Price v. State, A92A1201
| Decision Date | 04 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A1201,A92A1201 |
| Citation | 424 S.E.2d 841,206 Ga.App. 161 |
| Parties | PRICE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
H. Clay Collins, Fairburn, for appellant.
James L. Webb, Sol., Helen A. Roan, Denise A. Hinds, R. Lee O'Brien, Asst. Sols., for appellee.
Defendant Emile Frank Price appeals from the denial of his Plea and Amended Plea of Former Jeopardy. We affirm.
The record shows that on January 5, 1991, the car defendant was driving struck three cars stopped at the stop light at the intersection of North Avenue and Piedmont Avenue in the City of Atlanta. Defendant did not stop at the scene of the accident and proceeded westbound on North Avenue. Defendant travelled approximately one-eighth of a mile and then struck another car at the intersection of North Avenue and Williams Street on the Georgia Tech campus, causing the car he struck to strike two parked cars. Defendant failed to stop following this second collision and proceeded until he ran up on a curb on the Georgia Tech campus. Defendant was arrested by Georgia Tech Police and issued citations for the offenses of DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, running a red light and failure to stop at an accident with injuries. Defendant was also charged with leaving the scene of the North Avenue and Piedmont Avenue collision by a City of Atlanta police officer who issued defendant a citation for that offense while he was in custody on the Georgia Tech campus.
On February 14, 1991, defendant appeared in the City Court of Atlanta in connection with the leaving the scene of the accident charge issued by the Atlanta police officer. On February 21, 1991, defendant again appeared in the City Court and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of leaving the scene of the accident. On February 26, 1991, the uniform traffic citations issued by the Georgia Tech police officer were filed in the State Court of Fulton County. Defendant subsequently filed a Plea and Amended Plea of Former Jeopardy, urging that the prosecution in State Court was barred by the federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and by OCGA § 16-1-7(b), the procedural aspect of double jeopardy. Held:
1. OCGA § 16-1-7(b) provides that "[i]f the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution...." Pretermitting whether the crimes here arose from the same conduct, we hold that the trial court correctly held that defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that "the proper prosecuting officer" had knowledge of all the charges against defendant prior to the entry of his plea in traffic court. OCGA § 16-1-7(b) applies " 'only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.' " (Citation omitted.) Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567, 569, 361 S.E.2d 808 (1987). Although defendant presented evidence that the judge presiding over the city court proceedings and the City of Atlanta police officer who testified at the proceedings discussed the other charges against the defendant when defendant first appeared in that court on February 14, 1991, undisputed evidence was also presented that none of the assistant solicitors who routinely handle cases in that court was present on that date. It has been repeatedly held by this court that the " 'proper prosecuting officer' as that phrase is used in OCGA § 16-1-7 means the prosecuting attorney for the State." Zater v. State, 197 Ga.App. 648(1), 399 S.E.2d 222 (1990). Furthermore, no evidence was presented that the prosecuting attorney was present when defendant entered his plea on February 21.
Defendant posits, however, that even if the prosecuting attorney was not present during the city court proceedings, other evidence was presented to establish the requisite knowledge on the part of the prosecuting attorney. In support of this contention defendant argues that the record shows that on February 14 defendant's trial counsel served "opposing counsel" by hand delivery with a Motion for Discovery and Entry of Appearance. Defendant argues that "opposing counsel," could only refer to one of the solicitors who prosecute cases in city court, and if the solicitor had investigated the facts behind...
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Hill v. State
...rejected a constructive knowledge or "should have known" standard. Baker, supra at 568, 361 S.E.2d 808; Price v. State, 206 Ga.App. 161, 163(1), 424 S.E.2d 841 (1992). Likewise, Hill's argument that the arresting officer's knowledge can be imputed to the prosecuting officer has been repeate......
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Dean v. the State.
...officer” refers to “the prosecuting attorney for the State.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Price v. State, 206 Ga.App. 161, 162(1), 424 S.E.2d 841 (1992). The probate court solicitor testified that he prosecutes cases in the Probate Court of Catoosa County. He further testif......