Priesman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 89357 |
| Citation | 441 Mich. 60,490 N.W.2d 314 |
| Parties | Renee PRIESMAN and Corey Warfield, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MERIDIAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant. , |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
The question presented is whether an underage, unlicensed driver injured while driving his mother's automobile without her knowledge or consent may recover medical benefits from the no-fault insurer of her automobile. We agree with the Court of Appeals that he is entitled to recover no-fault medical benefits, and affirm.
Renee Priesman owned an automobile insured by Meridian Mutual Insurance Company. Her son, Corey Warfield, who was fourteen years old, took the automobile without her permission during the nighttime while she was sleeping. Corey picked up friends, was involved in an automobile accident, and one of his friends was killed. 1
Corey sustained serious and severe bodily injuries, necessitating medical treatment at a hospital. Meridian paid billings by the hospital until six months after the accident, when it informed Priesman that it would not continue to pay because Corey had taken her vehicle without permission.
The circuit judge granted Meridian's motion for summary disposition with regard to Priesman on the ground that she lacked standing, granted a motion to amend the complaint to name Corey as a plaintiff, and granted Meridian's motion to dismiss with respect to Corey because the vehicle had been unlawfully taken. The Court of Appeals reversed. 2
Meridian contended in the circuit court and the Court of Appeals that Corey was not entitled to no-fault medical benefits because an exception in the no-fault act provides that a person is not entitled to no-fault benefits if, at the time of the accident, he is using a vehicle that he had "taken unlawfully." 3 Meridian contended that Corey's taking of his mother's vehicle was "unlawful" because the Penal Code provides that it is a misdemeanor to take or use a vehicle "without authority." 4
The Court of Appeals, observing that Corey had not been charged or convicted, stated that the question was whether the "mere fact of taking without permission by an underage driver who is the son of the owner and lives in the owner's household is 'unlawful' under the no-fault act." 5 The Court observed that the term "unlawful" is not defined in the no-fault act, and said that, under § 3114 6 of the Insurance Code, Corey was entitled to no-fault benefits because he was a relative of his mother domiciled in her household. The Court concluded that Corey did not lose that "entitlement by virtue of using his mother's car without her permission," and that his use was not "unlawful under the no-fault act": "We cannot say that the Legislature intended that § 3113(a) of the act would apply under the circumstances of this case." 7
--those who own vehicles and those who do not;
--those who insure a vehicle they own, and those who do not insure a vehicle that they own, unless a person who does not insure is injured while driving that uninsured vehicle;
--the spouse and a relative domiciled in the same household of an owner of a vehicle without regard to whether the owner has insured the vehicle;
[441 Mich. 65] --passengers, pedestrians, sidewalk gawkers, persons walking, sitting, or lying down in a parking lot or a field, and also those who become involved in a vehicular accident while in a structure
are entitled to recover full medical benefits without regard to fault and without regard to whether they or a family member has paid for no-fault coverage, under Michigan's most comprehensive no-fault act. 12 It is in that context--full medical benefits, unlimited in amount for every person, including even a person who does not insure a vehicle he owns (except when driving that vehicle) and the spouse and relatives domiciled in the household of the owner of an uninsured vehicle even when driving or riding as a passenger in that uninsured vehicle[441 Mich. 66] --that we assess the correctness of Meridian's contention that the Legislature did not intend that Corey recover medical benefits because, when he was fourteen years old, he took his mother's insured vehicle in the middle of the night, while she was sleeping, without her permission.
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, a model act considered by the Legislature when the no-fault act was adopted, excepts from coverage a "converter"--a person who steals--unless covered under a no-fault policy issued to the converter or a spouse or other relative in the same household. 13
Meridian contends that the Legislature, in substituting "unlawfully" for the UMVARA language excepting uninsured converters from no-fault coverage, intended to except from no-fault coverage not only those who convert, but also joyriders like Corey, who was not a "converter" because he did not intend to steal and, thus, would not have been excepted under the UMVARA even if his mother was not insured.
While this is, indeed, arguable, the argument does not consider that there may be other explanations for the failure to adopt the UMVARA language.
The UMVARA exception permits, as Meridian acknowledges, a thief to recover no-fault benefits while driving the stolen vehicle if he is covered by insurance he purchased or by insurance purchased by his spouse or relative in the same household. The Legislature, in rejecting the language of the UMVARA exception, apparently decided to except from no-fault coverage a thief driving a stolen vehicle even if he or a spouse or relative had contributed to the no-fault pool of money.
The legislative purpose, in rejecting the UMVARA language, was thus to except from no-fault coverage thieves while driving stolen vehicles even if they or a spouse or relative had purchased no-fault insurance, and not necessarily to except joyriders from coverage. At the same time, the Legislature simplified the complex verbiage of the no-fault exception, 14 and thereby avoided litigation concerning what constitutes "conversion," a term of art in criminal and personal property law. That, in substituting "taken unlawfully" for "converts," the Legislature did not intend any substantial difference in scope or meaning from the prototypical UMVARA concept excepting thieves from no-fault coverage, appears to be the view of Judge Keeton and Professor Widiss, who read the Michigan provision as excepting a person injured in an automobile that he has "stolen." 15
Legislators generally are also parents and sometimes grandparents. Some may have had experience with children, grandchildren, nephews, nieces, and children of friends who have used a family vehicle without permission. Some may have themselves driven a family vehicle without permission.
We are not persuaded that legislators, sitting at a drafting session, concluded that the evil against which the UMVARA exception was aimed was not adequate because it did not cover teenagers who "joyride" in their parents' automobiles, especially automobiles covered by no-fault insurance, in the context that countless persons would be entitled, under the legislation they were drafting, to no-fault benefits without regard to whether they are obliged to purchase no-fault insurance or, if obliged to insure, do in fact do so. 16
It appears that in the twenty years since no-fault automobile insurance legislation was first enacted, no appellate court has decided that a person like Corey is not entitled to medical benefits.
Affirmed.
Respectfully, I dissent. The majority departs from the clear and unambiguous language of § 3113(a) of the no-fault act 1 to reach a result contrary to both its language and its legislative history. Because I conclude that coverage was excluded under the circumstances of this case, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 2
Because Corey Warfield is a relative of the insured, domiciled in the same household, he would ordinarily be eligible for the payment of personal protection insurance benefits under § 3114(1) of the act. 3 However, § 3113(a) provides an exclusion:
"A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:
"(a) The person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." M.C.L. § 500.3113; M.S.A. § 24.13113. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court found Corey's taking and use of his mother's car unlawful under the joyriding statute 4 and held that he was excluded from coverage under § 3113(a). However, despite the clear and unambiguous language of both § 3113(a) and the joyriding statute, the majority holds that the exclusion does not apply in this case, finding, in effect, a "family member" exception to both provisions. I disagree.
The no-fault act does not define "unlawfully." Where a word used is not defined in a statute, that word is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 5 According to one commonly used source, the word "unlawful" means "contrary to or prohibited by law; not authorized or justified by...
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