People v. Vincent, Docket No. 105808
| Decision Date | 15 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 12,Docket No. 105808,12 |
| Citation | 565 N.W.2d 629,455 Mich. 110 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Duyonn Andre VINCENT, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Arthur A. Busch, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Flint, for People.
State Appellate Defender by Randy E. Davidson, Detroit, for defendant.
Ronald J. Bretz, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Lansing, and Patrick Levine Rose, Lansing, amici curiae for the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
Michael Thomas, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Detroit, amici curiae for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
We granted leave in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly characterized a particular statement made by a trial judge as a directed verdict of acquittal. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that the judge's inchoate observations did not ripen into a directed verdict of acquittal and did not become a final judgment. There was neither a written or signed order nor an oral or written ruling on the record sufficiently detailing the reasons for granting or denying the motion. Consequently, the defendant's constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy was not violated by the submission of the issue to the jury.
The defendant and his two codefendants were charged with open murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, arising from the shooting death of Markeis Jones. Jones was shot during a confrontation between two groups of youths at Hamady High School in Flint. The defendant and his friends did not attend Hamady, but were waiting for friends who were attending a dance at the high school. In the school driveway the two groups of youths began arguing. There was some pushing and shoving and some verbal threats. Ultimately several shots were fired out of the back of a Mustang hatchback. Testimony indicated that defendant and codefendant Dameon Perkins fired shots from the back of the car. Codefendant Marcus Hopkins drove the car away as the shots were fired. There is some evidence in the record indicating that the shots missed their intended mark and inadvertently hit Markeis Jones, a friend of the defendants. There is also evidence in the record that the confrontation was gang related, involving rival groups known as "Folks Up" and "Folks Down."
All three young men were charged with open murder and felony firearm and were tried before two separate juries during one trial. Defendant Vincent and codefendant Hopkins were tried by one jury, while codefendant Perkins was tried by a second. At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, counsel for all three defendants moved for directed verdicts of acquittal on the charges of first-degree murder, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation and that the shooting was unplanned and spontaneous. The prosecution opposed the motion.
When defense counsel had completed their arguments on the motion, the trial court judge responded with the following comment:
Well my impression at this time is that there's not been shown premeditation or planning in the, in the alleged slaying. That what we have at the very best is Second Degree Murder. I don't see that the participation of any of the defendants is any different then anyone else as I hear the comment made by Mr. Doll [counsel for Perkins] about the short time in which his client was in the vehicle. But I think looking at it in a broad scope as to what part each and every one of them played, if at all, in the event that it's not our premeditation planning episode. It may very well be the circumstance for bad judgement was used in having weapons but the weapons themselves may relate to a type of intent, but don't necessarily have to show the planning of premeditation. I have to consider all the factors. I think that the second Count should remain as it is, felony firearm. And I think that Second Degree Murder is an appropriate charge as to the defendants. Okay.
This discussion took place outside the hearing of the jury. Before adjourning the proceedings, the prosecutor requested time the next day to "make a brief restatement in terms of the First Degree Murder...." The judge replied that he would "be glad to hear it ... [and that he was] always glad to hear [the] people."
The next day, the prosecution presented an argument regarding the quantum or threshold of evidence sufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict on the charges of first-degree murder. After hearing both sides, and over the objections of defense counsel, the judge decided to reserve his ruling on the motion until he heard and thought more about the issues. Defense counsel maintained that the judge had directed a verdict resulting in a final judgment of acquittal regarding the first-degree murder charges, and that double jeopardy concerns were implicated. 1
The judge, reconsidering his earlier remarks, noted that the jury had not been informed of any of the discussion, and, therefore, the defendant had not been prejudiced. The judge was adamant that he had not directed a verdict, All three defendants were convicted: Vincent of first-degree murder, Hopkins of involuntary manslaughter, and Perkins of second-degree murder. All three appealed in the Court of Appeals.
Codefendant Hopkins, who had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter, raised the double jeopardy issue on appeal. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the judge's ruling was not a final judgment or ruling, but the mere expression of an opinion.
While the court expressed an opinion that ultimately would have ripened into a final ruling had nothing intervened and the court taken the issue from the jury, the court, before acting on its expressed opinion, agreed to hear further argument from the prosecutor regarding the issue. When the court recessed for the day, everyone was aware that the prosecutor was going to present further argument on the issue of first-degree murder the next morning, before defendants would proceed with their cases. The matter was addressed the next morning, and the court reconsidered its opinion earlier expressed, concluding that it would reserve ruling. Thus, the record indicates that the court expressed an opinion, and then before finalizing that opinion, agreed to entertain further argument. The court did not make a final ruling until it denied defendant's motion for directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. We conclude the court was not barred from further consideration of the matter. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 20, 1995 (Docket No. 158133), slip op. at 2 .]
The Court also concluded that MCR 6.419, which bars the judge from reserving his ruling on the motion was not violated because in this case Hopkins did not present any proofs and the judge made clear that he wanted the jury to decide between the different degrees of murder. Id. at 3. The Hopkins Court also concluded that in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of first-degree murder. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the motion. Id.
Codefendant Perkins also raised the double jeopardy issue in his separate appeal. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals noted both that the trial of the first-degree murder charge continued after hearing the prosecution's arguments and that the jury was ultimately instructed on first-degree murder. Accordingly then, the Court held that "[s]ince the trial court had never indicated to the jury that it was directing a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, there was no prejudice to defendant and, more importantly, defendant's double jeopardy rights were not violated." Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 21, 1995 (Docket No. 160177), slip op. at 2.
The Perkins Court held, just as the Court in Hopkins, that the prosecutor had presented sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation so the trial court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict or in instructing the jury on the charge. "We are satisfied that the prosecution did present sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the killing was done with premeditation and deliberation." Id. 2
However, a third panel of the Court of Appeals heard defendant Vincent's appeal, and in a published opinion reversed the decision of the trial court. Vincent also argued that his conviction of first-degree murder violated his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. 215 Mich.App. 458, 460, 546 N.W.2d 662 (1996). The Court agreed, reversed the conviction, and remanded the case "for entry of a conviction of second-degree murder and for resentencing." Id. at 471, 546 N.W.2d 662. 3 The Court conceded that the trial judge's first statement "Well, my impression at this time," was ambiguous, but that the later statement "What we have at the very best is second-degree murder," was not. Id. at 468, 546 N.W.2d 662.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold, on the basis of the following evaluation, that the judge's inchoate impressions did not mature into a final judgment of acquittal of the charge. Consequently, Vincent's right not to be placed twice in jeopardy was not violated. 4
We recognize that a judge's characterization of a ruling and the form of the ruling may not be controlling. People v. Anderson, 409 Mich. 474, 486, 295 N.W.2d 482 (1980); United States v....
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