Pridgen v. Pridgen

• Decision Date: 16 September 1925
• Docket Number: 64.
• Citation: 129 S.E. 419,190 N.C. 102
• Parties: PRIDGEN v. PRIDGEN ET AL.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

129 S.E. 419

190 N.C. 102

PRIDGEN v. PRIDGEN ET AL.

No. 64.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

September 16, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Nash County; Sinclair, Judge.

Proceeding by Annie Pridgen against Sidney Pridgen and others for dower. From a judgment on pleadings for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed for new trial.

Children claiming trust estate in land held by father required to show express agreement by him to use their labor for them, and from it to purchase land in question.

Special proceeding by plaintiff, widow of J. Henry Pridgen, against Sidney Pridgen and others, heirs at law of J. Henry Pridgen deceased, for dower. From a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, defendant appealed. Reversed.

The plaintiff alleged her marriage to J. Henry Pridgen, the death of her husband, and his seizin during coverture of three tracts of land, the Hollingsworth, the Collie and the Vester & Upchurch tracts, and prayed for the admeasurement of dower in usual form. Defendants, who are children of J. Henry Pridgen by a former marriage, admitted the marriage and death of the husband, and that he left surviving him the defendants, his children by both marriages, and, as to the seizin, alleged as follows:

"That so much of said petition as alleges that the said J. Henry Pridgen, during his coverture with the petitioner was seized in fee simple and possessed of the lands described in the petition, is untrue and is denied; the truth in respect to the ownership in said lands is as follows: The said Annie Pridgen is the second wife of the said J. Henry Pridgen; that the said J. Henry Pridgen, as a young man married Thaney Pettiford, and they lived and worked together for more than 20 years, and there were born to them, as children, these defendants, Sidney Pridgen, Charlie Pridgen, Anna Pridgen, who married T. O. Stokes, May Pridgen, and A. B. Pridgen; that the said J. Henry Pridgen was a poor man at the time he was married to the mother of these defendants, and continued so until these defendants had grown up. He then made an agreement with these defendants that if they would remain with him and work with him that he would use the proceeds of their labor in the purchase of a tract of land, and that he would hold said land in trust for these defendants, subject to a life estate in his own favor, and purchase and pay for a tract of land.

In pursuance of said contract and agreement, these defendants did remain with their father and worked hard and faithfuly for him for many years, and out of the profits of their labor was paid the purchase price of the three tracts of land described in the petition, and while the deeds therefor were made to the said J. Henry Pridgen, it was expressly understood in agreement that he was holding the same in trust for these defendants, subject to his life estate, and, when requested by these defendants to do so, would execute to them a deed conveying to them the said land and effectuating said agreement.

That after all of the said tracts of land had been bought and fully paid for, and after the mother of these defendants had died, the said J. Henry Pridgen married his second wife, the petitioner herein, and there were born to him by her one of the second set of children, the other defendants in this action. That after his second marriage, the said J. Henry Pridgen ceased to accumulate property, and became involved in debt."

The plaintiff moved for judgment upon the pleadings, and the cause was heard upon the complaint, answer, and the following deed:

"This indenture made this 10th day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirteen, between J. H. Pridgen of the county of Nash and state of North Carolina, of the first part, and Charley Ransom Pridgen, Ann Elizabeth Stokes, Henry May Pridgen and Al Branch Pridgen, all of the county and state aforesaid. The object and consideration of this conditional deed by J. H. Pridgen, to become valid at his death to the above named children of his, is to give them a certain tract of land to be equally divided between them at his death; that is to say, provided the said J. H. Pridgen is the owner of the land below described, at the time of his death, as follows: One tract of land bounded as follows: On the south by the lands of Lucy Matthews, deceased; on the west by the lands of heirs of Jordan Vester; on north and east, lands of Mrs. Anna B. Bunn, containing one hundred fifteen and one-half acres, more or less. The home tract on which the said J. H. Pridgen now resides."

The following judgment was rendered:

"This cause coming on to be heard before the undersigned judge of the superior court, and being heard upon the complaint and answer and the certain deed made by J. H. Pridgen to certain of his children on May 10, 1913, duly registered, in Nash county, May 25, 1925, which defendants by leave of court offered as part of the answer, after argument of the counsel; and it appearing to the court that the defendants do not ask to reform the deed referred to in the petition; and it further appearing that there is no intimation in the answer of any mistake in the drafting of the deed, or that it was taken by mistake, accident or fraud:

It is considered, adjudged, and ordered that the petitioner is entitled to dower in the lands described in her petition, and that the same be duly allotted to her in the manner prescribed by law."

