, Tex., for appellants.
Mays & Perkins and P. Edward Ponder, all of Sweetwater, for appellees.
Jack Smith was appointed by the probate court of Mitchell county administrator of the estate of Chas. Mann, deceased, and duly qualified. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company presented its claim, asserting it was a secured creditor of the estate, which claim was in part allowed, conditioned upon a release being executed by the claimant of a lien against the Mann homestead. (The claim was based on notes and a deed of trust executed by Lena Smith Mann and Chas. Mann, deceased.) The allowed portion of said claim was approved by the court, subject to said release, and ordered paid. Apparently, the payment of the approved portion of said claim as a secured claim exhausted the remaining assets of the estate in the hands of the administrator, claims having priority having been paid, and left nothing for the payment of claims of unsecured creditors.
Appellants, R. P. Price et al., unsecured creditors of the estate, long after the payment of the claim of Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, brought this suit in the county court in the nature of a bill of review to set aside the order of the probate court approving said claim. In appellants' unverified petition it was alleged that appellants did not know of the approval of the claim of Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and of the order for payment thereof until after the period within which they might appeal had elapsed; they alleged that upon such discovery they filed an application for writ of certiorari in the district court; that it was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; that appellants then instituted a suit in the district court to set aside the order of the probate court approving said claim and that this petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; then the present suit was instituted in the county court on behalf of appellants and all other unsecured creditors of the estate to set aside said order of the probate court, in which appellants prayed for a judgment vacating and annulling the allowance of said claim, the approval by the court and the order of payment, and for an order commanding said insurance company to pay over to the administrator the money collected by it, and that such money be held by the administrator for the payment of claims against the estate, etc.
Appellants appealed from the decision of the probate court to the district court. That court sustained appellees' plea to the jurisdiction and general demurrer to the petition, and, upon appellants declining to amend, dismissed the suit, from which action of the court appellants have appealed to this court. Said, insurance company, the administrator, and Mrs. Lena Smith Mann are the appellees.
Appellees contend that appellants, unsecured creditors of the estate, cannot avail themselves of a bill of review to set aside said order of the probate court approving said claim, and that the only remedy for such dissatisfied creditor is an appeal to the district court from the order of the probate court.
In Jones et al. v. Wynne et al. (Tex. Civ.App.) 104 S.W.(2d) 141, 144, the court said:
The authorities cited in the above quotation are relied on by appellees to sustain their proposition. However, since the filing of briefs in this case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of error in said case with the following notation: "The court erred in overruling appellants' first assignment of error, as follows: The court erred in sustaining defendant's general demurrer and dismissing plaintiffs' petition for want of jurisdiction, because plaintiffs' petition for certiorari alleged that Helen M. Jones was merely a surety upon the note of the administrator and that no suit had been had against the principal maker of the note, in which event the approval of the claim by the probate court was void and was subject to be set aside upon proceeding for certiorari."
We think appellees' proposition is not entirely correct. A probate court may set aside its order and judgments after the expiration of the term for fraud or want of jurisdiction in a direct suit for that purpose instituted in the court in which the judgment was rendered; such suit is a proceeding in equity, not a statutory bill of review, but in the nature of a bill of review. In 13 Tex.Jur. § 54, p. 639, it is said: "But while it is true that the probate court may not revise its own judgment rendered at a previous term, it may, in common with the other courts, set aside its order or decrees for fraud or want of jurisdiction; and a bill of review or a similar proceeding may be maintained for this purpose." Hicks v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 233, 14 S.W. 575; Edwards v. Halbert, 64 Tex. 667, 669; Fortson v. Alford, 62 Tex. 576.
It is not shown that the order approving the claim was void for want of jurisdiction; the court had jurisdiction of the persons and subject-matter involved. Stegall v. Huff, 54 Tex. 193. But before appellants can in this equitable proceeding set aside the order of the probate court entered at a former term they must excuse their failure to appear and contest the claim and to appeal to the district court in addition to showing a meritorious defense. 25 Tex.Jur. §§ 224, 239.
In Nevins v. McKee, 61 Tex. 412, 413, the court said:
To the same effect, see Stewart v. Byrne (Tex.Com.App.) 42 S.W.(2d) 234, 236. In Harding v. W. L. Pearson & Co. (Tex. Com.App.) 48 S.W.(2d) 964, 965, the rule in such cases, without reference to failure to appeal was stated in an opinion by Justice Sharp, as follows:
In Bearden v. Texas Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 41 S.W.(2d) 447, 462, the court said:
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