Prichard v. Battle

• Decision Date: 24 November 1941
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: PRICHARD. v. BATTLE, Director of Division of Motor Vehicles.

178 Va. 455

17 S.E.2d 393

PRICHARD.

v.BATTLE, Director of Division of Motor Vehicles.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 24, 1941.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1942.

Original mandamus proceedings by A. M. Prichard, Jr., against M. S. Battle, Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to compel the director to surrender to petitioner a certain bond and attached collateral deposited with the director as a condition to renewal of petitioner's license to operate a motor vehicle.

Mandamus denied.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.

Joseph I. Nachman, of Staunton, for petitioner.

Edwin H. Gibson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

EGGLESTON, Justice.

This is a petition for mandamus filed by A. M. Prichard, Jr., against M. S. Battle, Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Commonwealth of Virginia, to compel the latter to surrender to the petitioner a certain bond and the attached collateral deposited with the director as a condition to the renewal of the petitioner's license to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State.

The petitioner alleges that on February 27, 1939, he was convicted by the civil and police justice for the city of Charlottesville on a charge of leaving the scene of an accident in which an automobile driven by him was involved, Michie's Code of 1936, § 2154(104); Acts 1932, ch. 342, p. 648, as amended by Acts 1938, ch. 302, p. 435; that as a result of this conviction his license to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State was suspended for the period of one year by the Division of Motor Vehicles under the provisions of section 17 of the Virginia Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act, Michie's Code of 1936, § 2154 (186); Acts 1932, ch. 385, p. 781, as amended by Acts 1934, ch. 389, p. 822; Acts 1936, ch. 22, p. 37; Acts 1938, ch. 188, p. 304; that in order to secure the reissuance of his license he was required, on September 2, 1940, to file with the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles a bond in the penal sum of $11,000, conditioned according to law, and to deposit therewith certain collateral as evidence of his ability to respond in damages which might thereafter be adjudged against him on account of accidents resulting from his ownership or operation of a motor vehicle; that on February 26, 1941, there was granted to him by the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia a full and complete pardon for the offense of which he had been convicted, "thereby removing all disability suffered by the petitioner as a result of said conviction;" and that although as a result of the pardon the petitioner was entitled to have restored to him the bond and collateral which he had deposited with the director, the latter had failed and refused to return them to him and was withholding them without authority of law.

The prayer of the petition is that this court direct the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring the director to return and deliver to the petitioner the bond and the collateral therewith deposited.

The contention of the petitioner is that section 17 of the Virginia Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act, supra, makes it mandatory that the Division of Motor Vehicles "forthwith revoke" the license to drive an automobile "upon receiving a record of the conviction of such person" of certain specified offenses, including that ofleaving the scene of an accident in which his car is involved; that such revocation is a part of the penalty or punishment inflicted upon the offender within the meaning of section 73 of the Constitution of Virginia and section 2569 of the Code, as amended by Acts 1928, ch. 415, p. 1080; Acts 1930, ch. 391, p. 828, which empower the governor to "remit * * * fines and penalties"; and that the effect of the pardon granted to petitioner is to restore to him the right to operate an automobile upon the highways of the State free of the conditions which were imposed upon him by the division when his license was renewed. Accordingly, he says, the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles should be required to return to him the bond and the collateral.

The director has filed a demurrer to the petition which challenges its sufficiency in law. His contention is that the revocation of the license and the requirement of the deposit of the bond and collateral as a condition to the reissuance of the license, are not a part of the penalty or punishment inflicted on the petitioner for his breach of the law, but are measures flowing from the police power of the State designed to protect other users of the State highways. Hence, he argues, the pardon granted to the petitioner did not have the effect of restoring his license to drive a motor vehicle free of the conditions which were imposed upon him by the division pursuant to the statute.

In our opinion the position of the director is well taken.

The argument of the petitioner overlooks the nature and purpose of the issuance and revocation of licenses to drive motor vehicles.

In Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 414, 4 S.E.2d 762, 767, we said:

"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways is a common right, but the exercise of that right may be regulated or controlled in the interest of public safety under the police power of the State. The operation of a motor vehicle on such highways is not a natural right. It is a conditional privilege, which may be suspended or revoked under the police power. The license or permit to so operate is not a contract or property right in a constitutional sewse."

See, also, Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 454, 199 S.E. 516, 519.

Such a privilege is granted to those who are qualified and is withheld from those who are not. As we said in Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 524, 180 S.E. 416, 417:

"The enactment of the Virginia Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act by the Legislature was designed under the police power of the state to protect the use of the highways from those who are not qualified to operate motor vehicles, to exercise some measure of control over such operators, and generally to regulate, standardize, and make uniform, so far as practicable, the granting or withholding of this privilege in furtherance of the safety of the users of the highways of the state."

The provisions for both the issuance and the revocation of licenses are a part of this purpose. The fact that the revocation of a license is made mandatory as the result of a conviction of certain specified offenses under section 17 of the act, Michie's Code of 1936, § 2154(186) does not, of course, alter its purpose. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has simply provided that one who has been convicted of these offenses is no longer deemed fit to operate motor vehicles on the State highways unless and until other users of the highways are protected against him, that is, until the offender establishes "his ability to respond in damages which may thereafter be adjudged against him on account of accidents resulting from his ownership or operation of a motor vehicle."

Certainly there is nothing legally objectionable to putting drivers convicted of serious violations of the motor vehicle statutes in a class separate from those who have not been so convicted, and requiring of the former security or conditions not required of the latter in order that they may be licensed to operate on State highways.

The revocation is no part of the punishment fixed by the jury or by the court wherein the offender is tried. Commonwealth v. Ellett, supra, 174 Va. at page 411, 4 S.E.2d at page 765. Nor is it, in our opinion, an added punishment for the offense committed. It is civil and not criminal in its nature. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65, 69, 70; Steele v. State Road Commission, 116 W.Va. 227, 179 S.E. 810.

The question as to whether the revocation of a license because of an act for which the licensee has been convicted or because of the conviction itself is an added punishment has frequently been beforethe courts. The universa holding is that such a revocation is not an added punishment, but is a finding that by reason of the commission of the act or the conviction of the licensee, the latter is no longer a fit person to hold and enjoy...