Price v. Victor Valley Union High Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 November 2022
• Docket Number: E076784
• Citation: 85 Cal.App.5th 231,301 Cal.Rptr.3d 177
• Parties: La Vonya PRICE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VICTOR VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

85 Cal.App.5th 231

301 Cal.Rptr.3d 177

La Vonya PRICE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.VICTOR VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

E076784

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Filed November 9, 2022

Taylor Labor Law, Christopher W. Taylor, Parham Barkhordar, Taylor H. White and Philip Horlacher, Pasadena, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Walsh & Associates, Dennis J. Walsh and Wendy K. Marcus, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

CODRINGTON J.

I.INTRODUCTION

La Vonya Price worked intermittently as a part-time substitute special education aide at the Victor Valley Unified School District (the District) before applying for a full-time position. She received an offer for a full-time position that was contingent on passing a physical exam. When she failed the physical exam for not being "medically suitable for the position," the District rescinded the offer, terminated her as a substitute, and disqualified her from any future employment with the District.

Price sued the District for retaliation and various disability-related claims, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the District. Price appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Price suffered a serious stroke in 2003 that initially left her paralyzed. After years of treatment, she eventually regained the use of her body and relearned how to speak, stand, and walk, yet she did not fully recover. Price suffered some permanent paralysis, which limited her ability to walk and the use of her left foot. Throughout 2005 and 2006, Price had to use a walker and a wheelchair because of her limited mobility. By 2007, Price's condition had improved, but she still struggled with grasping and holding items, although she could hold small items without them falling.

Price first worked part-time for the District between August 2006 and September 2006 as a substitute para-educator for special needs students. She was not required to take or pass a physical examination for the position, and she did not tell the District she had a disability or any medical restrictions.

In the fall of 2007, Price worked for the District on a long-term substitute assignment (about eight hours for 35 days). She left the position because of problems with swelling in her knee, which required her to wear a brace full-time. Price, however, did not tell anyone at the District about her disability or medical restrictions.

Price worked for a different school district in 2013 as a substitute para-educator for special needs students. She was not required to take a physical examination for the position and, again, she did not tell anyone at that school district about her disability or medical restrictions.

Price did not work for the District again until February 2018, when she was hired as a substitute Instructional Assistant for special education students. Price was assigned to work one-on-one with an autistic student, who would sometimes run away from teachers and aides, including Price.¹

Although she considered herself disabled, Price stated in her application that she did not have a disability that needed accommodations because she believed she did not need any at the time. Price again did not tell anyone at the District that she had a disability or needed an accommodation, even though at the time she could only lift a few pounds with her left hand, she could fall if she had to jog without holding onto something, and she could work only 20 to 25 hours per week because of her medical issues. Because she applied for a substitute position, Price did not have to pass a physical examination.

In July or August 2018, Price applied and interviewed for a full-time position as an Instructional Assistant for special needs students. In her application, she stated that she left her job in 2010 because of a "disability," but she also stated that she did not have a current disability that required accommodations. Price was offered the position conditioned on certain screening procedures, including passing a physical examination, which is required for all new full-time hires at the District.

An independent physician's office conducted Price's physical examination. The District provided the physician with a description of the position Price had been offered to determine whether she was qualified to perform its physical requirements. Physician's assistant Johnathan Luna administered Price's physical examination.

During the examination, Price told Luna that she had a disability and told him about her medical history, including that she had suffered a stroke. Luna then administered a lifting test and balance test.

After the examination, Luna prepared a two-page report. On the first page, Luna stated that Price passed the "lift & carry" test, but failed the "physical" test. Luna indicated that Price had a "balance deficit, strength deficit in R leg." In the section on the second page concerning the items "performed and results reviewed," Luna wrote, "Deficit in RLC, balance, ? fall risk." Based on the examination, Luna determined that Price was "NOT medically suitable for the position."

Luna sent his report to the District. The District's Director of Classified Personnel, DeShawn Dickinson, read Luna's report. After reading the report, Dickinson decided to rescind Price's job offer because the District will not hire anyone who fails either of the tests administered during the physical examination. If someone who has received an offer contingent on passing the physical examination fails either test, the offer is automatically withdrawn.

Dickinson met with Price later that week. Dickinson told Price that the District had rescinded her job offer because she failed the physical test. He made it "very clear" that Price could not challenge the decision.

Price asked Dickinson for more information on why Luna determined she failed the physical test. Dickinson replied, " ‘I don't know that because I'm not the doctor. You would need to contact them.’ " Price told Dickinson that she disagreed with Luna's report, noted that she had successfully performed the job as a substitute, and that she could consult her own doctor about whether she was medically qualified for the job. Dickinson said he would not consider information from Price's doctor and told her, "[you are] a liability." When Price asked him to explain what he meant by that, Dickinson repeated three times that Price was "a liability."

Dickinson then gave Price a letter that explained the District rescinded her job offer because she failed the physical examination. The letter also explained that Price's failing the physical examination disqualified her from her current position as a substitute and any future positions with the District.

B. Procedural History

Price first sued the District for seven claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code § 12940 et seq.² ). After the District's successful demurrers (which Price does not challenge on appeal), only five of Price's FEHA claims remained: (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to accommodate a disability; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) retaliation; and (5) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation. The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for the District. Price timely appealed.

III.DISCUSSION

Price contends the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to the District because there are triable issues of fact concerning all of her claims. We agree as to her first claim for disability discrimination, but disagree as to the rest of her claims.

A. Standard of Review

"A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion there is no triable issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant satisfies this burden by showing one or more elements of the cause of action in question cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. If the defendant meets this initial burden, the opposing party must then make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] [¶] We review the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. [Citation.] We strictly construe the moving party's affidavits and liberally construe the opposing party's affidavits. We accept as undisputed facts only those portions of the moving party's evidence that are not contradicted by the opposing party's evidence." ( City of San Diego v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 21, 25, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 26.) Thus, "[w]hen deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." ( Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 707.)

B. Disability Discrimination

FEHA prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an applicant based on the applicant's actual or perceived physical disability. ( § 12940, subd. (a).) To assess Price's FEHA discrimination claim, we use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.³ (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 ; Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (200) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089.) To succeed on her claim under that framework, Price has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination. ( Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 234-235, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 ( Moore ).) If Price satisfies her burden, the burden shifts to the District to prove that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for subjecting Price to an adverse employment action. ( Id. at p. 235, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 841.) If the District satisfies...