Price v. State, CR-95-129
| Decision Date | 24 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | CR-95-129 |
| Citation | 683 So.2d 44 |
| Parties | Kenneth Lee PRICE v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Therese Green, Mobile, for Appellant.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Cedric Colvin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.
The appellant, Kenneth Lee Price, appeals his conviction for murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.
I
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because, he says, § 12-15-34.1, Code of Alabama 1975, under which he was charged, is unconstitutional. He argues that that section violates both equal protection rights and his right to due process of law.
Section 12-15-34.1, Code of Alabama 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.)
Because the appellant had obtained the age of 16 years and was charged with committing a Class A felony, he was charged under § 12-15-34.1, Code of Alabama 1975. Such a legislative classification is scrutinized under the "rational review" standard. Because the section has a rational basis relating to a legitimate governmental interest, i.e., retribution for serious crimes in addition to having the deterrent effect that facing an adult trial would have on juveniles, it does not violate the appellant's equal protection rights. Cf. Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309, 1317 (Ala.1985); cf. Hardy v. State, 576 So.2d 685 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) ()
The appellant argues that the statute violates his equal protection rights because, he says, it allows the arresting officer and the prosecutor to determine whether he is tried as a juvenile or adult. However, because the requirements of § 12-15-34.1 are compulsory, the appellant's argument must fail. Hardy, supra.
Additionally, the appellant argues that he was denied due process of law because § 12-15-34.1 is vague and overbroad and fails to consider the accused's background, education, and prior criminal record, if any.
With regard to the appellant's vagueness claim, because the language contained in § 12-15-34.1 is plain and unambiguous, this court must give effect to the legislature's intent as expressed in those words. See M.C. v. State, 600...
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State v. B.T.D.
...has already decided the constitutionality of § 12-15-34.1, Ala. Code 1975 -- the predecessor to § 12-15-204 -- in Price v. State, 683 So.2d 44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).3 On June 25, 2018, the circuit court heard oral arguments from the parties regarding B.T.D.'s due-process and equal-protecti......
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...and divests a child accused of committing a serious offense of the right to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court, see Price v. State, 683 So.2d 44 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), it does not modify the statutory definition of the term "child" and does not, by its terms, divest the child of the prote......
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Young v. State
... ... the juvenile court and divests a child accused of committing a serious offense of the right to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court, see Price v. State, 683 So.2d 44 (Ala.Cr.App.1994[(1996)]) , it does not modify the statutory definition of the term `child' and does not, by its terms, ... ...
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Little v. State
...and divests a child accused of committing a serious offense of the right to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court, see Price v. State, 683 So.2d 44 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), it does not modify the statutory definition of the term `child' and does not, by its terms, divest the child of the prote......
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...to obtain release before the end of that term. Id. (202.) See State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 600 (N.C. 1998); see also Price v. State, 683 So. 2d 44, 45 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). In Green, the child was convicted of first-degree sexual offense, attempted first-degree rape, and first-degree bur......