Price v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 28 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC02-1953.,SC02-1953.
• Citation: 890 So.2d 246
• Parties: Dallas G. PRICE, et ux., Petitioners, v. Avery L. TYLER, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

890 So.2d 246

Dallas G. PRICE, et ux., Petitioners, v. Avery L. TYLER, et al., Respondents.

No. SC02-1953.

Supreme Court of Florida.

October 28, 2004.

Rehearing Denied December 22, 2004.

Keith T. Grumer of Grumer and Levin, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.

Thomas R. Bolf of Ruden, McCloskey, Smith, Schuster and Russell, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review Tyler v. Price, 821 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Saporito v. Madras, 576 So.2d 1342 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).¹ We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision under review for the reasons set forth in our analysis below and disapprove Saporito to the extent it conflicts with our analysis here.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant action arises from a reversal of the trial court's final judgment awarding the petitioners ("the Prices") attorneys' fees. See Tyler, 821 So.2d at 1126. This action involves four parcels of property. See id. at 1123. Parcel A is a marina presently owned by the respondents ("the Tylers"). See id. Parcel B is a mobile home park presently owned by the Prices. See id. Over the northwest portion of parcel B is a twenty-five-foot roadway easement granted to parcel A ("the easement"). See id. To the east of this easement exists a trapezoid-shaped parcel of land ("the trapezoid parcel"), which leads to the marina basin. See id. Prior to 1962, Charles and Ruth Snyder owned all of the property involved in this action. See id. In 1962, the Snyders sold parcel B to Ravenswood, Inc., and the parties executed an agreement reserving the easement in favor of parcel A. See id. at 1124. The parties agreed that parcel A could not be used in a way that would create a nuisance to parcel B. See id. In addition, the agreement provided that the Snyders would convey the trapezoid parcel to Ravenswood if they ever sold parcel A. See id. In 1963, Ravenswood sold parcel B to Stanley and Maria Klosinski. As a result of Stanley's death, Maria Klosinski obtained sole ownership of the property. See id.

In 1972, the Snyders executed a lease and option to purchase parcel A, excluding the trapezoid parcel, to the Tylers. See id. In 1975, the Tylers exercised this option and purchased the property. See id. Notwithstanding that the recorded 1962 agreement required the Snyders to convey the trapezoid parcel to Ravenswood, or its assigns, in the event that parcel A was sold, no such conveyance was made. See id. Thus, title to the trapezoid parcel remained with the Snyders. See id.

In 1989, Gustavo Passerelli purchased parcel B from Klosinski, subject to the easement and a purchase money mortgage. See id. The same year Passerelli also purchased parcel A, the legal description for which included the trapezoid parcel, from the Tylers, also subject to a purchase money mortgage. See id. Passerelli failed to make payments on both mortgages, and both Klosinski and the Tylers foreclosed on their mortgages, securing judgments of foreclosure. See id. The certificate of title issued by the court to the Tylers included parcel A and the trapezoid parcel. See id. The certificate of title to Klosinski included parcel B. See id. Klosinski then sold parcel B to the petitioners, Dallas and Angela Price. See id.

In 1998, the Prices filed an action against the Tylers seeking termination of the easement, alleging that it was personal to the Snyders, and also requesting the entry of a judgment declaring that they had exclusive use and possession of the trapezoid parcel pursuant to the 1962 agreement. See id. The Prices subsequently amended their complaint to seek damages, alleging that the marina located on parcel A was a nuisance to parcel B. See id. The Tylers answered and counterclaimed for declaratory relief, requesting that the court declare the easement to be perpetual and running with the land. See id. The Tylers also requested that the court either declare a prescriptive easement in both the easement and the trapezoid parcel, or quiet title to the trapezoid parcel in them based upon the certificate of title they acquired when they foreclosed Passerelli's mortgage. See id. After the action was filed, Charles Snyder, as surviving owner, transferred his interest in the trapezoid parcel to the Prices. See id. at 1125.