The defendants who are the children of the marriage of plaintiff and J. Henry Pridgen do not resist plaintiff's claims, and admit that the plaintiff is entitled to dower as sued for, but to this judgment, the defendants, who are the children of J. Henry Pridgen's first marriage, excepted and appealed.

Austin & Davenport, of Nashville, and W. M. Person and W. H. Yarborough, Jr., both of Louisburg, for appellants.

Cooley & Bone, of Nashville, and I. T. Valentine, of Spring Hope, for appellee.

VARSER J.

The plaintiff's motion for judgment upon the answer is, in effect, a demurrer to the answer, and can only prevail when the matters pleaded constitute an admission of plaintiff's cause of action, or are insufficient as a defense, or constitute new matter insufficient in law to defeat plaintiff's claim. Alston v. Hill, 165 N.C. 255, 258, 81 S.E. 291; Churchwell v. Trust Co., 181 N.C. 21, 105 S.E. 889. Under C. S. § 535, we construe the defendants' answer liberally, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. This means that every reasonable intendment must be taken in favor of the pleader, and if the answer contains facts sufficient to constitute a defense, it must be sustained. Hartsfield v. Bryan, 177 N.C. 166, 98 S.E. 379; Parker v. Parker, 176 N.C. 198, 97 S.E. 223; Muse v. Motor Co., 175 N.C. 466, 95 S.E. 900; Wyatt v. Railroad, 156 N.C. 307, 72 S.E. 383; Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N.C. 467, 70 S.E. 947; Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N.C. 104, 73 S.E. 228; Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N.C. 394, 10 S.E. 566; Gregory v. Pinnix, 158 N.C. 147, 73 S.E. 814; Railway Co. v. Main, 132 N.C. 445, 43 S.E. 930; Phifer v. Giles, 159 N.C. 142, 74 S.E. 919; McNinch v. Trust Co., 183 N.C. 33, 41, 110 S.E. 663.

The common-law rule requiring every pleading to be construed against the pleader has been materially modified by C. S. § 535. Sexton v. Farrington, 185 N.C. 339, 117 S.E. 172. Therefore, as against a demurrer, a pleading will be upheld if any part presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense, or if facts sufficient for that purpose can be gathered from it under a liberal yet reasonable construction of its terms. It will not be overthrown unless it is wholly insufficient. Sexton v. Farrington, supra; Blackmore v. Winders, 144 N.C. 212, 56 S.E. 874; Banking & Trust Co. v. Duffy, 156 N.C. 83, 72 S.E. 96; Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N.C. 65, 72 S.E. 1011; Hendrix v. Railroad, 162 N.C. 9, 77 S.E. 1001; Foy v. Foy, 188 N.C. 518, 125 S.E. 115; Churchwell v. Trust Co., supra.

Viewing the defendants' answer in the light of this settled rule of construction, we are constrained to hold that the answer sets up a trust between J. Henry Pridgen and the defendants who are the children of his first marriage which attached to the lands in controversy prior to the marriage of the plaintiff and J. Henry Pridgen, on account of which J. Henry Pridgen was not beneficially seized during plaintiff's coverture, of such an interest in the lands in controversy as was purchased from the profits arising from the labors of these defendants after they became sui juris.

Dower is now, and has been since the Act of March 2, 1867 (Laws 1867, c. 54), the legal right of a widow whose husband dies intestate, or when she dissents from his will, to have allotted to her upon the death of her husband one-third in value of all the lands, tenements, and hereditaments (including both legal and equitable estates) whereof her husband was beneficially seized during the coverture. C. S. § 4100; Allen v. Saunders, 186 N.C. 349, 119 S.E. 486; Thompson v. Thompson, 46 N.C. 430; Chemical Co. v. Walston, 187 N.C. 817, 123 S.E. 196; McGehee v. McGehee, 189 N.C. 558, 127 S.E. 684; Mordecai's Law Lectures, 516, 519; 9 R. C. L. 561; 2 Blackstone, 131; Pollard v. Slaughter, 92 N.C. 72, 53 Am. Rep. 402.

A requisite of seizin is that it must be beneficial, and not a mere naked seizin for the benefit of others. Hendren v Hendren, 153 N.C. 505, 69 S.E. 506, 138 Am. St. Rep. 680; Alexander v. Cunningham, 27 N.C. 430; Thompson v. Crump, 138 N.C. 32, 50 S.E. 457, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514; Gilmore v. Sellars, 145 N.C. 283, 59 S.E. 73; Waller v. Waller, 33 Grat. (74 Va.) 83; McCauley v. Grimes, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 318, 324, 20 Am. Dec. 434; Stanwood v. Dunning, 14 Me. 290; Edmondson v. Welsh, 27 Ala. 578; Redding v. Vogt, 140 N.C. 562, 53 S.E. 337, ...