Pridemore v. Columbia Gas of Ky., Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-17-DLB |
| Citation | 598 F.Supp.3d 541 |
| Parties | Linda Sue PRIDEMORE, et al., Plaintiffs v. COLUMBIA GAS OF KENTUCKY, INC., et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Randy G. Slone, Timothy C. Bates, Slone & Bates, PSC, Terry D. Jacobs, Jacobs Law Office, Hindman, KY, for Plaintiffs Linda Sue Pridemore, Tommy Lee Caudill.
Andrew F. Gann, Jr., Mitchell D. Diles, McGuire Woods LLP, Richmond, VA, Bethany A. Breetz, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Louisville, KY, Emily Larish Startsman, Stites & Harbison PLLC, Lexington, KY, J. Brian Jackson, McGuireWoods, LLP, Charlottesville, VA, for Defendant Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc.
Jonathan C. Shaw, Porter Banks Baldwin & Shaw, Paintsville, KY, for Defendants Michael Jacobs, Knott County Water & Sewer, Inc., Jared Salmons, Avery Shrum, Lance Jacobs.
Bethany A. Breetz, Stites & Harbison, PLLC, Louisville, KY, Emily Larish Startsman, Stites & Harbison PLLC, Lexington, KY, J. Brian Jackson, McGuireWoods, LLP, Charlottesville, VA, for Defendant NiSource, Inc.
This matter is before the Court on its own motion based on the Court's inherent power and duty to ensure the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are satisfied in all cases. Plaintiff Samantha Campbell initially filed suit in Knott Circuit Court against Defendants. (Doc. # 1 at 1). Defendants Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc. ("CGKY") and its parent company, NiSource, Inc., then removed the action to this Court. (Id. ). On March 17, 2022, the Court entered an Order requiring the parties to submit briefing as to why this Court has jurisdiction over the matter. (Doc. # 5). Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 13). Because Defendants have failed to meet their burden to prove that removal was proper and the Court thus lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, this matter will be remanded to Knott Circuit Court.
This action was originally commenced by Samantha Campbell, as Guardian and Next Friend of Linda Sue Pridemore and Pridemore's son, Tommy Lee Caudill. (Doc. # 1-3 at 2). Eventually Campbell was terminated and replaced with Pridemore and her son as the named Plaintiffs. (Doc. # 1-7 at 19). This dispute centers around a natural gas explosion that destroyed Pridemore's home and severely injured Plaintiffs in February of 2021. (Doc. # 1-7 ¶ 12). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Knott County Water & Sewer, Inc. ("KCW&S") conducted excavation activities that damaged an underground natural gas service line a month prior to the explosion. (Id. ¶ 13). The gas line was owned by Defendant CGKY. (Id. ). Plaintiffs also allege that CGKY was aware of KCW&S's planned excavation and had sent an employee to mark the location of the service line to avoid damage. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16). While the employee did allegedly place flags in front of the Pridemore residence, no other marking took place, which Plaintiffs allege was improper. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 21).
After the gas line was damaged, KCW&S employees allegedly attempted to repair the line, which resulted in a gas leak and the explosion. (Id. ¶¶ 22-25). Plaintiffs allege that KCW&S's repair was improper and inadequate and that its employees were not trained or guided in working on the gas line. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 92-94). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that KCW&S generally breached its duty to prevent injury and damage to Plaintiffs and others through its actions, such as failing to ensure safe repair and replacement of the damaged gas line. (Id. ¶¶ 96-106).
As to CGKY, Plaintiffs allege that its negligence also contributed to the explosion because it knew or should have known that the failure to maintain, monitor, inspect, alter, repair, and mark its pipeline, among other actions, could result in severe injury. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 58). Further, CGKY allegedly breached several duties including maintaining, marking, and detecting damage to its pipelines and training/supervising its employees properly. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 56-63). As a result, Plaintiffs suffered several categories of injuries and damages. (Id. ¶ 65). Additionally, Defendant NiSource is the parent company and owner of CGKY. (Id. ¶ 67). Plaintiffs’ allegations as they relate to NiSource are substantially similar to the ones made against CGKY. (Id. ¶¶ 73-87).
Importantly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants NiSource and CGKY should have known that an excess flow valve ("EFV") could have been installed in the gas line and would have mitigated the damage or even prevented the explosion. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 76). Based upon the mention of an EFV in the Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs’ allegation that the operation of a natural gas pipeline was an "ultra-hazardous activity," Defendants NiSource and CGKY removed the action to this Court by asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 24).
As an initial matter, Defendants—because they are the removing parties—bear "the burden of demonstrating federal jurisdiction, and all doubts should be resolved against removal. " Harnden v. Jayco, Inc. , 496 F.3d 579, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp. , 438 F.3d 544, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2006) ). If removal was improper, the action should be remanded back to the originating state court; the order is not appealable. See Dunch v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pa. , 43 F. App'x. 918, 920 (6th Cir. 2002) () (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer , 423 U.S. 336, 343, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976) ).
A defendant may remove a civil action brought in state court to a federal court embracing the place where such action is pending only if the action is one over which the federal court could have exercised original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over claims "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," commonly referred to as federal-question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Typically, federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by a plaintiff who pleads a cause of action that is created by federal law. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. , 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005). This may include a right of action expressly created by statute, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1983, or a right of action that is implied from a statute, such as the right of private victims of discrimination to sue for violations of Title IX. Id. ; Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677, 688, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). However, "[t]here is ... another longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction," that has been recognized for over a century; that is "in certain cases federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues." Grable , 545 U.S. at 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363. The Court has noted that Gunn v. Minton , 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). However, the Court has strayed from the belief that the mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will open the "arising under" door. Grable , 545 U.S. at 313, 125 S.Ct. 2363.
1. Arising Under
Then, what does open the "arising under" door? That is not a simple question. The Supreme Court has explained that "federal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one , indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum." Grable , 545 U.S. at 313, 125 S.Ct. 2363 (emphasis added). This is not foolproof however as "even when the state action discloses a contested and substantial federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is still subject to possible veto." Id. Federal jurisdiction must still be consistent with "congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331." Id. at 313-14, 125 S.Ct. 2363. Arising-under jurisdiction has the potential to upset "the state-federal line drawn (or at least assumed) by Congress," so much so that even "the presence of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible importance of a federal forum are never necessarily dispositive." Id. at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363 (citing Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 810, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986) ).
In short, there is no magic word to access the federal courthouse, as the Court has not "treated ‘federal issue’ as a password opening federal courts to any state action embracing a point of federal law." Id. The Sixth Circuit has elucidated a three-part test, known as the "substantial-federal-question doctrine," to determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists over a state-law claim: "(1) the state-law claim must necessarily raise a disputed federal issue; (2) the federal interest in the issue must be substantial; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must not disturb any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp. , 501 F.3d 555, 568 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Yet the mere presence of a federal issue alone in a state-law claim is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 565. Lastly, but importantly, this Court is "mindful that state courts are generally presumed competent to interpret and apply federal law." Id. at 560.
Defendants contend that a federal issue is...
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