Price v. Thornton

• Decision Date: 31 March 1846
• Parties: SUSAN PRICE v. JOHN THORNTON ET AL.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

10 Mo. 135

SUSAN PRICE

v.JOHN THORNTON ET AL.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1846.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT.

GANTT, for Appellant.

GEYER, for Appellees, cited: Abbott on Ship. 132; Reynolds v. Tappan, 15 Mass. 370; Dios v. Owners of Revenge, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 262.

NAPTON, J.

This was an action on the case, brought by the plaintiff in error, against the defendants, who were sued in connection with David Tatum and Samuel Lewis, as owners of the steamboat General Leavenworth. The declaration contained four counts, charging the defendants with having, through their agent and servant, the master of the said boat, carelessly and negligently shipped on board of said boat two slaves belonging to the plaintiff, without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff, whereby the said slaves were totally lost, &c. The defendants pleaded not guilty.

The bill of exceptions taken at the trial shows that the plaintiff offered testimony conducing to establish the following facts: Joseph White was the captain, and part owner of the steamboat Leavenworth, and whilst said boat was lying at Glasgow, two slaves belonging to the plaintiff applied to him for passage on his boat to St. Louis, and produced some papers which the witness thought did not have any seal affixed thereto. Capt. White was heard to tell them that their passage to St. Louis would be four dollars apiece, if they wooded. Capt. White's attention was directed once or twice during the downward trip of the boat to the propriety of investigating more closely the character of the negroes; but nothing was done, and the negroes after their arrival at St. Louis, escaped in another boat bound for Cincinnati--and were never recovered. The plaintiff offered to prove upon the trial, the declarations and admissions of Capt. White; but they were excluded. The court, at the instance of the defendants, instructed the jury that if they found from the evidence that the slaves in the declaration mentioned, were shipped on board the steamboat Leavenworth, without the knowledge or consent of the defendants, the plaintiff could not recover. The defendants had a verdict and judgment. The case is brought here by writ of error.

The question presented by the record is, whether an action on the case can be maintained against the owners of a steamboat for the negligence of the master, in permitting the plaintiff's slaves to take passage on the boat as freemen, or in allowing them to be shipped on the boat, without the consent of the owner of said slaves. That an action of trespass in such case would lie against the captain, was decided by this court, at the last term, in the case of Eaton v. Vaughn.

The general principle of law is, that the master is liable for the acts of his servant, when the servant is acting in execution of the authority given him. Where a servant loses sight of his master's interest and business, and through mere malice of his own, commits a trespass or felony, the master is not liable. But even when a trespass is committed by the servant, if done through negligence or inattention, and whilst in the attempted discharge of duty, the master is liable, not for the trespass, but in an action on the case for the damages consequential on his employment of an unskillful servant. McManus v. Crickett, 1 East, 108. It is upon this principle that actions have been brought and maintained against the proprietors of stage coaches, railroad cars, &c., for injuries resulting from the mismanagement of their officers and servants. Moreton v. Hardem and others, 4 Barn. & Cres. 223; Johnson & Co. v. Small, 5 B. Mon. 25. It is upon the same grounds that owners of ships have been held liable not only for the contracts but for the torts of the master, when done within the scope of his employment. The responsibility cast upon the owners of ships for the acts of the master, is based upon the soundest principles of public policy, arising not only from the fact that the master is selected by the owners, and held forth to the public as a person worthy of trust and confidence, but growing out of the necessity of preventing opportunities for fraud and collusion, which would otherwise be afforded. Abbott on Shipping, p. 131. Hence all injuries by collision, arising from the want of skill and care of the master, fall upon the owner. 4 Dall. 206; 1 Dall. 184. But the responsibility of the owner is not confined to cases of this character; for any other torts committed on the high seas, except where they are acts of piracy, the owners are personally liable. Mauro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 486; Mealary v. Shattuck, 3 Cranch, 458; Murray v. Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 483; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362. In Talbot v. The Commanders and Owners of Three Brigs, 2 Dall. 103, the responsibility of the owners for the default of the master for an illegal seizure on the high seas, was fully maintained; and it is said by Judge Story, in his notes to Abbott on Shipping, p. 132, that the right to institute proceedings in the admiralty by a suit in personam for torts on the high seas against the master and owners, has been well established, and applies to cases of spoliation, illegal seizure, and personal damage. The case of the Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, is a striking illustration of the character of this responsibility, and the extent to which it has been carried. That was a suit against the owners of a privateer, for boarding a neutral schooner, and robbing and plundering the libelants who were on board the schooner of divers articles of wearing apparel and...