Pride v. Baker

• Decision Date: 05 March 1901
• Citation: 64 S.W. 329
• Parties: PRIDE et ux. v. BAKER et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

64 S.W. 329

PRIDE et ux. v. BAKER et al.

Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee.

March 5, 1901.

Appeal from chancery court, Davidson county; H. H. Cook, Chancellor.

Suit by Sam R. Pride and wife against William Giles Baker and others. From a decree in favor of complainants, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

John T. Lellyett and Lellyett & Barr, for appellants. Vertrees & Vertrees, for appellees.

WILSON, J.

This bill was filed October 23, 1896, by complainants, to set aside a deed to some 50 acres of land described in the bill executed August 24, 1896, by Mrs. Pride, then Rachel Ann Baker, to the wife of defendant Giles Baker and their three minor children. The grounds of relief averred in the bill are that the execution of the deed was procured by fraud and duress. The bill was taken for confessed at first against Giles Baker, but the pro confesso was set aside, and the defendants answered, the minors by guardian ad litem. The grounds of relief averred were put in issue by the defendants. A large volume of evidence was produced by the parties. It consists of some 26 depositions, and, with the pleadings, orders, etc., constitutes the large record of over 400 typewritten pages before us. The chancellor heard the cause April 25, 1900. He decreed that the complainant Mrs. Pride was entitled to the relief sought, set aside her deed to the land in issue, ordered a writ of possession to put her in possession, and taxed Giles Baker and wife with the costs. His decree was based upon his finding that said deed was procured by fraud and duress. From this decree defendants prayed and were granted an appeal to the supreme court. They perfected their appeal, and, the case being before this court, they have assigned, in effect, the following errors: First, error in sustaining the bill and granting the relief prayed for; second, error in decreeing a cancellation of the deed of Mrs. Pride to the 50 acres of land, made by her August 24, 1896, to Mrs. Giles Baker and her three children; third, error in taxing defendants Giles Baker and wife with the costs; fourth, error in ordering a writ of possession to issue to restore the 50 acres of land to the complainants. This case was argued before us orally with force and elaboration by both sides, and in addition both sides, through able and industrious counsel, filed with the record able and exhaustive briefs, in which every scrap of evidence in the record tending to support their respective theories is brought to our attention. So, if we have not reached the correct conclusions, the error cannot be contributed to counsel on either side. We have gone through, read, and weighed, and carefully considered all the voluminous evidence in this voluminous record. After doing so, we are reasonably satisfied that the chancellor reached the right result in his decree; that the deed from Mrs. Pride, formerly Rachel Ann Baker, to Mrs. Giles Baker and her children, assailed in the bill, was procured by both fraud and duress, and that it should be canceled, and Mrs. Pride reinvested the title to the land covered by the deed, and restored to its possession. In saying this we are not to be understood as holding that there is not evidence in the record of cogent force tending to sustain the contention of defendants that the deed in question was freely, voluntarily, and understandingly made by Mrs. Pride, then Miss Baker. We have reached our conclusions upon what we believe to be the weight of the evidence. We might conclude this opinion with the statement of fact, found by us to be a fact, that the deed in question was procured by fraud and duress, but, as duress is a mixed question of law and fact, we deem it proper to state the main facts as we gather them from the record leading up to and surrounding the execution of the deed, and our inferences therefrom. In doing this it is not to be expected that we should state, set forth, or discuss many circumstances and incidents and facts appearing in the evidence which tend to fortify the main, controlling, and ultimate facts which lead to the final decision at which we have arrived. We simply state the main facts in connection with the execution of the deed.

D. A. Baker lived in the Fourth civil district of Davidson county. He owned a tract of land of some 90-odd acres, worth about $4,600, on which he lived. He had five children, — the defendant Giles Baker, Mary H. (married Sharp), Howell, Thomas, and complainant Rachel, — the latter, after his death, marrying the complainant Sam R. Pride. He died at his home on this place August 18, 1896, of cancer of the mouth, with which he had been afflicted for some 10 or 12 years. His wife died in October, 1885. All his children had married and moved to themselves long before his death, except his daughter Rachel and his son Thomas, who were living at the home place with him when he died. His daughter Rachel, at the time of his death, was between 21 and 22 years of age, and Thomas some 26 years of age; she had been his constant companion since the death of his wife, and his nurse, cook, and general utility woman during all his affliction. She was his youngest child, a daughter, and unmarried, and he was very fond and devoted to her, and she was faithful and devoted to him. His son Thomas, according to the evidence of some of the witnesses, giving Thomas' version of himself, was a dyspeptic, and according to the clear weight of the evidence was possessed of a very reprehensible character. He was ill-natured, overbearing, and manifested or was given to the exhibition of the traits of a bully and a desperate man. He seemed not to be on amiable terms with his father or any of his brothers and sisters, and it appears that he and his brother Giles had not spoken to each other for years before the death of his father. No excessive love existed between him and his sister Rachel. As before stated, D. R. Baker died at his home on this place August 18, 1896. Several months before, he made a will devising this tract of land to his daughter Rachel. Before his death it appears that the disposition he had made by this will of his property became known to the other children, and was not agreeable to them. The old man was buried on Wednesday, August 19, 1896, the day after his death. At the funeral Mrs. Sharp and Howell informed Giles that the will of his father was an unjust one, and that they would contest it, Mrs. Sharp stating, in effect, that she would sell the dress from her back fighting it, and Howell saying he would spend all he had to set it aside, and requested Giles to so inform Rachel of their purpose in this respect. After the old man was buried, Giles asked Rachel where she was going, and she replied that she supposed she would stay on the pike, meaning at the old home on the pike. He asked her to go home with him from the funeral, and she did so. There is proof tending to show that Giles said at the funeral to one Mrs. Cowgill that he was going to ask Rachel to go home with him, and that, if she did not go willingly, he would use his buggy whip, and make her go. At any rate, she did go home with him, and remained at his home until the following Monday, when she came into Nashville, and executed the deed assailed in this cause. Now, there is some conflict between Giles and Rachel as to what was said as they were going to the home of the former after the burial of the old man. We are satisfied, after a careful analysis of the evidence, that on this trip to his home the subject of the will was brought up, and that she was informed by Giles of the determined purpose of Mrs. Sharp and Howell to set...