In the final judgment quieting title, the trial court determined that the easement had been extinguished in 1989 when Passarelli acquired both parcel A and parcel B. Regarding the trapezoid parcel, the trial court found that when the Snyders sold parcel A to the Tylers in 1975, the 1962 agreement obligated the Snyders to convey the trapezoid parcel to the Prices' predecessor in title. Therefore, the Prices' predecessors had obtained equitable title, which the Snyders held in trust. When the Snyders transferred legal title in 1998, combining it with the equitable title, the Prices acquired sole title to the trapezoid parcel. Based on this reasoning, the trial court quieted title in the Prices and ejected and ousted the Tylers from the easement and the trapezoid parcel. The trial court awarded costs and attorneys' fees to the Prices pursuant to the final judgment quieting title.

On appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court's determination that the easement had been extinguished, but affirmed the judgment insofar as it quieted title to the trapezoid parcel of land in the Prices. See Tyler, 821 So.2d at 1126. In addition, the Fourth District reversed the award of attorneys' fees granted to the Prices in their quiet title action. See id. In reversing the award of attorneys' fees, the Fourth District stated:

The Prices did not request attorney's fees in their pleadings. See Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835, 837-38 (Fla.1991). While the Prices claim that they did not have to plead attorney's fees based upon Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So.2d 29, 31-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), in which this court held that attorney's fees were considered part of the damages in a slander of title case, the Prices did not allege a slander of title claim. Instead, they sued for declaratory judgment, and the court entered a judgment quieting title. Neither type of action permits the recovery of attorney's fees absent a contractual provision or a statute authorizing the same. Moreover, attorney's fees in slander of title cases are considered "special damages." See Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So.2d 651, 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(g) states, "[w]hen items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." Thus, the Prices are not entitled to attorney's fees.

Tyler, 821 So.2d at 1126 (emphasis added).

The Prices sought review of the Fourth District's decision with regard to the extinguishment of the easement and the award of attorneys' fees. On April 14, 2003, this Court granted review of the Fourth District's decision. See Price v. Tyler, 842 So.2d 845, 845 (Fla.2003) (table).²

ANALYSIS

The primary issue in the instant action is whether the Prices are entitled to recover attorneys' fees as the prevailing party in the quiet title action. Our legal precedent in this area of the law is reasonably clear. As this Court has determined, "[A]ttorney's fees incurred while prosecuting or defending a claim are not recoverable in the absence of a statute or contractual agreement authorizing their recovery." Bidon v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 596 So.2d 450, 452 (Fla.1992). In addition, this Court in Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 850 So.2d 462 (Fla.2003), reaffirmed the general rule that "[u]nder Florida law, each party generally bears its own attorneys' fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise." Id. at 465; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla.1993) ("This Court has followed the `American Rule' that attorney's fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties."); Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Fla.1985) (recognizing that this Court has adopted "the `American Rule' that attorney fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties"); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1967) ("It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party ... (1) where authorized by contract; [and] (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment;...."). Therefore, pursuant to controlling authority, the Prices are only entitled to attorneys' fees if a statute or contract provides for such fees.

In the decision below, the Fourth District pursuant to our precedent correctly determined that attorneys' fees are not recoverable in declaratory relief or quiet title actions, absent an independent statutory or contractual basis. See Tyler, 821 So.2d at 1126. The Prices rely, however, on the Fifth District's decision in Saporito in asserting their entitlement to attorneys' fees. In Saporito, the district court affirmed the award of attorneys' fees stating it was following "the trend of decisions upholding an award of attorney's fees as damages in suits to quiet title or remove a cloud from title." Saporito, 576 So.2d at 1345 (emphasis added) (citing Susman v. Schuyler, 328 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); and Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)). However, contrary to the Fifth District's reasoning in Saporito that it was following the trend of decisions upholding an award of attorneys' fees as damages in suits to quiet title or remove a cloud from title, the trend of decisions in Florida referred to which uphold attorneys' fees as damages actually involved slander of title actions, see Susman, 328 So.2d at 32; Glusman, 285 So.2d at 31, which were tort actions in which damages are recoverable, not actions to quiet title, such...