Price v. Wood
Decision Date | 21 November 1935 |
Docket Number | No 2838.,2838. |
Citation | 88 S.W.2d 530 |
Parties | PRICE v. WOOD. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Montgomery County Court; R. H. Weatherly, Judge.
Action by W. B. Wood against M. G. Price. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Morris & Darden, of Conroe, for appellant.
S. A. McCall, of Conroe, for appellee.
On January 2, 1935, appellee, W. B. Wood, instituted this suit against appellant, M. G. Price, in the county court of Montgomery county, praying for judgment upon a promissory note in the sum of $645, dated January 1, 1930, due "12 months after date." Appellant answered by special plea of the four years' statute of limitation, article 5527, R.S. 1925, that appellee had not commenced and prosecuted his suit within four years after "the cause of action" accrued. On trial to the court without a jury, the plea of limitation was overruled, and judgment was entered in favor of appellee against appellant for the amount sued for.
Appellant's proposition that appellee's cause of action was barred by the statute of four years' limitation is the only issue before this court.
By article 4591, R.S. 1925, January 1st is a legal holiday. Article 5937, § 85 (of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act), provides that when the day of maturity falls upon Sunday, or a holiday, "the instrument is payable on the next succeeding business day." Under this statute, notwithstanding the note by its terms matured on January 1, 1931, it was not "payable" until January 2, 1931, and appellant had all of that day to pay his note. Therefore, appellee's cause of action did not accrue, that is, he did not have the right to sue upon his note until the beginning of January 3, 1931, as appellant had all of January 2d in which to pay his note. Standard v. Thurmond (Tex.Civ.App.) 151 S.W. 627, is in point on the proposition that the cause of action accrued January 3d. In that case, the court said:
With the note maturing January 2, 1931, that is, "payable" on that day, Key v. Forshagen (Tex.Civ.App.) 57 S.W.(2d) 232, is in point on the proposition that appellee had all of January 2, 1935, in which to file his suit. And, as the suit was filed on that day, appellee's cause of action was not barred by limitation. In that case, the court said:
Appellant relies principally upon the following proposition announced by the court in Standard v. Thurmond, supra: ...
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Seibert v. Sally
...Key v. Forshagen, Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 232; Douglas v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 643; Price v. Wood, Tex.Civ.App., 88 S.W.2d 530; Article 23, Revised Civil Statutes, Sections 15 and 16; Gardner v. Universal Life & Acc. Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 582, err......