Price v. State
| Decision Date | 29 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 64281,64281 |
| Parties | EDMOND PAUL PRICE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a jury verdict of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, conspiracy to commit robbery, false imprisonment with a deadly weapon, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jennifer P. Togliatti, Judge. The charges arose from an incident in Primm, Nevada between Ronald Wall and appellant Edmond Paul Price.1
The district court did not err under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Price makes several arguments related to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Broadly, they fall into two categories: (1) the district court was required to send Price back to California after this court ordered his first indictment be dismissed; and (2) the district court erred by denying Price's second motion to dismiss for violation of IAD's speedy trial provision.
The district court was not required to send Price back to California after this court ordered his first indictment be dismissed
After Price initiated an Article III request for final disposition of untried indictments, informations, or complaints under the IAD, he was transported to the Clark County Detention Center ("CCDC") on July 7, 2011. Price filed a motion to dismiss, complaining that the State violated his right under Marcum2 to notice and the opportunity to testify before the grand jury, which the district court denied on October 13, 2011. The district court granted a stay, so Price could petition this court for a writ of mandamus.3 On May 10, 2012, this court granted the petition and directed the lower court to dismiss the indictment.4
On May 17, 2012, the district court dismissed the indictment as directed by the writ. The district court orally ordered the CCDC to notify California that Price was free to return California at the earliest convenience. At some point, the State issued a subpoena to the jail to bring Price to the grand jury to testify.5 On May 25, 2012, the State reindicted Price for the same charges as in the first indictment. On June 5, 2012, the district court denied Price's oral motion not to be remanded on the new indictment and to be returned to California at the earliest practicable time.On June 14, 2012, The State arraigned Price and both Price and the State invoked the 60-day right to a speedy trial. Trial was set for July 30, 2012.
Price offers three arguments to support his claim that the IAD required Nevada to send Price back to California after the first indictment was dismissed. First, he argues that the district court violated NRS 178.620, Article V(e), by not signing a written order to transfer Price to California after it dismissed the first indictment. Second, he argues that the prosecutor improperly issued a subpoena to CCDC to keep Price in jail so he could testify at the grand jury proceedings, as opposed to sending Price back immediately following dismissal of the first indictment. Third, Price argues that the district court erred by ordering him to be remanded on the new indictment warrant when he should have been returned to California.
As Price's contentions require us to interpret NRS 178.620, art. V(d)-(e), de novo review applies. Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188, 192, 995 P.2d 1016, 1018 (2000). Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's text. If a statute is "clear on its face," it will be enforced as written. State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011)(internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevada is a party to the IAD, which is codified at NRS 178.620. Diaz v. State, 118 Nev. 451, 452, 50 P.3d 166, 166 (2002). A principal purpose of the IAD is to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints] and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictment, information or complaints." NRS 178.620, art. I; see Diaz, 118 Nev. at 455, 50 P.3d at 168 (). To facilitate this goal, the IAD provides cooperative measures. Id. Amongthese cooperative measures is a state's ability to lodge a detainer against a defendant serving a term of imprisonment in another state, gain custody of said defendant, and prosecute the defendant on the charges underlying the detainer. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351-53 (1978); see also NRS 178.620, art. IV(a), V(a). In relevant part, NRS 178.620, art. V(d), provides:
the temporary custody referred to in [the IAD] shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction.
(emphasis added).
By its plain terms, article V(d) allowed Nevada to hold Price for prosecution on charges arising out of the Primm incident despite dismissal of the first indictment. See id. As other courts have recognized, Article V(d) "permits the receiving state to retain custody and to bring new charges 'arising out of the same transaction' as the original charge in the indictment under which the prisoner was transferred." State v. King, 733 P.2d 472, 475 (Or. Ct. App.1987), aff'd, King v. Brown, 8 F.3d 1403, 1410 (9th Cir. 1993); see State v. Batungbacal, 913 P.2d 49, 54 n.4 (Haw. 1996) (). We agree and hold that a receiving state can keep custody of a prisoner and bring new charges arising out of the same transaction that formed the basis of the detainer. Since the second indictment against Price arose out of the same transaction—the Primm incident—that led to the first indictment, which formed the basis of the detainer, the State could retain Price while it sought a second indictment. While NRS 178.620, art. V(e), does state that a "prisoner shall be returned to the sending state" "[a]t the earliest practicable time," the brief retentionin this case was "consonant with the purposes of this agreement." Id. The IAD's purpose to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition" of Price's charges would be thwarted if Price were required to be sent back to California immediately after the first indictment was dismissed, as he would have been required to be sent back to Nevada on the new indictment. See NRS 178.620, art. I.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by declining to send Price back to California or by ordering Price to be remanded on the new indictment warrant. For this reason, it was also not improper for the prosecutor to issue a subpoena to Price in jail to testify at the grand jury proceedings.
There was good cause for the continuance of trial from January 31, 2013, to May 20, 2013
After oral argument failed to clarify the record, we ordered a limited remand for the district court to determine whether the continuance from January 31, 2013, to May 20, 2013, was a necessary and reasonable continuance for good cause under the IAD or should be counted against the State. Price v. State, Docket No. 64281 (Order of Limited Remand, May 10, 2016). The district court held evidentiary hearings on October 24, 2016, and November 7, 2016. Following the hearings, the parties submitted briefs to the district court and, on April 6, 2017, the district court entered its findings of facts and conclusions of law and order finding good cause supported the continuance. After the decision, Price moved for reconsideration based on his discovery of a video recording of the preliminary portion of the January 31, 2013 hearing, which the district court denied. As a result of the hearing, the district court clarified its previously filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, to read that "[t]he only reasonable and necessary reason th[e] [district] [c]ourt can find fromthe record for setting the trial on May 20, 2013, was that there was a general civil stack prior to the May 20, 2013 date." The district court also reaffirmed its finding that "there were reasonable and necessary grounds constituting good cause for a trial setting beyond February 11, and 25, 2013."
In his supplemental brief to this court on this issue, Price argues that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating good cause for the continuance from January 31, 2013 to May 20, 2013, and that the delay associated with this continuance, combined with the other State-caused delays in the prosecution, violated the IAD and require dismissal of the charges. Price contends that neither prosecutor "had a good faith belief that accommodations could not be made" in the prosecutors' other trials pending in February of 2013. The State disagrees. It contends that the district court properly took a variety of factors into consideration in delaying the trial until May 20, 2013, and that the subpoena issue was an added concern because "[h]ad the trial been set sooner, the [d]istrict [c]ourt would have found itself in the position of once again having to vacate another trial setting for [Price]."6
Pursuant to the IAD, "any necessary or reasonable continuance" may be granted where "good cause [is] shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel [is] present, [and] the court ha[s] jurisdiction of the matter." NRS 178.620, art. III(a), IV(c). The IAD does not define the term "good cause." Brown v. Wolff, 706 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, courts have deemed it to "mean[ ] a substantialreason; one that affords a legal excuse."...
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